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What do we mean when we refer to world? How does world relate to the hu-
man person? Are the two interdependent, and, if so, in what way? What is the 
world at hand for an ethnographer? Much has been said of worlds and world-
views, but are we really certain that we know what we mean when we use these 
words? 
his book is centrally concerned with exploring the conditions of possibility 
of the ethnographic gesture and, by implication, with ethnographic theory and 
the debates that presently ire it. he important changes that have occurred over 
the past two decades concerning the way in which we relate human cognition 
with humanity’s embodiedness strongly suggest that we are on the threshold 
of a new conceptualization of the human condition—a new anthropology—
that breaks away from the sociocentric and representationalist constraints that 
plagued the social sciences throughout the twentieth century. his essay is a 
contribution toward that momentous change.
I myself have a long career as an ethnographer, and that is what, over the 
years, moved me to engage with theory. Consequently, most of what I have 
written here is directly informed by the three long-term ethnographic projects 
I have carried out over the decades (rural NW Portugal, 1986; urban Eurasians 
in south China, 2002a; naming systems in NE Brazil, with V. Silva 2013). All 
of them have been centrally engaged with contemporaneity, in contexts where 
modernity was the order of the day, and where globalization was everywhere 
present. Whether by chance or design, the fact is I was never allowed to enter-
tain the primitivistic fancies that continue to enthrall so many of our colleagues. 
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his led me very early on to place a central focus on historicism as part of 
ethnography, on the one hand, and on its political signiicance, on the other. 
having irst encountered anthropology in South Africa during the period of 
apartheid and then moved to postrevolutionary Portugal, I was from the outset 
convinced of the political and moral worth of the ethnographic enterprise—not 
as a direct instrument of resistance against exploitation and oppression (as some 
of my teachers espoused), but as a necessary means for debunking hegemonic 
truths, among them racist and classist convictions and imperialist lies.
he ethnographic empiricism that has marked my intellectual path is some-
thing that I cherish and which I mean to continue to pursue in the future. 
Nevertheless, from the very beginning, I have been struck by the fact that ethno-
graphic description cannot be undertaken without the support of comparative 
analysis and of anthropological (and, more broadly, social scientiic) theoretical 
elaboration. here is something dishonest—or, better phrased, unfortunate—
about writing ethnography as if (a) one could dispense with theory or (b) one 
were the irst ethnographer to visit “my people.” In particular, one is struck by 
the transparent delusion of those among our colleagues who manage to con-
vince themselves that they no longer need to engage honestly with the history 
of the discipline! over the years, I have systematically pursued these convictions 
and today I ind myself writing a book that in many ways traces the paths where 
that constant engagement with theoretical and ethnographic history has led me.
he starting point here was to make sense of the notion of world. he con-
cept became central to anthropology ever since Paul Veyne’s study of the at-
titudes of classical greeks toward their myths impacted our discipline ([1983] 
1988). But, in the mid-2000s, it became apparent that serious confusions were 
being espoused. We needed to go back to the drawing board. his was par-
ticularly evident the moment anthropological thinking came to be inluenced 
by neurophenomenology and the philosophers who propose radical embodied 
cognition. one could perceive there the glimpse of a sophisticated new path 
out of the in-de-siècle idealist disposition, and the corresponding self-serving 
paternalism, that besieged anthropology during the 1990s and 2000s. Suddenly, 
the poststructuralist eforts of our teachers in oxford in the late 1970s came to 
appear increasingly relevant.
hus, when I took up donald davidson in the late 1990s, the idea was 
to ind a path from his epistemologically clear waters toward the more murky 
waters of phenomenology that I would inevitably have to navigate if I wanted 
to study personhood, presence, and transcendence. Supported by his advice 
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(davidson 2005), at no point did I worry about mixing diferent inspirations 
or picking and choosing concepts and arguments from diverse sources, so long 
as they stood well together. my goal was clear: to produce a minimal realist 
anthropological account that both safeguards the ethnographic task and illumi-
nates the human condition.
It was not until I started moving from chapter to chapter that some of the 
central arguments of the book emerged. As the title suggests, the starting point 
was an examination of world as it is to be found in the work of our contempo-
rary colleagues (chapter 1, “World”). hat led directly to an encounter with the 
challenge of transcendence, as it continues to be one of the more contentious 
sides of our discipline. It became apparent that, although many of us chose 
to ignore it, contemporary anthropology remains deeply indebted to Evans-
Pritchard’s struggles with faith, augury, and witchcraft at midcentury. hus, I 
was led to his inspiration in r. g. Collingwood’s thought and to the onto-
logical Proof of god’s existence (chapter 2, “transcendence”). transcendence 
raises the issue of imagination. Sartre and Evan hompson were the inspira-
tions for a move beyond representationalist approaches, in search of the limits 
of imagination (chapter 3, “Imagination”). In turn, that implied a revisitation 
of Wittgenstein’s impact on my oxford teachers in the 1970s and on the work 
of the contemporary philosophers who are exploring radical embodied cogni-
tion (chapter 4, “Person”). finally, the argument came together in an attempt to 
show that personhood and world correspond but that metaphysical pluralism is 
the abiding condition (chapter 5, “Worldview”). In the course of the narrative, 
some discussions and concepts are reencountered time and again as they be-
come increasingly clariied. his is the case, for example, with the central difer-
entiation between intentionality and propositionality, with personal ontogeny, 
with personhood and presence, with cohabitation, with ontological weight, with 
retentivity, with the ethnographic gesture, and with relation and relatedness.
In writing the book, I was obliged to dialogue with concepts and argu-
ments originating in very many and very diverse disciplines (neuropsychol-
ogy, phenomenology, critical philosophy, analytical philosophy, developmental 
psychology, physics, human geography, political science, etc.). here is noth-
ing surprising about this, as social anthropology has ever been open to broad 
intellectual inspiration—indeed, this is one of the more appealing facets of 
our disciplinary tradition. It is notably the case during moments, such as our 
present one, when we need to break with the established grooves of received 
wisdom in order to address some central quandary. he result is that this book 
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is punctuated by words and arguments that many readers may ind unfamiliar. 
he reader should not stop reading upon encountering an unfamiliar concept, 
as I have made a point of proposing deinitions for all of the central concepts 
explored in the book. for reasons of narrative economy, however, these deini-
tions are not always to be found at the point of irst encounter with the concept.
In attempting to achieve an anthropology of person and world, I have un-
earthed three central aspects of each of them that respond in broad terms to the 
way in which our analysis of sociality has evolved: 
(i)  the world embraces humans as a source due to their capacity to address it 
intentionally (i.e., with purpose), thus initiating worlding; 
(ii)  as, in becoming persons, humans acquire a presence, they start confront-
ing the world perspectivally as a domain, so the world encompasses them 
dyadically; 
(iii)  and, inally, with the rise of propositional thinking, the world is divided by 
symbols into a myriad of intrinsically plural entities. relations emerge out 
of the containment imposed by the limits of propositionality.
transcendence is our privilege as persons; it is what allows us to see the world 
as creation, a world which includes us. Yet, owing to this very personal tran-
scendence, metaphysical pluralism is not reducible. from an anthropological 
perspective, the ambivalence of world that heidegger identiied (its uncertainty, 
its fuzziness, its indeterminacy) cannot and should not be resolved; it remains 
with us as a challenge, for it is a central conditioning feature of the emergence of 
persons in world. In his own distinct mode of speaking, davidson called it “the 
anomaly” (2004: 121). Ethnography—an examination of humans carried out by 
persons in ontogeny—must learn to operate within that condition, frustrating 
as it may at times be. 
I hope, thus, to have contributed toward creating the space of possibility 
for an ethnographic theory for the twenty-irst century that remains essentially 
realist and within the parameters of the broader scientiic project, but that opens 
up new pathways for the continued conceptual incorporation of ever-new eth-
nographic evidence. he anthropology here proposed is not one that belongs 
to greeks or trojans, but one that leaves itself open in human history to ever-
widening levels of ecumenical incorporation. he beauty of ethnography as a 
scientiic method is that it calls on its practitioners to remain fully, participat-
ingly human; never to attempt to rise above our common human history, what-
ever it may come to be.
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chapter one
World
Anthropologists, historians, and qualitative sociologists often take recourse to 
the word world as if its meaning were self-evident. While, indeed, it might be 
argued that the broad enterprise of science is nothing but a study of world, 
the word remains highly ambivalent, often extending its meaning in a peril-
ously polysemic fashion in the course of any single debate. When we describe 
some feature of the “world of the Nyakyusa” (Wilson 1951), which difers from 
that of other peoples, the meaning of the word is rather distant from that giv-
en to it by philosophers when they speak of “world-involving sentient activ-
ity” (Hutto and Myin 2013: 157); the same applies when we oppose home to 
world ( Jackson 1995), or when we talk of social world, as Bourdieu so often did 
(e.g., 1991). How do these meanings combine? Is world still a useful category 
for ethnographers?
Of late, as it happens, the category has been playing a rather crucial role in 
anthropological debates. Tim Ingold, for instance, predicates one of his semi-
nal arguments with the statement, “People do not import their ideas, plans or 
mental representations into the world, since the very world . . . is the homeland 
of their thoughts’ (1995: 76). Here, we can assume that Ingold means by world 
something akin to Martin Heidegger’s “the manifestness of beings as such as a 
whole” ([1929/30] 1995: 304), in short, everything that there is. So, the meaning 
of the word would difer from a more socially localized one, as in “the world of 
the Nyakyusa.” And yet that leaves out the main perplexity posed by Ingold’s 
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sentence: there being many ways of deciding what there is, which one should 
his reader adopt?
hese perplexities have haunted the social sciences for a very long time. 
twentieth-century anthropologists ranged from those who espoused more or 
less unsophisticated forms of realism to those who adopted semiotic ideal-
isms. on the one hand, for example, there was max gluckman’s positivism 
or marvin harris’ materialism; on the other, there was the kind of idealism 
that James Boon and david Schneider argued for in the 1970s when they pro-
posed “liberating” kinship as a “cultural semantic ield” from “sociofunctional 
prerequisites,” granting it “an autonomous integrity analyzable in its own right” 
(Boon and Schneider 1974: 814). here is a dichotomist propensity at work 
in anthropological theory that makes it somehow safer to adopt either one 
or the other extreme. In midcentury England, this was largely represented by 
Evans-Pritchard’s radical rejection of the durkheimian positivism of his pre-
decessors in his 1949 marett lecture, “Social anthropology: Past and present” 
(1962), and was long instanced in the oxford versus Cambridge divide. But the 
dichotomist propensity continued: once more, in the 1980s, American post-
modernist interpretivism reengaged it; and then, in the 2000s, perspectivism 
brought it back all over again. to opt for a starting point such as roy Wagner’s 
“man invents his own realities” (1975: ix) is to engage a dangerous truism, for 
whilst in one sense this is a veriiable observation, in another sense it leads us 
profoundly astray, pushing to secondary level the central fact that our existence 
(and all human communication) is predicated on the inhabiting of a largely 
common world.
over the past four decades, as I proceeded with my own ethnographic 
projects,1 I could not help but feel that we had to overcome this dichotomist 
propensity, as it was both intellectually reductive and ethically unviable. his 
book constitutes an attempt to articulate the structure of the concept of world 
(cf. frankfurt 2009: 2) as it is being used in contemporary anthropological de-
bates with the primary aim of developing a theoretical approach toward the 
possibility of the ethnographic gesture. he book proposes a view concerning 
world that aims at overcoming the efects of the all-or-nothing fallacy that so 
often dominates anthropological theorization, that is, “the fallacy of reasoning 
from the fact that there is nothing we might not be wrong about to the conclu-
sion that we might be wrong about everything” (davidson 2001: 45).
1. See www.pina-cabral.org for a review of these projects.
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our inquiry here is diferent from martin heidegger’s question in his fa-
mous lecture course of 1929/30 (1995): “what is world?” It difers in that we 
do not ask about the essence of world or its entities; rather, we aim to lay out 
the conditions of possibility for the ethnographic gesture. our inquiry is about 
“the world which is present at hand” to the ethnographer. As foucault put it 
concerning Kant’s Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, our aim is rather 
“not the description of what man is but what he can make of himself ” ([1961] 
2008: 52). 
hus, as ethnographers, we do not ask “is there world?” but, in the wake of 
Wittgenstein’s inspiration, we ask “what world are we engaging?” his book, 
therefore, examines the everyday blurred concept of world that is a permanent 
component of all human engagement. our starting point is that, for the persons 
ethnographers engage with, there is world; persons live with the assumption 
of world. his being the case, world is an evidence for ethnographers and what 
we are called to do as anthropologists is to see how world works out for us—
whether or not there “actually” is world. As it happens, in any case, one is bound 
to agree with Sean gaston—who has written a history of the concept of world 
since Kant—that it is pointless to try to avoid the experience that humans have 
of being “in media res, a inding oneself in the midst, in the middle of a relation 
to an indeinite and ungraspable beginning and end” (2013: 161) After all, this 
too was Kant’s founding concern in his Anthropology. 
herefore, and since we are not metaphysicians but anthropologists, it would 
be pointless for me to deny world, because the evidence of its role in human so-
ciality is such that we would be denying our vocation. And as to the worthiness 
of the anthropological endeavor, that is, I am afraid, a judgment that we must 
answer historically rather than metaphysically. he worthiness of anthropology 
(and of ethnographic methodology) can only be assessed by what it has allowed 
us to see over the years about the world we live in, the world amidst which 
we cannot but be. herefore, we cannot grant much authority on that matter 
to metaphysicians when they deny world (e.g., gabriel 2015). finally, most of 
these philosophical debates on world start and inish with language. Since all 
of us are persons, there is nothing surprising about that. But it does mean that 
we allow ourselves to fall into anthropocentrism, and that is something that our 
very ethical constitution as humans does not recommend that we do.
As humans, we are also animals, and the world in the midst of which we can-
not but ind ourselves has a lot to do with the world of the animal that we also 
continue to be—that we are, note, not were. So, we have to see that, language 
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being ours, we have means to inscribe things in the world that our coevals of 
other species do not, but we broadly share with them many of these things, for 
animals too are in the midst of world. here we must agree with today’s vital ma-
terialists (e.g., Bennett 2010 or Connolly 2011) that our very humanity obliges 
us to de-anthropocentrify. In short, even although it will always be developed 
within language, an anthropological examination of world cannot be bound by 
the limits of language, for the world as a condition antedates historically and 
remains beyond language. 
herefore, while this book is concerned with the world of persons, we can-
not discard or reduce the signiicance of what heidegger calls “the compara-
tive examination” ([1929/1930] 1995: 176–78). In fact, his three theses—that a 
stone has no world, that an animal is poor in world, and that a human is world 
forming—help us focus on an important characteristic of some of the debates 
that have been iring of late the interdisciplinary understanding of human exist-
ence. hey must be understood as a broad formulation of the principal levels of 
diferentiation in the relation with world. 
In the wake of Bruno latour, there are many who question not only that 
humans are the only world-forming agents but also that stones have no world. 
People such as Jane Bennett have argued convincingly in favor of the need “to 
undo the conceit that humanity is the sole or ultimate well-spring of agency” 
(2010: 30). Similarly, William Connolly sustains that we live in an “immanent 
world of becoming,” and thus he decries what he calls “the anthropic exception,” 
that is, the “radical break between humanity and other processes” (2011: 31). 
one is bound to agree broadly with these thinkers, but one has to admit that 
heidegger’s theses—while they cannot be taken on board today in the precise 
way they were phrased—do outline three broad conditions of diferentiation be-
fore the world that impose themselves. hese conditions of diferentiation must 
be seen as levels of emergence in the sense that Jagdish hattiangadi (2005) has 
memorably proposed. hus, I ind it impossible to follow Bennett’s diktat that 
we must “bracket the question of the human” (2010: ix), for that is precisely 
what anthropology cannot do, since human personhood is a level of emergence: 
that is, it gives rise to a stable whole that, once it has arisen, can be seen as self-
perpetuating in the sense that it can only be understood to the extent that it 
interacts with itself (hattiangadi 2005: 88). 
It is hardly a matter of “placing humans at the ontological centre or hierar-
chical apex” (Bennett 2010: 11), but it is a matter of understanding the speciic 
characteristics of human emergence as a self-perpetuating facet of the world. 
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to do that we have to engage with the nature of personhood, since only persons 
can engage in propositional thinking and, therefore, address the world as world. 
ours is not a generic human condition; it is the condition of historically speciic 
persons in ontogeny.2 our world is not only human; it is personal—and there is 
a speciicity to that which is irreducible in the sense that hattiangadi proposes 
when he claims that “though a whole is always composed of its parts, sometimes 
the types of things that constitute the parts cannot be fully described in all 
causally relevant respects without describing how they interact with the types 
of things that are wholes as wholes that are composed out of them” (2005: 89). 
In short, as the human world operates conjointly at all three levels of emer-
gence (material, animal, and personal), we have to be attentive to the “ambiva-
lent character of the concept of world,” the standpoint from which heidegger 
starts his questioning ([1929/30] 1995: 177f.). In consequence, that is also the 
essential point of departure to what follows. much like heidegger and davidson 
(2004: 121), we do not aim to abolish the ambivalence of the “anomaly”; rather, 
we aim to contribute toward its further unveiling. his book proposes an out-
look on world that allows both for the universalist hopes of the anthropological 
endeavor within the broader project of science and for the particularistic de-
mands of ethnographic practice. 
A mINImAlISt rEAlISm
of late, anthropological theory has been oscillating between two alternative 
options concerning world forming. here are those who follow a metaphysical 
path in proposing to reenchant the world, with all of the rhetorical charm that 
goes with such excesses (Viveiros de Castro [2009] 2014; Kohn 2013); there are 
others, such as myself, who have opted to stick to the more pedestrian path of 
building a scientiic analysis of what it is to be human in the world, for which 
you have to assume that all humans share common paths of humanity and of 
animality, and that only within these paths does it make sense to be a social 
scientist at all. Social analysis is carried out by persons in ontogeny, and it is to 
be received by persons in ontogeny. Verisimilitude, therefore, is an indispensable 
feature of all successful sociological or anthropological description, as any social 
2. for the history of the concept of personal ontogeny, see toren (1990, 1993, 1999, 
2002, 2012).
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scientist who has had to defend a Ph.d. thesis well knows. And verisimilitude 
depends on assuming the background of a common human world. his ap-
proach is, no doubt, less exciting from a rhetorical point of view because it 
obliges us to the constant exercise of critical attention implied in the fact that 
we are always part of what we observe and that there are insuperable limits to 
certainty.
As such, this book proposes a realism that is minimalist to the extent 
that it sees persons as capable of engaging the world in very diverse manners 
(cf. lynch 1998). humans are part of the world and respond to its afordances 
like the members of other species,3 but they do so in a particular way. like other 
animals, we too can only make meaning in a social way, but unlike them, we 
develop propositional (symbolic) thinking. his means that we are capable of 
contemplating our position vis-à-vis world. Yet we do so only in as much as we 
develop personhood. 
We cannot, therefore, discuss world without considering “for whom.” But, 
as we will demonstrate, contrary to the belief of those who succumb to the all-
or-nothing fallacy, this minimal realist position is perfectly compatible with a 
single-world ontology based on a nonrepresentational approach to cognition 
of the kind espoused by donald davidson in his late writings, where he devel-
ops further his notion of “anomalous monism” inspired by Spinoza’s thought 
(cf. 2005: 295–314). Anthropologists would do well to pay greater attention to 
davidson’s interpretivist rereading of W. V. Quine’s critique of understanding, 
for it provides a ready escape route for many of the quandaries concerning mind, 
knowledge, and belief which have haunted anthropological theory since Evans-
Pritchard’s days and which were brought to a skeptical paroxysm in rodney 
Needham’s Belief, language, and experience (1972).
Essentially, davidson’s view is that “there is a single ontology, but more than 
one way of describing and explaining the items in the ontology” (2004: 121, 
our emphasis). he describes the emergent properties resulting from personal 
constitution in history as an “anomaly”—that is, although “mental entities are 
identical, taken one at a time, with physical entities,” “there are no strictly law-
like correlations” between the two (ibid.). taken in its broadest deinition, this 
3. Cf. davidson: “It may be that not even plants could survive in our world if they did 
not to some extent react in ways we ind similar to events and objects that we ind 
similar. his clearly is true of animals; and of course it becomes more obvious the 
more like us the animal is” (2001: 202).
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“anomaly,” to use davidson’s quaint expression, is common to all animals, but its 
efects are again signiicantly potentiated by the emergence of human proposi-
tional (symbolic) thinking.4 We must steer of our propensity to indulge in the 
all-or-nothing fallacy: humans are not only social, they are also persons who 
can appreciate that their own selves are part of the world—to that extent they 
are world forming. hus, for a minimal realist, the relation between personhood 
and world is fundamental.
for some, like Connolly, this emphasis on the “anomaly” is incorrect: “he 
line between agency and cause is historically linked to Cartesian and Kantian 
contrasts between human beings invested with the powers of free will and non-
human force-ields susceptible to explanation through nonagentic causes. But 
the powers of self-organization expressed to varying degrees in open systems of 
diferent types translate that irst disjunction into a matter of degree” (Connolly 
2011: 173). one is obliged to agree with him concerning the mind/body duality. 
Indeed humans share with other species the intentional forms of thinking. But 
one cannot follow him concerning the possibility to conceive of the person as 
separate from the world (here called “presence”), which is a function of propo-
sitional, human-speciic thinking (cf. hutto and myin 2013). Broadly deined, 
heidegger’s “poorer” world of animals corresponds to a level of emergence, but 
the personal condition of humans corresponds to yet another. here is a his-
torical supervenience of one on the other, for the animal condition supervenes 
on materiality and the personal condition on animality. As hattiangadi put it, 
“looking at a new entity as emergent is to focus on its novelty against the back-
ground history of the substrate that precedes it” (2005: 94). Emergence in this 
sense occurs in world but involves a change of aspect of world for the entities 
that emerge.
my hope in writing this book is that, from such a historicist perspective, we 
can bypass the all-or-nothing fallacy and the dichotomistic propensity of an-
thropological epistemology, which ontologist idealism again rehashed over the 
past decade, and develop the bases for a truly ecumenist anthropological theory. By 
that I mean one that works toward a common anthropological ield of debate, 
one which all humans can access should they so desire.
4. As will be clariied further in chapter 3, “propositional” is here being used in a sense 
approximate to the meaning given to “symbolic” by the older Peirce (Short 2007; 
cf. hutto and myin 2013). 
8 World: AN ANthroPologICAl ExAmINAtIoN
thE Word
today, the more general acceptation of the word world is “what exists,” that is, eve-
rything. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, however, the main reference 
is to the planet Earth. he etymological root of the word lies in the old English 
word woruld, meaning “human existence, the afairs of life”; itself derived from 
the Proto-germanic *weraldiz, a combination of the words for “man” (*veraz; 
related to latin vir) and “age” (*aldiz, meaning age, generation), thus implying 
“the age of man.” further to be considered is that both the latin mundus and the 
greek kosmos bore etymologically connotations of order, cleanliness, and neatness.
It is important to realize that the etymological connotations we have just 
briely outlined have not lost their relevance today. for example, when people 
claim that the most pressing problem of our time is humanity’s relation to a 
world that can no longer be taken as ininitely robust and inexhaustible, what 
meaning are they placing on the word? In this context, the limited meaning of 
planet Earth is not suicient by any means but the meaning “all that exists” also 
falls short. on the other hand, the further implications that emerge from the 
etymology, concerning humanity’s dwelling place and an ordered context for 
human habitation, are decidedly at stake. here are lessons to be learned from 
the word’s polysemy and, as we will see, world’s ambivalence will eventually turn 
out to be impossible to cast aside.
however, owing to the importance of the legacy of Christianity in the 
development of the scientiic tradition in Western Europe, the word has ab-
sorbed into itself the notion of man’s fallen condition. As such, the world—that 
which presently exists—has come to be opposed to that which is yet to occur: 
Christ’s second coming. his range of meanings is condensed in the notion of 
mundane; a notion that conjoins in a millenarian fashion two very separate but 
metonymically related meanings: (a) everyday humdrum existence and (b) that 
which is not divine, spiritual, heavenly, and is therefore assumed to be shal-
low, false, doubtful, even irregular (as when, in french,  the vice squad is called 
police mondaine). he conjoining of the two carries within itself a world-denying 
implication that facilitates the dualist strains in European thinking and is best 
represented by descartes’ radical philosophical restart—his cogito ergo sum dec-
laration—that is so fundamental to the development of the modern scientiic 
tradition. A somewhat diferent type of dualism concerning the deception of 
the senses also plays a central role in the Buddhist traditions and has remained 
globally very inluential. In fact, historically, it constituted a major source of 
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tension with China’s Confucian school, which is probably the least world deny-
ing of the major philosophical traditions.
herefore, for contemporary anthropologists, after the profound epistemolog-
ical changes that took place in mid-twentieth-century philosophy, the best way of 
going about discovering what is world is surely to see how it presents itself in peo-
ple’s historically situated lives. Note, we did not write, “what meaning the word 
has for the people we study,” as ethnographers are prone to put it, for that is only 
part of the issue. A small shift in meaning is being performed here that should 
not be silenced. davidson and the late Wittgenstein are surely correct when they 
state that triangulation with world is an indispensable component of all acts of 
human communication. herefore, our research concerning world cannot be lim-
ited to the collecting of the meanings of the word world, the category world, or 
even less the belief world. World exists and is immanent (in the sense of imposing 
itself—Connolly 2011), so world is anterior to language and is a condition for it, 
both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. hus, “the accessibility of beings” is 
an intrinsic condition of all human communication (heidegger [1929/30] 1995: 
269), including when the latter deals with world, such as our present discussion.
We are bound to cast aside the dualist suspicions concerning the world’s 
reality that characterized both the Christian and the Buddhist traditions, and 
which were based on a systematic distrust of the senses, for they were victims of 
the all-or-nothing fallacy. We follow davidson in claiming that, “If words and 
thoughts are, in the most basic cases, necessarily about the sorts of objects and 
events that commonly cause them, there is no room for Cartesian doubts about 
the independent existence of such objects and events” (2001: 45; see godlove 
1996). If, in this way, we reject the duality between shape and substance, then 
all our communication is based on an always-anterior existence of world: “We 
do not irst form concepts and then discover what they apply to; rather, in the 
basic cases, the application determines the content of the concept” (davidson 
2001: 196). herefore, we must never abstract from history: irreversibility and 
unpredictability are constitutive characteristics of the human condition in this 
world of becoming (cf. Arendt 1958: 233).
BASIC mINd ANd SCAffoldEd mINd
today, we are pressed to avoid the twentieth-century proneness to entertain a 
metaphysics of society, to consider sociality in an abstract fashion as something 
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that exists in terms of the species or of groupness aside from personhood. hu-
man sociality remains ever bound to the interactions of singular embodied per-
sons. furthermore, as george lakof and mark Johnson (1999) have argued for 
category formation, and rodney Needham (1987) has discovered for duality, our 
own body experience (of containment and of handedness, respectively) is con-
stitutive of our most basic mental properties. for an ethnographer, therefore, to 
study the varied ways in which humans are “at home in the world” is to study the 
particular conditions of their existence as speciic human persons who encounter 
each other conjointly in space-times that are common to them to the extent that 
they are historically speciic, that is, space-times that transport a history of hu-
man sociality within which each participant of the company came into being.5 
Inhabiting the world as persons is not only to be of the world or to be di-
rected at the world, as in the philosophical meaning of the word intentionality. 
for persons who have entered into language (in the broader sense of the term), 
as opposed to the other animals, inhabiting the world is confronting the world 
formatively, in the sense of thinking propositionally. hus, we must be mindful of 
the distinction that daniel hutto sets up between intentional thinking, which 
humans share with other species (basic mind), and propositional thinking in 
language, which is speciic to humans (scafolded mind): 
he very possibility of conceptual meaning, even in the case of phenomenality, 
requires an intersubjective space. Acknowledging this entails no denial of the 
existence of nonconceptual, noncontentful experiences with phenomenal prop-
erties associated with basic minds.  .  .  . our facility with concepts about such 
experiences is parasitic on a more basic literacy in making ordinary claims about 
public, worldly items. . . . he acquisition of such conceptual abilities depends 
on being able to have and share basic experiences with others. (hutto and myin 
2013: 173) 
In short, persons inhabit the world in both intentional and propositional ways, 
which means that they are in permanent ontogenesis—that is, they work relex-
ively at the fabrication of their own singularity. 
Note that we are not limiting propositional thinking to the boundaries of 
“conscious/linguistic” thinking, an error that has dogged anthropological theory 
5. I ind Ingold’s “dwelling perspective” an interesting formulation of what may be 
involved here (1995: 75–77).
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throughout the past century. he world feeds back on humans the ontogenet-
ic actions of earlier humans in ways that they cannot foresee—the notion of 
scafolding of mind is, in this regard, usefully evocative of what humans do in 
the course of their lives. he notion originated in studies of skill acquisition 
(including language acquisition—gibson 1979) and is dependent on the con-
cept of afordances. hese are deined as relations between an animal’s purpo-
siveness and the environment’s features, giving rise to meaning (see Chemero 
2003). In speaking of scafolded mind, we are generalizing the proposition that 
learning is essentially a process not of imitation but of participation in tasks in 
a world where afordances are shared.6 
humans invest their meanings in the world (they reify meaning) and then 
interact with these reiications—theirs and other people’s. Even if I am alone, I 
permanently interact with the traces of others; I encounter the traces of earlier 
persons as afordances with which I engage in my own processes of meaning 
creation: in this way, being-in-the-world turns out to be always being-with-
others, as heidegger insisted. In their sensorial immediacy, these afordances 
both provide alternatives to meaning and shape meaning, in that they com-
municate their properties by relation to available routines (lupton 2015: 623). 
Indeed, the very development of problem solving and skill acquisition in chil-
dren is a process of scafolding, to the extent that adults provide the child with 
pathways for problem solving (see Wood, Bruner, and ross 1976: 90).7
Yet, even although the world feeds back on humans the meanings they in-
vested in it, the ambiguity of world will never vanish. We can only create mean-
ing because we know that things might not be; meaning is veridical and, to that 
extent, it is fuzzy—for it is based in constant error assessment. two important 
corollaries can be taken from this: irst, we are subject to the indeterminacy of 
interpretation, that is, no meaning will ever be ixed or permanently determina-
ble; second, we are subject to underdetermination, that is, there will never be cer-
tainty in knowing. his is what davidson meant when he claimed that he was 
a “monist” (there is one single ontology) but that his monism was anomalous, 
6. “Scafolding supports higher-order thinking, which begins in socially mediated 
interactions and gradually becomes part of an individual’s cognition” (Belland and 
drake 2013: 904).
7. his formulation covers many of the implications of latour’s concept of 
“interobjectivity” (1996), which proposes that, in human sociality as opposed 
to animal sociality, subjects and objects coexist in forming human/nonhuman 
collectives.
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for world will ever remain indeterminate and underdetermined, that is, it will 
remain historically plural.
he person is born as a member of the human species but is not born fully 
human, as it is only in the course of ontogenesis that the person enters into 
humanity. We are neurologically equipped with a propensity to enter the world 
of human communication and to remain within it through memory—this con-
stitutes primary intersubjectivity. But, in order to enter into the world of human 
communication (to acquire a scafolded mind and engage in symbolic thinking), 
we have to be enticed into humanity by other humans who had already been en-
ticed by others before them, and so on and so forth back to the gradual and dis-
creet origins of the human species—this constitutes secondary intersubjectivity.
Primary intersubjectivity goes on occurring for the rest of our lives. “Non-
verbal responding, quite generally, only involves the having of intentional—but 
not propositional—attitudes” (hutto 2008: xiii). But, through the immersion in 
the complex communicational environments of early ontogeny and the relations 
of mutuality by means of which carers capture and are captured by children, 
young humans develop a secondary intersubjectivity that operates above pri-
mary intersubjectivity. It is by intersubjectively engaging in “unscripted conver-
sational exchanges” (ibid.: 136)—leading to secondary intersubjectivity—that 
humans acquire the central propositional attitudes of belief and desire. hus, 
children are driven away from infant solipsism by participating in complex com-
municational contexts where viewpoints clash and where they are subjected to a 
series of diverse unscripted narratives and explanations (in short, company). he 
very idea that it may be possible to inhabit the world in solitude is ludicrous—
as davidson famously put it, “the possibility of thought comes with company” 
(2001: 88). his sentence constitutes perhaps the central guideline to the argu-
ments developed in this book.
As it happens, my own ethnography of personal naming among secondary 
school children in Bahia (NE Brazil) encouraged me to focus on the multiple 
processes of scafolding of mind, strongly conirming the outlook on person-
hood briely sketched above, to which we will return in the course of this book. 
Children assumed their personal names, played with them, and manipulated 
them (by means of small adaptations and recontextualizations, erasures, hypoc-
oristics, diminutives, etc.—Pina-Cabral 2013b). All of this happened, however, 
in a context where their namers and primary carers were present (or had absent-
ed themselves with signiicant implications) and engaged in processes of per-
sonal surrogation with them—that is, relations of profound afective mutuality 
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(Pina-Cabral 2013c). he perspectival foci that structured the child’s world—
self, home, family, nation—emerged from a game of triangulations within an 
embodied world where new afordances were constantly ofering themselves 
as invitations to action. As they embraced the world more broadly and in-
teracted with others in ever-widening circles, children engaged the scafolds 
(reiications) that were provided by the environment and the narrative contexts 
in which they were immersed (see Pina-Cabral 2010d and Belland and drake 
2013). heir docility toward the adoption of these scafolds (together with the 
hegemonic relations they carried) was a condition for their own coming into 
personhood—what radclife-Brown called their “consociation.”8 deep histori-
cal recurrences, going way beyond anything the children themselves could con-
sciously formulate, combined with shallow local speciicities as invitations for 
action; engagement with the world at large combined with a deeply felt sense of 
local closure. Children could only revolt (and that they did) to the extent that 
they had already entered into the scafolded interactions of human sociality.
At homE IN thE World
If we want to explore what world can be to humans, then perhaps the best 
starting point is to choose an ethnographic study by an anthropologist who has 
set out to examine just that. my surprise is that since the days of lévy-Bruhl 
so few philosophers have chosen to avail themselves of this rich lode of evi-
dence. out of a number of possible examples, I have chosen to focus on michael 
Jackson’s phenomenologically inspired study of the Warlpiri Aboriginal peo-
ple of Australia. Called At home in the world (1995), the book is an attempt 
to theorize the concept of home by overcoming the obvious and much-noted 
sedentarist implications that the concept carries in most contemporary scien-
tiic thinking, and that owes a lot to the long-term history of Western Europe 
(see Pina-Cabral 1989). As Jackson puts it in the synopsis of his book, “ours 
is an era of uprootedness, with fewer and fewer people living out their lives 
8. radclife-Brown ends his classical essay on joking relationships with a reference to 
a debate he was then having with marcel mauss concerning the latter’s Essai sur 
le don: “he joking relationship is in some ways the exact opposite of a contractual 
relation,” he sustains, as it is based not on contractual binomiality but on continuity 
and fusion (radclife-Brown [1940] 1952: 102–3). here is no reciprocity between 
the partners; there is a fusion of interests, not a matching of interests. 
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where they are born. At such a time, in such a world, what does it mean to be ‘at 
home’?” (1995, back page). In fact, as he proceeds to explore the ways in which 
the Warlpiri produce and inhabit what we might choose to call their home, he is 
forced to give us a varied and increasingly complex set of suggestions concern-
ing what world is, both to him and to them.
After all, it is not possible to debate home without placing it in world, for two 
main reasons: one is that home is that which is not world; the other is that home 
is perhaps the central feature of any person’s world. hese two contrasting mean-
ings actually constitute boundary markers for a complex continuum of contexts 
where the word world seems to most of us to come in handy. his latter aspect is 
especially signiicant, and Jackson does manage to produce a verisimilitudinous 
account of it in his book. furthermore, his insights can be available both to most 
trained anthropologists and to the Warlpiri themselves, with whom he debated 
the book before publishing it. his study, therefore, is not out of history; it is very 
much part of what world is becoming. much as was the case when I worked in 
coastal Bahia (Pina-Cabral and Silva 2013: ch. 9), and is the case with most eth-
nographers these days, there were no sharp linguistic barriers between Jackson 
and his subjects. Yes, there were profound linguistic diferences that Jackson does 
indeed explore, but both he and the Warlpiri had a signiicant take on each 
other’s linguistic universes anterior to their actual (historical) encounter.
As this ethnographic case exempliies, there are subtle veins of meaning 
that go from one usage of world to another, both creating semantic overlap 
and inducing diference. hey lead us from one aspect to the other, much like a 
salesman who wants to sell a car goes through the various features of the vehicle 
without ever losing touch of the notion that this is the vehicle that we must 
want (not just this kind of wheel, or this kind of motor, or this kind of paint, 
etc.). hus, we continue to refer to world in spite of its essential ambivalence, as 
heidegger noted, but also because of it. he ambivalence becomes a margin for 
worlding to occur.
So Jackson tells us that “I had learned that for the Warlpiri, as for other 
Aboriginal people, the world was originally lifeless and featureless. It had been 
given form, instilled with life, and charged with meaning by totemic ances-
tors” (1995: 57). here we meet up with the old paradox of the world-before-
the-world: if for the Warlpiri such a world had no meaning, was it world? 
for the purposes of the present discussion, however, the more relevant ques-
tion is: What is at stake for the Warlpiri when the notion of world is so ge-
nerically used? In this case, from the context, we can assume that Jackson’s 
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sentence refers to an environment that embraces humans and reaches beyond 
their existence—what we might call a cosmos. And yet we know that the Warlpiri 
are aware that there are places in the world where there are no Warlpiri-kind to-
temic ancestors, so it is legitimate to ask them: Who formed the world of non-
Warlpiri peoples? In short, a universalist meaning of world (the cosmos) and a 
localized meaning (a speciically sociocultural meaning, as in “the world of the 
Nyakyusa”) are somehow made to merge as a result of Jackson’s ethnographic 
mediation, both for him and for the Warlpiri.
A few pages earlier, musing about his African experiences among the Kuranko 
of Sierra leone, Jackson had told us, “I wondered if any person is ever free to be-
gin anew, to walk out into the world as if for the irst time” (ibid.: 51). of course, 
the answer to his question turns out to be negative because all persons are rooted 
in anteriority and there is no exit from history. But for our present purposes, 
there is a noteworthy diference between this “world” here and the one discussed 
in the paragraph above. here, world is the opposite of home; it is the contrasting 
outside that accounts for the presence of self and home and whose manifestation 
is the planet Earth and the bodies within it, in their material diversity.
In this second instance, world now integrates two parts that are hierar-
chically complementary: world plus home. In short, another set of meanings 
emerges that assumes that world is fundamentally perspectival: this second vec-
tor of world results from postulating a perspectival home or self that opposes it. 
Such a meaning is inscribed in our historically acquired proclivities as anthro-
pologists, owing to the role that the notion of mundanity plays in Christian 
theology. But there is a case for arguing that this polarization between “world 
outside” and “self/home within” is so pervasive in the ethnographic record that 
it can be considered as a constant of human experience: as godfrey lienhardt 
argued, “one can lay too much one-sided stress on the collectivist orientation 
of African ideas of the person. . . . he recognition of the importance of an in-
ner, mysterious individual activity, comparable to what is meant by speaking in 
English of ‘what goes on inside’ a person is attested by many proverbs’ (1985: 
145, original emphasis). I chose this example because of lienhardt’s emphasis 
on “mysterious”—on the evanescent nature of the perspectival centre that the 
person constitutes. 
his connects with the way Jackson proceeds: 
At that moment, sitting there with Zack and Nugget, Pincher and francine 
[his partner], I think I knew what it means to be at home in the world. It is to 
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experience a complete consonance between one’s own body and the body of the 
earth. Between self and other. It little matters whether the other is a landscape, 
a loved one, a house, or an action. hings low. here seems to be no resistance 
between oneself and the world. he relationship is all. (1995: 110)
As he experiences a merging of embodiment and propositional thinking, 
Jackson is forced to qualify world by reference to “the body of the earth,” and 
this is no passing matter, since the groundedness of being is precisely what he 
is trying to get at in this passage. Self/home are now integrally and materially 
part of world, and this implies cosmic universality once again: “In shared bod-
ily needs, in patterns of attachment and loss, in the imperatives of reciprocity, 
in the habitus of the planet, we [that is, all persons] are involved in a common 
heritage” (ibid.: 118).
In the wake of merleau-Ponty, Jackson comes to see that the very possibility 
of anthropology and ethnography is dependent on this “habitus of the planet,” 
not contrary to it.
he possibility of anthropology is born when the other recognizes my humanity, 
and on the strength of this recognition incorporates me into his world, giving me 
food and shelter, bestowing upon me a name, placing upon me the same obliga-
tions he places upon his own kinsmen and neighbours. I am literally incorpo-
rated in his world, and it is on the basis of this incorporation and my reciprocal 
response to it that I begin to gain a knowledge of that world. Anthropology 
should never forget that its project unfolds within the universal constraints of 
hospitality. ( Jackson 1995: 119)
here could be no better ethnographic instantiation of what lies behind 
davidson’s principle of “interpretive charity.” According to the latter, in order 
to manage to interpret a speaker, we have “to read some of [our] own standards 
of truth into the patterns of sentences held true by the speaker. he point of 
the principle is to make the speaker intelligible, since too great deviations from 
consistency and correctness leave no common ground on which to judge either 
conformity or diference” (davidson 2001: 148) his implies what we have al-
ways known, as it were intuitively: that ethnography is only possible because 
the world of the ethnographer and the world of the native are largely common.
Note, for instance, the way in which Jackson lays out in this sentence the 
central paths for the possibility of the ethnographic gesture: food, shelter, name, 
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relatedness. Personhood, both in its organic (food, shelter) and its social speci-
icity (name, relatedness), is a boundary condition for world and it is universal 
in its diversity. So a third vector of meaning of world appears to emerge: one 
that opposes the visceral groundedness of personhood to propositional thinking 
(within language). his conjoining is the quandary that Ingold tries to address 
in the sentence I quoted earlier: “People do not import their ideas, plans or 
mental representations into the world, since the very world . . . is the homeland 
of their thoughts.”
In Jackson’s engagement with the Warlpiri, then, we witness the various im-
plications of world coming together in a set of three principal vectors of opposi-
tion: (a) the cosmic vector—the universally embracing cosmos as opposed to the 
locally conceived culturally constructed worlds; (b) the perspectival vector—the 
encompassing world as opposed to the central but evanescent reference point of 
home or self; and (c) the propositional vector—the world as embodied materiality 
as opposed to propositional thinking.
hese vectors manifest themselves in three formally distinct modes of world 




Diagram 1. he three modes of world.
(i)  wider and vaguer levels of cosmic embracement operate as sources of experi-
ence for more locally deined and more clearly structured worlds; 
(ii)  world encompasses self, home, or heimat in such a way that these perspectival 
domains both contrast with it and are a constituent part of it; 
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(iii)  world materially limits our sense of internal existence (our “arena of pres-
ence and action”—see Johnston 2010) in that it contains it,9 preventing its 
spreading and situating it. 
Embracement, encompassment, and containment are distinct but related pro-
cesses, and in everyday experience the three modes of world combine in a process 
of becoming through which world constantly unfurls and multiplies (world 
worlds, as heidegger famously put it). It is a movement of (i) totality versus 
singularity; (ii) encompassment versus identiication; and (iii) exteriority versus 
interiority, which never stops being vaguely aporetic because totality, encom-
passment, and exteriority never disappear before singularity, identiication, and 
interiority. Even as world becomes worlds, world remains.
hus, for example, in a sentence like the following by glenn Bowman writ-
ing about Jerusalem as a pilgrimage site, we see the three vectors evolving in 
such a way that world unfolds into a number of worlds while remaining present 
as world, in as much as it is the condition of possibility both for the distinct 
pilgrimages and for the author’s ethnographic study of them: 
he centrality of the [biblical] text meant that it was the reference point by 
which religious Christians judged the world through which they moved, but the 
proliferation of meanings accreted around it as it variously developed through 
the historical spread of the Christian faith meant that the worlds constituted in 
its terms were very diferent—even when, as in the case of holy land pilgrim-
ages, those worlds were nominally the same. (1991: 100)
other pilgrims too go around those very same streets and react to the very 
same texts. he sharing of a space and a text imposes itself on the pilgrim at 
the very moment they are postulating a divergent perspective from pilgrims of 
other kinds. he evidence of the embracing world challenges the completeness 
of the job of ethnic or religious identiication. Alterity10 remains irreducible and 
identiication incomplete.
9. See lakof and Johnson’s notion of bodily containment (1999).
10. A reviewer argued that Emmanuel levinas’ thought (much as heidegger’s) is 
too divergent from our guiding inspiration in donald davidson’s philosophical 
insights for it to be a useful reference. on irst approach, this may indeed appear 
to be the case. to the contrary, however, the late thinking of davidson (2005) is 
amply compatible with levinas’ use of the concept of “alterity as anterior,” which so 
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At this point we must be reminded of davidson’s injunction that there can 
only be communication between two speakers when they can triangulate it with 
the world: that is, the “habitus of the planet” is a condition of possibility for hu-
mans to mutually understand each other (both at the level of person-to-person 
understanding and at the level of culture-to-culture understanding), but it is 
also what divides us. Confronted with the desert’s unresponsiveness to human 
presence, Jackson experienced a moment of doubt: “In the desert, I had become 
convinced that it is not in the nature of human consciousness to enter the world 
of nature. he truth of nature does not participate in the truth of human con-
sciousness” (1995: 116). he reference to the desert here is not a passing one; it 
is essential to what he is telling us, that the desert is a speciic environment that 
shapes human experience. In this momentary confrontation with the desert, the 
reduction of mind to consciousness again calls our attention to the unresolved, 
aporetic side of the third mode identiied above: human mind (propositional, 
relexive mind) and world interpenetrate without ever fully meeting, that is the 
major implication for anthropology of the theory of the indeterminacy of in-
terpretation (see feleppa 1988). Persons are of the world but they confront the 
world. “Some balance must be possible between the world into which we are 
thrown without our asking and the world we imagine we might bring into being 
by dint of what we say and do” ( Jackson 1995: 123). his is what Jackson calls 
“the existential struggle,” and it is the principal object of his book—the condi-
tions of presence.
When he speaks of “disengaging from the world about us” in order “to be in 
touch with ourselves” (ibid.), or when he claims that the sound of traic outside 
is “a world away,” he is using the more general cosmic implications of the word. 
But then, speaking of a moment of great personal intensity, he says, 
It was not unlike the experience of watching someone you love dying—the same 
sense of the world falling away, of oneself falling away from the world, and of all 
one’s awareness condensed by pain into a black hole. At such times, the world at 
large is diminished and loses its hold, eclipsed by the viscerally immediate world 
of oneself. It is always a shock, going outdoors again after a birth or a death, to 
ind that the world has not changed along with you, that it has gone on unaf-
fected and indiferent. (1995: 135)
inspired the discussion of ethical issues and the role of the person in sociality in this 
book (cf. levinas 1961).
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here we ind a kind of logical non sequitur: “the world falling away from us” 
is held to be the same as “us falling away from the world.” In fact, the error 
is only apparent, because the “world at large” and the “visceral world” cannot 
quite come to separate from each other; they are held together by the fact that 
sociality and intentional thinking are preconditions for propositional (relexive) 
thinking. he world embraces us to the extent that it places us—not in space, 
not in time, but in existence. here is, then, something external in world, for 
there is no way out of world, we are contained by it; but the world is also an 
openness, as we are recurrently confronted by the indeterminate relations be-
tween words and world and our condition is not only to inhabit world but also 
to inhabit language. In sum, persons are world forming.
here would, then, be three aspects to world that Jackson is manipulating 
without ever being willing to separate them, for he sees them as mutually con-
stitutive: (a) the cosmic world; (b) the perspectival world; and (c) the propositional 
world. he central conclusion we take from our examination, however, is that 
personhood—the fact that humans are propositionally thinking embodied crea-
tures—is what holds together the complex dynamic between world and worlds, 
the world’s ambivalence.
gloBAlIZAtIoN
let us now take another example from a diferent tradition of anthropological 
thinking: Ulf hannerz’s relections concerning the present situation of anthro-
pology and his own personal trajectory within it. Anthropology’s world: Life in a 
twenty-irst-century discipline (2010) takes a very diferent perspective on world 
from Jackson’s book, as it is less concerned with how people studied by anthro-
pologists inhabit world, and more with anthropology as a mode of inhabiting 
world. he focus is shifted toward the condition of being an anthropologist 
in a world that is becoming more .  .  . global. While never referring to henri 
lefebvre’s concept of mondialisation, hannerz also explores the way in which 
his condition as an anthropologist in the second half of the twentieth century 
was afected by this “shift from the nation-state to the world scale” (Elden 2004: 
232–35), this process by which a new political and economic order emerged that 
followed on from the nation and the city, imposing new forms of domination, 
repression, and hegemony.
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hannerz’s was the curiously contradictory life of someone who, never having 
left his own Swedish academic base (for he retired from the same department 
where he carried out his undergraduate studies),11 worked and dialogued with 
colleagues and informants all over the world and had a worldwide academic 
impact. however, he notes, his “cosmopolitan” condition, is two-faced: on one 
side, the worried face of someone who contemplates humanity as a whole and 
its evolving political turmoil (the scale of lefebvre’s mondial); and, on the other 
side, the satisied face of the one who looks out on the fascinating diversity of 
meanings and meaningful forms in the human world (hannerz 2010: 93).
here is an ainity between the two faces, hannerz suggests, which is po-
tentiated by anthropology’s main challenge, as he sees it, of “making the world 
transparent.” (ibid.: 87) Now, transparency is a project of mediation between 
the two faces of the cosmopolitan observer: the globalized condition can only 
remain humanly pleasing to the extent that pluralism survives. “he world of 
anthropology keeps changing” (ibid.: 1), hannerz claims: for anthropologists, 
the global and the cosmopolitan are two manifestations of facing the contradic-
toriness of world’s becoming. 
In fact, in the very irst page of his book, hannerz outlines the nature of the 
aporia that confronts him as he looks back at his life as a ieldworker. As it hap-
pens, he brings out the same three vectors that emerged from Jackson’s study: 
the cosmic vector—“anthropology’s world is the wider outside world”; the per-
spectival vector—“anthropology is a social world in itself ”; and the propositional 
vector—“it is a world anthropologists are inclined to think of as made up of a 
multitude of ‘ields’” (ibid.).
As the book evolves, we see hannerz turning time and again to a central 
quandary concerning the very deinition of his discipline. In Sweden his deci-
sion to become an anthropologist in the 1960s had involved a political convic-
tion. hat is why he had wanted to carry out research in Nigeria. he period was 
one of decolonization, and the young hannerz’s burning wish, which turned 
him into a social scientist, was to understand that process and contribute ac-
tively toward it. he saw as ethically problematic the internally turned volkskunde 
(folklore) type of academic engagement being carried out in the department 
next door. As he puts it, he wanted to be an “expatriate researcher,” not someone 
11. I was privileged to be part of the fascinating retirement symposium that his 
colleagues organized, which brought out very vividly his lifework and its curiously 
understated creativity.
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turned in onto the historicist preoccupations of a national/nationalist type of 
research engagement. So the opposition between away and home ieldwork en-
gagements was formative.
however, as things evolved in the 1980s and 1990s, neocolonialism turned 
into neoimperialism, and the face that contemplated the global order (the mon-
dial) became sadder and sadder. hannerz’s experiences in Nigeria, when he 
inally managed to get there, were particularly distressing. At the same time, 
anthropology’s other face also changed radically. here were departments of an-
thropology in most places where previously anthropologists had been expatri-
ates, and a new “anthropology at home” emerged that was as cosmopolitan as 
hannerz’s own “away anthropology.” It could hardly be classiied in the same bag 
as the earlier nationalist-driven research that he had avoided in the 1960s. By 
the early twenty-irst century, studying international reporters, hannerz himself 
was going everywhere, from interviewing a neighbour of his in Stockholm to 
Washington, Johannesburg, Jerusalem, or tokyo. hus, he calls for the need to 
retain the “awayness” of the anthropology of the past that he most cherishes, by 
preventing the new cosmopolitan anthropology from becoming at the global 
level what folklore had been at the national level. his aim is to retain “our part 
as anthropologists as helpers of a worldwide transparency, as men and women 
in the middle” (ibid.: 91).
It is worth confronting here the quotes of two anthropologists of the ear-
lier generation that inspire him. In 1988, Cliford geertz had declared that 
“the next necessary thing is to enlarge the possibility of intelligible discourse 
between people quite diferent from one another .  .  . and yet contained in a 
world where, tumbled as they are into endless connection, it is increasingly 
di cult to get out of each other’s way” (quoted in ibid.: 88–89). hannerz then 
quotes fei xiaodong, who, in 1992, claims that people “shaped by diferent 
cultures with diferent attitudes towards life are crowded into a small world 
in which they must live in complete and absolute interdependence” (quoted 
in ibid.: 100).
his sense that, faced with the world’s increasing smallness, there is a burn-
ing need to build on the world’s plurality is what drives hannerz’s eforts at 
passing on anthropology to the next century. Between the cosmic and the perspec-
tival modes of world, anthropology would be a kind of propositional mediator 
that turns interiority into exteriority and vice versa, thus preventing the global 
order from destroying the conditions for its own cosmopolitanism. Anthropol-
ogy would be a task carried out by persons who convert the very means that turn 
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them into persons (i.e., propositionally thinking beings) into an instrument for 
the production of ever-wider bird’s-eye-view efects.12
A PlUrAlItY of WorldS
A number of arguments have emerged of late—some more coherent than oth-
ers—claiming that there are “worlds,” or, better still, that there is “a plurality 
of ontologies.”13 he simpler form of the argument may be summarized in the 
following terms:
rather than using our own analytical concepts to make sense of a given eth-
nography (explanation, interpretation), we use the ethnography to rethink our 
analytical concepts. rather than asking why the Nuer should think that twins are 
birds, we should be asking how we need to think of twins and birds (and all their 
relevant corollaries, such as humanity, siblinghood, animality, light or what have 
you) in order to arrive at a position from which the claim that twins are birds 
no longer registers as an absurdity. What must twins be, what must birds be, et 
cetera? (holbraad 2010: 184)
hus formulated, the argument is immediately problematic owing to its ahis-
toricism and to the assumption that “us” is a geopolitically recognizable vantage 
point. one wonders how the author accounts historically for the fact that he 
reads ethnographies and why Nuer ethnography is his chosen example. how did 
Evans-Pritchard actually manage to fall through the trappings of “our” world to 
enter into “the Nuer world,” only to come out again at the end? one must try 
very hard not to remember that Collingwood’s theory of history ([1946] 1994) 
was quite as inluential to Evans-Pritchard’s formulations concerning the Nuer 
as were the Nuer themselves. 
12. As heidegger puts it in his quaint language: “World is brought before dasein 
through dasein itself ” (1998: 122).
13. Perhaps this is no more than “a certain (and thus unavoidably fading) moment 
in the recent history of the discipline, where a vaguely deined cohort of mostly 
Cambridge-associated scholars found it exciting to experiment with the nature 
of ethnographic description and anthropological theorizing in a certain way,” as 
morten Pedersen puts it (2012).
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here are, however, other versions of the argument. hese claim that we must 
“not see ethnography as a kind of translation from one worldview to another,” 
that “all ontologies are ‘groundless’ in the sense that no one is the true ontol-
ogy” (Paleček and risjord 2013: 10, 16). In their essay, martin Paleček and 
mark risjord revisit davidson’s injunction that we ought to reject the dualism 
between scheme and content, attempting to adapt his nonrepresentationalism 
to anthropology (davidson 1984: 183–98). his is a laudable exercise. Unfor-
tunately, together with most of their colleagues of this inspiration, the authors’ 
use of the word ontology depends on a shift in meaning concerning world that 
bedevils all their successive arguments. Contrary to what the authors believe, 
the adoption of ontological monism does not imply the claim that one can 
have access to the one-and-only true ontology. ontological monism does not 
postulate that truth lies beyond the realm of human experience but rather that 
truth is a foundational feature of thinking: “Without the idea of truth we would 
not be thinking creatures, nor would we understand what it is for someone else 
to be a thinking creature” (davidson 2005: 16).
hat apart, we have a problem: in anthropology, referring to ethnography as 
translation in the old Evans-Pritchardian manner has come to be such a familiar 
trope that we have stopped wondering whether that is really a useful metaphor 
(cf. Beidelman 1971; Pina-Cabral 1992). What do ethnographers do precisely? 
Now, skeptical relativism is buried so deep into the tissue of our anthropological 
language that we ind it hard to give an account of ethnography that bypasses 
the problems raised by representationalist theories of thinking (see Chemero 
2009). Paleček and risjord are correct in trying to go beyond this, but they pro-
ceed to argue that “davidson’s later work can be used to scafold the inference 
from a rejection of the scheme–content distinction to a pluralism of ontology” 
(2013: 16). Yet this is an incorrect assumption: davidson is absolutely explicit 
about the fact that there is only one single ontology (there is only one world), 
and his dialogue with Spinoza at the end of his life is precisely an elaboration 
on that idea (2005: 295–314). to attempt to salvage the metaphysical nature of 
Viveiros de Castro’s perspectivism (his cannibal metaphysics—[2009] 2014) by 
twisting davidson’s positions is plainly a misguided step.
he discussion, however, cannot simply be left at that. from the indubitable 
observation that there is evidence for the existence of distinct “webs of interpre-
tation” that apply in diferent historical contexts, Paleček and risjord conclude 
that ontologies exist and are incommensurable. According to them, ontologies 
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are “the product of human interpretive interactions with one another and with 
their environments. hese interactions are often very diferent, constituting dif-
ferent ontologies. hey are incommensurable in the sense that no one way of en-
gaging the environment is right or wrong in metaphysical terms” (Paleček and 
risjord 2013: 16). I honestly can see no diference between this deinition of the 
word ontology and the meaning traditionally attributed to the anthropological 
concept of worldview, apart from the fact, of course, that the word ontology 
is tinted with a spirit of idealism (a metaphysical association) and the word 
worldview is not (because it presumes its own plural, implying that, if there are 
difering perspectives, then there is one world).
his matter of incommensurability, in fact, has a very long history, particu-
larly by reference to homas S. Kuhn’s argument about scientiic revolutions. 
In his later life, Kuhn himself (1962, 1983) took to criticizing the excessively 
relativist interpretations of his argument. In his survey of the debate, Philip 
Kitcher inds that Kuhn’s earlier claims of incommensurability were interpreted 
too literally and that “we can revert to the idea that full communication across 
the revolutionary divide is possible and that rival claimants can appeal to a 
shared body of observational evidence” (Kitcher 1982: 690). he conceptual 
incommensurability that divides scientiic paradigms turns out to be just like 
that which divides languages that are subject to translation—but always only 
partly due to the limits imposed by the indeterminacy of all communication. 
Kitcher’s reading of the late Kuhn’s take on incommensurability carefully avoids 
the all-or-nothing fallacy, arguing that most of Kuhn’s readers go too readily to 
irrationalist conclusions that are essentially politically conservative and are, in 
any case, unnecessary in order to interpret the historical evidence presented by 
scientiic revolutions.
In the same line, I espouse davidson’s claim that there are no radically in-
compatible human worlds because all human persons are endowed with the 
possibility of developing intelligent communication with all other persons (bar 
exceptional circumstances: e.g., insanity, drunkenness, extreme fear, etc., and I 
am not limiting myself to linguistic communication). Since all our thinking 
is based on intentional thinking as much as on propositional thinking, radical 
ontological breaks are inconceivable. We are historically part of the world. to 
claim otherwise would be tantamount to saying that ethnography is an impos-
sibility since, in order to learn what other persons think, we irst have to engage 
with them as human and, more than that, as humans cohabiting a recognizable 
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world, as we saw Jackson arguing earlier. Without the triangulation made pos-
sible by world, there is no place for communication.14
Paleček and risjord formulate this part of davidson’s thought in the follow-
ing terms: “Insofar as we are not able to separate our knowledge of the object 
from the object itself, we are not able to separate our knowledge of ourselves 
from the knowledge of others. he interpreter becomes a crucial aspect of what 
it means to have thoughts” (2013: 12). from this, then, they proceed: “he eth-
nographer is engaging not just an individual in one-on-one communication but 
a whole interpretive community” (ibid.: 14). Surely that is an important point—
quite as important as its symmetrical counterpart: the critique of ethnographic 
exceptionalism. hat is, in engaging the ethnographer, the peoples of the world 
who were being subjected to imperialism throughout the modern era were not 
only engaging an individual in a one-on-one communication, but were engag-
ing the full force of imperial globalization.
Now, it would seem that, if there are “interpretive communities,” there are 
worldviews, that is, that which diferentiates interpretive communities in the 
face of others (we will return to this argument in chapter 5). of course, it 
may well be argued that these interpretive communities should not be seen as 
“views,” for that would be to cede to representationalism and to an unjustii-
ably strong form of realism. descola has recently produced a formulation of 
our relation to world where he tries to argue just this (to have his cake and 
eat it, so to speak). he adopts a kind of minimalist realism similar to the one 
I have been defending here, but then he appends to it a critique of the notion 
of worldview:
here can be no multiple worlds because it is highly probable that the potential 
qualities and relations aforded to human cognition and enactment are the same 
everywhere until some have been detected and actualized, others ignored. But 
once this worlding process has been achieved, the result is not a world-view, 
i.e., one version among others of the same transcendental reality; the result is a 
world in its own right, a system of partially actualized properties, saturated with 
meaning and replete with agency, but partially overlapping with other similar 
14. here is in this argument no claim that the borders of humanity with other animals 
are precise, nor that human proneness to communication cannot elicit forms of 
communication with animals that often approximate interhuman communication. 
As heidegger (1998) would have it, intentional thinking in both humans and 
animals presupposes world, but a poor world: it has less of world .
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systems that have been diferently actualized and instituted by diferent persons. 
(descola 2010: 339)
here, we agree with descola concerning the minimal realism but not concern-
ing the worldview issue, since he unwittingly engages in the all-or-nothing fal-
lacy. he is assuming (à la Paleček and risjord) that the alternative to a multiple 
ontologies posture is a one-and-only true ontology posture. to deny that when 
human persons share worldviews they are essentially engaging a historically 
common world is to deny history and feeds into the primitivist strain in an-
thropological thinking that carries out what Eugen hammel long ago used to 
criticize as “one-village-one-vote comparativism” (1984: 29–43). furthermore, 
there is human exclusivism in this, because it is reducing world to propositional 
thinking (and to conscious categorical thinking at that). But world in humans 
is grounded in the sort of intentional thinking that we share with animals; scaf-
folded (symbolic) thinking only comes after and above that and, as we have 
argued already, it is in any case rooted in our common human embodiment. 
too many decades of unchallenged interpretivism have led anthropologists to 
assume implicitly that thought is primarily systemic in a culturalist sort of way 
and, therefore, that worlds = cultures.
But the ethnographer in the ield is not engaging an interpretive commu-
nity; she is engaging singular humans or, if we want to see it in time, a number 
of singular persons. Now that is of the essence, for it is due to her proneness to 
shared intentionality (cf. tomasello 2008) that the ethnographer can achieve 
communication through interpretive charity, never through any sort of per-
son-to-group communication. It is personhood that allows world to emerge 
(cf. heidegger 1998: 123). In short, I may communicate with a number of dif-
ferent persons at the same time, but I can only communicate with them because 
they are singular humans (persons in ontogeny) like myself. to forget that is to 
allow ourselves to slip back into a durkheimian type of sociocentrism.
We are here faced with another version of the quandary that the anthropol-
ogy of kinship has been intensely addressing for a number of years:15 there is 
a constant dynamic oscillation between singularity and duality in the dividual 
person. he unquestioned use of the word individual by authors such as Paleček 
and risjord actually carries implications of which they might not be aware, 
15. See mariott (1976); Strathern (1988); Sahlins (2011a, 2011b); Pina-Cabral (2013b, 
2013c).
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for it assumes too casually the unitariness of personhood.16 hat unitariness is 
precisely what gives credence to ethnographic exceptionalism (i.e., the image 
of the lone ethnographer faced with the whole of the tribe in front of her tape 
recorder and then coming back to “us” speaking out the words of the tribe and 
not of the persons in it—explaining why twins can be birds or why blood is beer 
to jaguars, to use the more tired examples). But what we have learned from the 
long history of the debate about personhood and kinship is that singularity and 
plurality imply each other in relations of mutuality (Strathern 1988: 11–14; 
Pina-Cabral 2013c). 
herefore, the ethnographer who is carrying out her task is permanently 
oscillating between plurality and singularity in a process of ontogeny—she can 
only access interpretive communities because she engages singular communica-
tors, and she can only engage the latter because she is willing to enter into their 
interpretive communities. Again, we are faced with the hegemonic strength of 
the all-or-nothing fallacy. here is no matter of true ontology as much as there 
is no matter in denying the veridicality of all ontologies. he notion of a truth 
that can exist outside of human interaction in history is absurd. truth is a feature 
of mind and “mind is a function of the whole person constituted over time in 
intersubjective relations with others in the environing world” (toren 2002: 122). 
for this reason, we cannot concur fully with thinkers like Jagdish hattiangadi 
or daniel Siegel, whose interest in psychology and psychotherapy leads them 
to treat mind in general as the relevant emergent entity. for anthropologists, 
whose concern with humanity is necessarily more holistic, the emergence is 
seen as occurring not in general, but in each historically singular animal and in 
each historically singular person, as Christina toren insists. In humans, mind is 
a historically determinable occurrence: the ontogeny of each person is the mo-
ment of emergence of a new level of supervening—the “anomaly” occurs each 
time a person enters personal ontogeny. World, therefore, is a function not of 
mind in general, but of its occurrence in particular animals and persons.
CoNClUSIoN
In conclusion, yes, there is only one world but, yes, there are diferences between 
the world of animals and the world of humans and, within the later, between 
16. An aspect that maurice Bloch’s “blob” (2012) also does not manage to bypass.
29World
interpretive communities. If these diferences were truly incommensurable, then 
there would be no ethnography.17 But the contrary is also the case: as no com-
munication can happen outside the indeterminacy of meaning, the question of 
commensurability is always relative from the start.
having examined the way in which the word world is used by anthropolo-
gists, we conclude that the meanings attributed to it relect a basic tension that 
operates along three main aspects: for each embodied person, (iii) the world in its 
limited materiality opposes itself to propositional thinking owing to (ii) the con-
stant constitution of perspectival domains (home/self ); in turn, the evanescent 
nature of these allows for (i) a constant play between the world as an embracing 
source and the world as a locally produced context. Personhood (propositionally 
thinking human beings historically engaged in sociality) is what allows for the 
three aspects of world to come together in a broad experience of world.
As phenomenology has taught us, human experience is social before it is 
rational. he world is one because, in personhood, alterity is anterior. In all of 
its plurality, the world cannot escape from history, that is, all those untold de-
terminations that accumulate in each single act of any singular person. here is 
freedom in personhood to the extent that propositional thought institutes its 
own processes of determination that supervene on animal intentionality and 
on material determination. World, therefore, like persons, will ever waver in 
the unstable terrain that lies between singularity and plurality; it is one and it is 
many. Chapter 2 will examine the structural conditions of world and argue that 
ethnography, in order to capture them, has to engage transcendence.
17. As godlove puts it: “Systematic religious conceptual contrast must be largely 
theoretical in nature, and relatively limited in scope” (1996: 5).
chapter two
Transcendence
Insofar as human beings exist at all,
they already ind themselves transposed in their existence
into other human beings, even if there are factically 
no other human beings in the vicinity. 
– martin heidegger ([1929/30] 1995: 205)
In their descriptions of people’s lived worlds, ethnographers are expected to 
clarify what beings there are for the people they study (their ontology) and 
how these beings interrelate meaningfully within world (their metaphysics). 
he starting point of this chapter, therefore, is that metaphysical concerns are 
never absent from any ethnographic description that aims to “take seriously” 
the experiences described.1 I now move to address the metaphysical implica-
tions of the process of worlding (cf. Tsing 2011), the human disposition that 
opens up the space of interaction where the “holism of the mental” operates 
1. See the debate between Viveiros de Castro (2011) and Matei Candea (2011). As we 
will see later on, however, my own take on “taking seriously” rejects the possibility 
of ontological incommensurability in the ethnographic gesture. hus, it emphasizes 
the creative nature of the ethnographic analysis and focuses preferably on the 
verisimilitude of the narrative.
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(davidson 2001).2 Concomitantly, I argue that transcendence is not to be seen 
as a feature of this or that culture or ontology. rather, it is a recurrent feature of 
human experience, as it is a function of the very process of constitution of hu-
man persons in ontogeny by means of what lévy-Bruhl called “participation.” 
he chapter starts by setting these discussions within the history of twentieth-
century anthropology in order to make sense of where we have come from. In 
particular, it argues for the continued relevance of a tradition that inds its roots 
in r. g. Collingwood’s rendering of the ontological proof of god’s existence, 
developed by Saint Anselm of Canterbury in the late eleventh century.
ThE EnChAnTMEnT of World
Most of the founders of our discipline at the turn of the twentieth century—
people like Mclennan, lubbock, Tylor, or frazer—were “great believers in 
laws of social evolution and in the necessary interdependence of institutions, 
and all .  .  . agnostic and hostile to religion” (Evans-pritchard 1962: 35). As 
Max Weber (1948) might have put it, they were enthusiastically engaged in the 
modernist project of disenchanting the world. his was not the case, however, 
with those who followed them after the 1920s methodological revolution led 
by Malinowski.
While the evolutionist fathers of the discipline were prone to disparage re-
ligion and magic as forms of thinking that science would dismantle, and thus 
considered the beliefs of “primitives” to be somehow inferior to their own, this 
was not the generalized approach on the part of the trained ethnographers who 
were making their way in the profession in the British Empire or the United 
States after the 1920s. It is, for instance, arguable that the impact of the work of 
Edward Burnett Tylor, John lubbock, robert Marett, or James frazer on the 
interwar generation of anthropologists was far lesser than that of the work of the 
great missionary and administrator ethnographers of the turn of the century. In 
any case, this was certainly Max gluckman’s opinion concerning the lasting im-
pact of henri-Alexandre Junod in Southern African ethnography (1962: 7–9); 
2. here I am not using the word “holism” in the fashion it is most commonly 
encountered in anthropological literature. donald davidson’s expression “holism 
of the mental” describes the participations that exist among all our thoughts and 
that tend to be igured into structures, without ever fully achieving an overarching 
structure.
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and the cases of Bruno gutman (1926; see Steiner 1999a) in Kenya, Elsdon 
Best among the maori, or r. S. Rattray among the Ashanti should suice as 
examples. 
Contrary to their predecessors, those who followed in the steps of Malinowski 
vowed to be respectful toward the transcendental experiences they encountered 
in the ield, refusing to treat them as somehow invalid, untrue, erroneous, or 
wrong-headed. he experiences of “enchantment” that they witnessed were 
taken to be genuine cases of transcendence.3 here was a price to pay for ethno-
graphic relativism, however, and that was the adoption of an agnostic posture 
toward the native opinions conveyed. Methodological relativism was taken dead 
seriously by such people as Audrey richards, ruth Benedict, raymond firth, 
or Marcel griaule—to give a few random examples. You will be hard pressed to 
ind one single professionally respected anthropologist from the 1920s onward 
who disparages the genuine spirituality of the transcendental experiences (the 
“beliefs”) they describe in their ethnographies (even lévy-Bruhl came to that 
opinion at the end of his life—[1949] 1998). In fact, they despised people like 
Tylor and frazer for doing just that. he efort to show the reasonableness of 
native “beliefs” was hardly exclusive to anthropologists who admitted to be-
ing Christian believers, such as Evans-pritchard, godfrey lienhardt, or Mary 
douglas, and it included even people who were explicitly inspired by materialist 
views, such as Max gluckman or Meyer fortes. 
While Christian ailiation was indeed not predominant among professional 
ethnographers after the 1920s, (a) they were all deeply attentive to and respect-
ful about the transcendental experiences they described, “taking them seriously” 
at all times, and (b) many of them were, in more or less private fashion, engaged 
in some form of personal spiritual quest, often non-Christian: Steiner’s Judaism, 
leach’s humanism, Srinivas’ and Madan’s hinduism, needham’s Buddhism, 
lienhardt’s or douglas’ Catholicism, Turnbull’s alternative spiritualist engage-
ments . . . to quote just a few examples. In the American case, in fact, the matter 
was made even more complex owing to the readiness of many of the north 
American Amerindianists to be adopted and initiated by the tribal peoples they 
studied. In many such instances, this involved deeply felt life-long engagements 
3. I use transcendence here to refer to that which is beyond the ordinary range of 
perception. he usual examples are the experience of the sacred or of the otherworldly, 
but the presence of my own personhood is also transcendent. As heidegger argues, 
dasein transcends: “Although it exists in the midst of being and enhanced by being, 
dasein as existing has always already surpassed nature.” (1998: 109).
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with Indian forms of spirituality (see Kan 2001). he same can be said of Afro-
American religion in the more impressive cases, such as pierre Verger, Zora 
neale hurston (e.g., [1935] 1990), Edison Carneiro, and ruth landes (e.g., 
[1947] 1994).4
post-Malinowskian methodological agnosticism was made possible owing 
to a conjugation of two oppositional axes: irstly, the adoption of an ontological 
separation between mind and matter; and, secondly, a strict diferentiation be-
tween collective and individual belief. Ethnographic relativism relied on a kind 
of bargain: you believed the native’s experience for so long as you accepted not 
to confront it with your own. It is only thus that Evans-pritchard ([1973] 1976), 
for example, could cope with the paradox of being certain that witches such as 
the Azande conceive of them do not exist (in material reality), yet he himself 
witnessed one passing in the middle of the night, because he had completely 
immersed himself in a collective world where it was reasonable to witness such 
things. 
however, as Evans-pritchard precisely meant to show by this aporetic ex-
ample, methodological agnosticism, handy as it was, placed the anthropologist 
in a singularly problematic condition, for it meant that he or she accepted the 
life of the spirit but abdicated from granting it real existence—it was a sort of 
borrowed enchantment, to coin a phrase. Ethnographic relativism was no more 
than a suspension of disbelief and, to use heidegger’s expression (see Wrathall 
and lambeth 2011), it left anthropologists in a situation of suspension, for 
either they were godless—when god alone might have provided the link with 
transcendence—or they were godforsaken—inding that their “faith” was a chal-
lenge too di cult to bear. he problem was especially acute for those who, like 
Evans-pritchard, refused the bargain as somehow reductive. his is how I can 
make sense of his often-quoted statement that it was the nuer who convinced 
him to convert to Catholicism ([1973] 1976: 245). What the nuer taught him 
was that the life of the spirit is true to the extent that transcendence is a genuine 
facet of the human condition; the particular form you choose for it then is not 
really as important, as it is a matter of personal circumstance. 
Yet the choice had tragic implications, for in accepting a god, you were not 
only accepting a “belief-system,” you were also engaging yourself in a morality, 
4. Indeed, in all of these cases, their careers were marred by prejudice. landes, in 
particular, sufered for many decades from the boycott imposed by herskovits 
owing to his homophobic prejudice (Cole 2003).
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a form of life, and that was a very heavy burden to bear for people whose lives 
were immersed in the complexities of modernity, as were most twentieth-centu-
ry anthropologists. his was probably what Evans-pritchard meant when he so 
often regretted that he was such a “bad Catholic.”5 he anthropologist-believer 
inhabited both sides of the equation: he or she was a scientist and a “primitive” 
at the same time, as franz Baermann Steiner comments about himself.6 he 
anthropologist who refused to be godless was transformed into a walking con-
tradiction—he or she was godforsaken. 
hese terms are borrowed from heidegger’s late writings, where he debates 
our contemporary metaphysical condition. here, he argues that these are the 
two metaphysical options in the “age of choice” (Wrathall and lambeth 2011: 
171; cf. heidegger 1999). for twentieth-century anthropologists of religion, 
methodological relativism promoted such a schismogenic condition. While the 
mind/matter polarity allowed for a temporary intellectual respite, ultimately it 
did not resolve the paradox posed by having to make transcendence compatible 
with a scientiically conceived material world. While Evans-pritchard (1962) 
accuses most of the anthropologists of his day of being godless, and thus in-
capable of coping with the fact that religion is a human inevitability, I believe 
it is reasonable to argue that his own extreme anti-intellectualist option was a 
manifestation of godforsakenness: a despair at the impending loss of the sacred. 
Ultimately, the two responses were of a kind.
from the perspective of Christian proselytism (cf. larsen 2014) it may in-
deed look like anthropologists who were not practicing Christians were some-
how blind to spiritual matters. But here is where some knowledge of the his-
tory of anthropological theory may help. he paradoxes produced by the mind/
body opposition and its conjugation with sociocentrism have posed themselves 
from the beginning. Evans-pritchard’s irst essay against what he called the 
“English intellectualist school” dated to 1933, eleven years before his conver-
sion. Ever since 1972 (needham 1972), in any case, we have been explicitly 
advised that there are serious intellectual problems with the representationist 
and collectivist assumptions that characterized midcentury anthropological 
5. he lifestyle choices implied in religious adherence placed him in constant 
contradiction with himself, and that is what ultimately caused his life to be so 
tragic (cf. larsen 2014). As a matter of fact, Steiner (1999a) struggled with similar 
problems, albeit for diferent reasons.
6. humorously but also tragically, in light of his own transethnic love life (Steiner 
1999a: 40, 47–48, 59).
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relativism—among both believers and nonbelievers. he debate concerning the 
nature of “belief/faith” has been long and fecund in anthropology and it remains 
probably yet uninished.7 
If there is one discipline that, from the beginning, did not accept whole-
heartedly the scientivistic project of disenchanting the world, anthropology 
is it. Since the 1980s, however, and with increasing intensity of late, we have 
witnessed a tendency to explicitly criticize methodological agnosticism and to 
call for a reenchantment of world (Turner’s anthropology of experience and 
Taussig’s works were probably some of the primary signs of this). his move-
ment accompanies a generalized dissatisfaction in the discipline—which found 
its moment of awareness around the millennium (see Jenkins 2000)—with the 
way in which irrationality is pervasive and beyond control in the global world 
we inhabit today: politically, economically, ecologically. his disenchantment 
with our world is accompanied by a call for a reenchantment of “other” worlds, 
leading to a new approach to the ethnographic task.
like Evans-pritchard himself, the anthropologists of today defend that the 
experiences they describe (e.g., shamanism) are genuinely transcendental—their 
“cannibal metaphysics” are presented as fully valid human experiences (Viveiros 
de Castro 2009). Yet a signiicant change has come about in that, instead of 
attempting to ind the reason in apparent unreason, there is a taste for empha-
sizing the “strangeness,” otherworldliness, or transcendence of the objects of 
study. Much like their forebears, these ethnographers and their readers purport 
to inhabit a spiritless world, yet the presentation of their ethnographic material 
emphasizes its genuine transcendental nature. Some have called this disposition 
“the ontological turn,” and it is often (but as we will see not always) presented as 
a form of pluralism of worlds resulting from a postulation of ontological incom-
mensurability between them (pedersen 2012). What came to pass was a revival 
of older and more transcendentalist categories, such as animism, totemism, and 
shamanism, accompanied by a ferocious critique of some of the more trusty 
tools of ethnographic analysis, such as methodological holism or worldview 
analysis. Whilst lévi-Straussian modes of structuralist analysis were taken on 
7. To cite only the high points: gellner (1974); pouillon (1982); ruel ([1982] 2002); 
Veyne ([1983] 1988); needham (1985); Tambiah (1990); latour (1991); Sabbatucci 
(2000); robbins (2007). furthermore, it must be seen as related to the debate on 
“the decline of magic” (see homas [1971] 1991) and on “superstition” (see pina-
Cabral 2014a).
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board in a silenced manner, latourian naturalism made big inroads under the 
guise of “animism” (e.g., descola 2005; Kohn 2013). 
however, the revisitation by these contemporaries of such concepts as ani-
mism, totemism, shaman, soul, or spirit does not imply the adoption of the at-
titudes of distancing that characterized the founding masters of our discipline: 
same words, diferent intentions. Contrary to the midcentury interpretivists 
whose towering igure was Evans-pritchard, our contemporary colleagues in-
stinctively reject the metaphysical divide between mind and matter that made 
possible the lowering of the anthropology of religion sixty years ago. In order 
to achieve this, some choose to adopt forms of ontological pluralism, others 
argue for an animistic reenchantment of the world. his chapter sustains that 
we have to avoid both of these options since, as was argued above, the practice 
of anthropology demands that we postulate a single ontology. 
rather, as Evans-pritchard already suggested in his courageous defense of 
lévy-Bruhl in the 1930s, we must attend to the process by which the ontogeny 
of partible persons takes place in sociality (Evans-pritchard [1934] 1970; see 
also Mills 2013). If we do so, we can account for transcendence whilst abandon-
ing the mind/matter polarity, thus inally bypassing the tragic choice between 
godlessness and godforsakenness that haunted twentieth-century anthropol-
ogy and which Evans-pritchard grapples with in his Aquinas lecture of 1959 
(1962).
MIdCEnTUrY InTErprETIVISM
he young E. E. Evans-pritchard, then professor of Sociology at King fuad 
I University in Cairo,8 published three short papers where he laid down the 
theoretical foundations for what was going to be his life’s work: “he intel-
lectualist (English) interpretation of magic” (1933); “lévy-Bruhl’s theory of 
primitive mentality” ([1934] 1970); and “Science and sentiment: An exposition 
and criticism of the writings of pareto” (1936). however, his lasting inluence 
in the discipline was not established until ten years later. his irst ethnographic 
monograph, Witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande ([1937] 1976), only 
became a classic of the discipline in the postwar period (see douglas 1970: xiii). 
8. A post held earlier on by another of Malinowski’s personae non gratae, A. M. hocart.
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together with franz Baermann Steiner (1999a, 1999b), he had a major im-
pact on a group of young anthropologists who came to write their theses in 
oxford immediately at the end of the war and who were going to shape the dis-
cipline globally (mary douglas herself, louis dumont, M. N. Srinivas, Paul and 
laura Bohannan, Julian Pitt-Rivers, godfrey lienhardt, homas Beidelman, 
Ian Cunnison, John peristiany, rodney needham, John K. Campbell, etc.). ow-
ing to them, Evans-pritchard’s interpretivist turn in the early 1950s and his 
favored metaphor for ethnography as “translation of cultures” (cf. Beidelman 
1971) became the foundation for most anthropological approaches to meta-
physical matters on both sides of the Atlantic during the second half of the 
twentieth century.9 he Azande granary (see igure 1) or the nuer twins were 
going to become familiar theoretical mnemonics for practically all trained an-
thropologists thereafter.
Figure 1. he Azande granary (Evans-pritchard, Sudan, 1927–30, pitt rivers Museum 
photographic Collection).
he son of an Anglican priest, Evans-pritchard had undertaken by then a deep-
ly emotional conversion to Catholicism (in 1944—larsen 2014: 91), and his re-
ligious struggles played no small part in his anthropological thinking. Although 
both Steiner (a practicing orthodox Jew) and Evans-pritchard were careful in 
9. Joan Bestard Camps called my attention to the fact that, whilst this was certainly 
the case in English-speaking environments, in Spanish-speaking countries the 
inluence of ortega y gasset played a similar role.
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keeping their religious options away from their academic works, it is not ir-
relevant that they were both deeply engaged “believers.” Indeed, many of their 
students in oxford who were to have a signiicant impact in discussing mat-
ters of religion were also religiously ailiated (e.g., godfrey lienhardt, M. n. 
Srinivas, Mary douglas, rodney needham, Eva gillies, and many more—see 
larsen 2014). for such people, the border between the two metaphysical condi-
tions that methodological relativism imposed (that of science and that of faith) 
required painful policing. 
Judging from his later writings, we might surmise that Evans-pritchard had 
been dissatisied with durkheimian structural functionalism from the very be-
ginning. his theoretical inspiration is rather to be sought in the works that 
Mauss and lévy-Bruhl were publishing in the interwar period and, in turn, his 
work and that of his colleagues directly afected their syntheses.10 he fact is 
that it was only in 1949/50—at a time when he was president of the royal An-
thropological Institute, radclife-Brown having retired, and Malinowski having 
died—that he felt empowered enough to write his irst theoretical manifesto 
(“Social anthropology: past and present,” the 1950 Marett lecture—1962). 
he was bold in his criticism: “I believe we shall not hear much more of so-
ciological laws . . . and that that will be much to the beneit of anthropology” 
(ibid.: 44). In fact, he had never been happy with the sociological positivism of 
the durkheimian school. he actually wonders whether there is “an entity which 
can be labelled ‘society’ and that such an entity has something called a ‘structure’, 
which can be further described as a set of functionally interdependent institu-
tions or sets of social relations. hese are analogies from biological science and, 
if they had their uses, they have also proved to be highly dangerous” (ibid.: 55).
Evans-pritchard’s Marett lecture, his Aquinas lecture, and his 1961 essay 
on “Anthropology and history” (ibid.) can be read together as proposing an in-
terpretivist approach to anthropology that was deeply at odds with the previous 
anthropological status quo and was at the root of the distancing that eventually 
took place between himself, Meyer fortes, and Max gluckman. But it should 
be stressed that the diferences between these men were not merely theoreti-
cal, as they had deep political and philosophical roots. Evans-pritchard’s new 
10. In his reply to Evans-pritchard, lévy-Bruhl (1952) declares that he regrets that 
when he wrote his books, he did not have the quality data that was later available 
as a result of the work of ethnographers of a newer generation. I imagine that the 
confrontation with such work, and particularly Maurice leenhardt’s, would be one 
of the main reasons for his change of mind at the end of his life.
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approach was politically conservative and philosophically based on the meth-
odology of history proposed by r. g. Collingwood (see ibid.: 51), whose lec-
tures he had attended in Oxford in the 1920s when he was a student of Robert 
Marett at Exeter College and clearly had never forgotten.11 Evans-Pritchard 
was a brilliant ethnographic writer whose empiricist creed led him to leave out 
of his writings any reference to his theoretical moorings. In his own words, 
“Perhaps I should regard myself irst as an ethnographer and secondly as a so-
cial anthropologist, because I believe that a proper understanding of the eth-
nographic facts must come before any really scientiic analysis” (1963: 24). As 
a result, his profound theoretical debt to Collingwood’s idealism has remained 
largely unnoticed in anthropological milieus.12
he founding stone of Collingwood’s philosophy of history is that the logic 
of nature and the logic of mind are radically distinct (Collingwood [1946] 1994). 
his explains largely Evans-pritchard’s conviction that “fundamentally there 
never were any real grounds for dispute between what natural science teaches 
about the nature of the physical world and what the Churches teach about 
faith and morals” (1962: 43). he only access to human action, Collingwood 
sustained, is through relexive thinking. So, in order to get to know human 
action, you have to position yourself in the role of the knower as it were by 
proxy. he ethnographer, therefore, has to place himself in the position of “the 
primitives” he studies so as to get to know what they know.13 his is one of the 
reasons why, in his methodological writings, Evans-pritchard emphasizes so 
much the need to actually experience physically the life and tools of the people 
one studies (e.g., [1973] 1976: 243). And, in order to give “us” access to the 
knowledge thus obtained about “them,” the ethnographer has to “translate.” In 
11. See also peter Winch’s comments on Collingwood: “here is a certain respect, 
indeed, in which Collingwood pays insuicient attention to the manner in which a 
way of thinking and the historical situation to which it belongs form one indivisible 
whole” (Winch [1958] 2008: 123) his can be seen to apply to all the long line 
of subsequent anthropological interpretivisms that (whether they know it or not) 
ind their original source in Evans-pritchard’s reading of Collingwood’s philosophy 
of history. I want to thank Tim Jenkins for having called my attention to Evans-
pritchard’s dependence on r. g. Collingwood’s idealist methodology of history. 
12. Mary douglas, for instance, comments explicitly that he promoted “a virtual silence 
of his intellectual debts” (1980: 29). 
13. As we will further develop later, these primitivist theses depend, of course, on an 
implicit representationalist theory of mind that has become naturalized in most 
anthropological discourse (see pina-Cabral 2010a, 2011, and 2013c).
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this process, however, one comes to achieve some greater knowledge of oneself. 
As Collingwood put it, “to know something without knowing that one knows 
it is only a half-knowing, and to know that one knows is to know oneself ” 
([1946] 1994: 204). hus, the study of “the primitives” was a part of the larger 
history of humankind for, again in Collingwood’s words, “the historical process 
is a process in which man creates for himself this or that kind of human nature 
by re-creating in his own thought the past to which he is heir” (ibid.: 226).
human nature (“man’s essence”) is created by humans in the process of ex-
istence by the thinking of history. hus, when they bring the experiences of the 
“primitives” into history, anthropologists are actually shaping human nature. he 
myriad historical and anthropological monographs being written are nothing 
but “chapters in a single historical work,” the process of emergence of human 
essence (ibid.: 27). his metaphysical circularity between essence and existence 
is profoundly connected with Collingwood’s particular interpretation of the 
ontological proof, which we will discuss later on in this chapter.
A surprising characteristic of this approach is that it is based on a deep 
distrust of the cognitive capacities of all humans—what I call for the sake of 
this argument anti-intellectualism. In Collingwood’s formulation: “It is only 
by its and starts, in a lickering and dubious manner, that human beings are 
rational at all” (ibid.: 227). humans are not essentially driven by ostension: to 
the contrary, there are a whole lot of “social restraints on perception,” which it 
is the ethnographer’s task to identify.14 As an ethnographer, therefore, Evans-
pritchard did not despise the primitives for thinking in logically unsatisfactory 
ways or for failing to take the correct conclusions from their experience, since 
he believed that “no one is mainly controlled by reason anywhere or at any ep-
och” (in douglas 1980: 33). Many of the readings of Evans-pritchard’s work on 
the Azande fail to see that he was attempting to explain how religious thought 
operates; he was not validating it as being rational or truthful.
for both Collingwood and Evans-pritchard, “Scientiic thought is a very 
specialized experience that only takes place in very specialized conditions” 
(ibid.: 31). In fact, the ethnographer’s main task as an interpreter of culture was 
precisely to explain “how a metaphysical system could compel belief by a variety 
of self-validating procedures” (ibid.: xviii). hus, douglas describes the main 
challenge that Evans-pritchard addresses in Witchcraft, oracles and magic, as the 
14. his is how Mary douglas explains the nature of the project that Evans-pritchard 
set himself when writing Witchcraft, oracles and magic (1970: xvii).
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need to explain “how a people can use an acceptable idiom to present their 
political system to themselves without worrying about how little it corresponds 
to the facts” (douglas 1970: xvii). his concurs perfectly with Collingwood’s 
preoccupation to explain how modes of thinking that rely on mutually exclusive 
absolute presuppositions can survive perfectly well next to each other.
As it happens, however, this anti-intellectualism is at the root of Evans-
pritchard’s personal religious options, and, in this sense, his theoretical views 
as a social anthropologist cannot be separated from his political and religious 
conservatism. We must not forget that the Catholicism he opted for at the 
time of the war was not the Catholicism that we are familiar with today and 
that was largely molded by the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s. he 
opted for the Ultramontane Catholicism of his day rather than the bland 
protestantism of his own father’s faith. protestantism’s reliance on the Bible 
as the source of belief was, in his eyes, eroded by historical criticism; whilst, 
on the contrary, the Catholic reliance on papal infallibility and the authority 
of the church left it safe beyond the realms of reason. his option, therefore, 
must be seen as an anti-intellectualist declaration very much in the line of 
Collingwood’s idealism: “As Comte long ago most clearly saw, . . . protestant-
ism shades into deism and deism into agnosticism, and . . . the choice is all 
or nothing, a choice which allows of no compromise between a Church which 
has stood its ground and made no concessions, and no religion at all” (Evans-
pritchard 1962: 45).
A polYdIVInISTIC AgE
When we read the work of our more recent colleagues in the light of those of 
an earlier generation, however, it becomes evident that the divide between the 
godless (those who deny the sacred) and the godforsaken (those who insist 
on awaiting a new coming) has shifted its ground. Authors such as Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro (2009) are engaging in genuine metaphysics, even as they 
do so by proxy. If my assessment is correct, anthropology is presently undergo-
ing a further and perhaps even more profound paradigmatic change than in 
the 1920s. heidegger calls this change “the passing of the last god,” when he 
claims that we are searching for a way of being human which is newly “open 
to transient and particular but intense manifestations of a plurality of sacreds” 
(Wrathall and lambeth 2011: 163), where the anxiety about transcendental 
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inaccessibility that characterized the twentieth century and tortured people like 
Evans-Pritchard no longer applies. 
When márcio goldman (2003) states that he actually could hear the drums 
of the dead being called by the shaman, he does not share the sense of para-
dox that accompanies Evans-Pritchard’s similar declaration about seeing a 
witch passing in the Azande night sky. he main diference is that contem-
porary anthropologists no longer rely on the kind of “ideistic” type of belief 
(see Sabbatucci 2000) that rodney needham (1972) deconstructed in his book 
about Evans-pritchard’s concept of belief. To put it in another way, goldman 
no longer feels he has to “believe in” in order to “believe that” (see ruel [1982] 
2002)—being and understanding are seen as related but separate.15
In truth, this change in aspect (or, better still, this ontological transforma-
tion) did not come about unannounced. his form of ethnographic engagement 
with magic and the metaphysical that preserves their transcendence indepen-
dently of the ethnographer’s own declared belief system has been emerging in 
anthropology over the past decades, making its presence felt in some of the 
more well-read ethnographic experiments. one of its most excessive and at the 
same time most poignant reminders is Michael Taussig’s he magic of the state 
(1997), that weirdly fascinating book. his is how he starts it:
how naturally we entify and give life to such. Take the case of god, the economy, 
and the state, abstract entities we credit with Being, species of things awesome 
with life-force of their own, transcendent over mere mortals. Clearly they are 
fetishes, invented wholes of materialized artiice into whose woeful insuiciency 
of being we have placed soulstuf. (1997: 3)
It would seem, then, that his materialist background was going to drive him to 
reject transcendence, but then he proceeds: 
I hope to clarify matters somewhat, and not only for myself, by thinking about 
the magic of the state in a European Elsewhere—your metaphor, my literality—as 
related to a free spirit who frequented those parts, a sunny place, she said, from 
15. In fact, the problem with some of Viveiros de Castro’s recent comments on this 
matter (cf. 2011) is precisely that he continues to pitch his arguments against 
a notion of belief that does not take into account the fact that anthropological 
understanding about what belief is has evolved signiicantly over the decades.
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where oil lows out, cars, ammo, and videos low in, and where a crucial quality 
of being is granted the state of the whole by virtue of death, casting an aura of 
magic over the mountain at its center. (1997: 4, my emphasis)
Rather than contrasted, therefore, literality and metaphor are somehow being 
combined. Two decades ago, when these pages were published, we took them 
to be an instance of creative writing; and that they are. But since then it has 
become clear that, buried inside Taussig’s metaphysical ranting, there was the 
emergence of a whole new way for anthropology to overcome its uncomfort-
ably dichotomic metaphysical condition: Heidegger’s “passing of the last god” 
(1999). We have given up on Evans-Pritchard’s hope of inding the advent of a 
“world-grounding being” in Ultramontane Catholicism, but we have not given 
up on transcendence. rather, to the contrary, anthropologists have chosen to be-
come open to the experience of transcendence in a plurality of divine fashions: 
we are “polydivinistic” to the extent that we learn to foster “whatever practices 
we have left to us for receptivity to the sacred” (heidegger’s words—Wrathall 
and lambeth 2011: 178). 
In line with this, Taussig concludes his book by claiming that the main role 
of anthropology is to bring such a conscience to actualization: that is, “the stor-
ing in modernity of what are taken to be pre-modern practices such as spirit 
possession and magic” (1997: 198, again my emphasis), and this for the sake 
of “profane illumination.” We assume that if these magical practices “are taken 
to be,” then it is because they are not really—or is it modernity that no longer 
“is”? hus, Taussig’s search for an immanent transcendence—for grounding the 
world’s strangeness in its own processes of becoming—relies on a kind of with-
holding of disbelief; it relies on a vicarious experience, assessed via the poly-
divinism of the other: the strange Maria lionza, the erotically charged goddess 
of the Venezuelan other. Taussig remains “modern,” he preserves his “Western-
ness,” and so the true experience of transcendence can only be achieved by proxy.
And indeed, this is a condition very akin to that which Eduardo Viveiros de 
Castro has been elaborating over the years16 when writing about Amerindian 
multinaturalism (2009: ch. 3) inspired by lévi-Strauss’ Mythologiques—the old 
master’s extensive survey of the mythical corpus of the whole of the American 
16. deleuze claims that “transcendence is always a product of immanence” (2001: 31) 
We agree. he issue is the nature of the anthropological account we give of that 
emergence.
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continent. he Amerindian world, Viveiros de Castro claims, is “a world of im-
manent alterity, where the human retains its primordiality” (ibid.: 28). hat is, 
contrary to “us”/ “Westerners,” for whom the transcendental manifests itself 
as utterly nonhuman, Amerindians experience “nature as variation” by means 
of a game of dislocation that Viveiros de Castro calls “perspectivism,” and that 
consists in treating all existing things as centers of intentionality (ibid.: 12). 
Whilst “we” have many cultures but one nature, “they” have many natures but 
one culture, since the focus of the perspective (personhood) is open to all beings. 
When he crosses the boundary of his embodiment as human, the shaman 
“adopts the perspective of the subjectivities of other species, so as to manage the 
relations between the latter and humans” (ibid.: 25). his disposition is based 
on considering that nonhuman agents (other species) see themselves and their 
own behavior much like we humans see our own. According to Viveiros de 
Castro, this involves a radical relocation of the notion of personhood that frees 
it from humanity, in that personhood becomes anterior and logically superior to 
humanity. So, both personhood and perspective cease to be seen as the distinct 
property of this or that species. rather, they are treated as a matter of degree, 
that is, they are the capacity to occupy a point of view (ibid.: 22). for the Amer-
indians, “Between the formal subjectivity of the souls and the substantial mate-
riality of the organisms, there is a central ground which is the body as a bundle 
of afects and capacities, and which is the origin of the perspectives” (ibid.: 40).
All this is very fascinating and takes anthropological theory to realms of 
theoretical sophistication which it has rarely attained since the days of Evans-
pritchard and lévy-Bruhl. Viveiros de Castro asks us to “take seriously” 
Amerindian multinaturalism; and that, of course, we must do, to the extent 
that we must learn its lessons. But its lessons will never be ahistorical; they will 
never remain purely virtual or textual. hey are our contemporary lessons and 
they are not about the ontological appositeness of such an ontology for, whether 
they happen to be Amerindian or not, anthropologists qua17 anthropologists 
are not about to become convicted multinaturalists. I need hardly stress that 
anthropologists are not really expected to adopt Amerindian forms of myth 
making. of course not; the lessons anthropologists have to learn from reading 
the Mythologiques are about how to overcome the inadequacies of previous an-
thropological modes of thinking so as to account for Amerindian metaphysics. 
17. And here, heidegger’s discussion of the “as” (qua) is much to the point (1995: 
353f.).
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to follow Collingwood’s suggestion, we are making ourselves by making all of 
these ontologies part of our history (not only the Amerindian ones, but also that 
of the Buddha, that of Plato, that of Saint Anselm of Canterbury, etc.). No hu-
man experience should remain strange to us; we must think through them all in 
our eforts to give body to our increasingly ecumenical condition.
Still, in order to do that, we have to trace a path that makes them all humanly 
possible and, therefore, available. We do not have to ind the coherence among 
them, the compatibility that will unite them all, nor do we need to close the 
boundaries of the species; we just have to make such experiences verisimilitudi-
nous. hat is the task of ethnography, irst, and of anthropological comparativ-
ism, later. But it remains unavoidable that, faced with such a variety of “regimes 
of veridiction” (descola 2014), we are left with having to propose a metaregime 
of veridiction. In short, we are ontologically responsible for the awareness of the 
existence of a plurality of ontologies. 
now, as argued in the irst chapter, that can only be done satisfactorily by 
refusing to see meaning and reason as dissociated from historically rooted hu-
man experience. It would all be easy if it were a matter of narratives, as when 
Viveiros de Castro claims that: “If there is one thing that it falls to anthropology 
to accomplish, it is not to explicate the worlds of others but rather to multiply 
our world, people it with ‘all those expressed, which do not exist apart from 
their expressions’” (2011: 137). But the problem is that we are not faced with 
having to determine how worlds are (note the plural) according to this or that 
“expression”; we have to account for how meaning is made by persons in world. 
he reason for this is that triangulating human expression with world is the 
only means anyone (ethnographer or not) has of having access to the meaning 
of others.
furthermore, the matter would be simpler if indeed we were dealing with 
collectively deined ontologies, that is, “cultures.” But cultures (and their compo-
nent elements) cannot be observed as such; they are the product of the analyti-
cal eforts of the ethnographer. Viveiros de Castro claims: 
Anthropology’s mission, as a social science, is to describe the forms which, and 
the conditions under which, truth and falsity are articulated according to the dif-
ferent ontologies that are presupposed by each culture (a culture here being taken 
as analogous to a scientiic theory, which requires its own ontology—that is, its 
own ield of objects and processes—in order for the theory to generate relevant 
truths). (2011: 143)
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Not only is he assuming an all-or-nothing theory of truth in the above passage, 
but he is assuming that cultures ofer themselves for our observation (a) as cul-
tures (which is not the case, the job of the ethnographer is analytical) and (b) as 
narrative structures, like a scientiic theory. his, of course, is not the case. Vivei-
ros de Castro had to approach the Arawetê before he produced a metaphysics 
of the world he inhabited with them. he is the author of their ontology. It all 
becomes even more complex, of course, when we are dealing with fully contem-
porary urban contexts, where a history of anthropological debate is already part 
of what is being studied, as Matei Candea noted (2011). here, it is simply im-
possible not to distrust the disposition for proposing ontological barriers which 
anthropology inherited from nineteenth-century primitivism.
faced, then, with the need to “take seriously” ethnographic material, tran-
scendence, in particular, becomes a challenge for the anthropologist, for the 
very words we use to convey it betray us horribly, owing to their profound 
ontological implications. Words such as “god,” “soul,” or “spirit” should never 
be used without considerable reserve. See, for example, the confusions that 
have characterized the anthropological adoption of the word soul when applied 
to Chinese traditional contexts (pina-Cabral 2002a: 120–25). lévi-Strauss 
and Viveiros de Castro, of all people, are fully aware of this, even as they use 
these terms. Such words have the same efect as “modern” and “nonmodern” 
in Taussig’s writing: they reconstitute the ontological barrier (the summa di-
visio) through the back door. If, however, we give up on single-world ontol-
ogy, adopting a form of culturalist agnosticism, we are back in a situation of 
godforsakenness.
here is, nevertheless, a lesson that we must take from the work of the 
Amerindianists: the lesson of becoming. hat is, the observation that, whatever 
our ontology comes to be, it cannot be about ixed entities but it must be about 
transformation. It cannot be about simple repetition or symmetry, but it must 
be about movement of essence, about broken symmetry (cf. lévi-Strauss [1958] 
1963). As it happens, we are strongly encouraged to go that way by a radi-
cally diferent authority: that of contemporary physics (see lederman and hill 
2004). As Marc Kirschner, John gerhart, and Tim Mitchison propose, “here is 
no guarantee that the capacities of human knowledge in an undesigned world 
will ever mesh entirely with the crooked ways of the world itself ”—that is, 
indeterminacy rules (2000: 81). In short, we have no reason to worry about the 
epistemological break, since the notion that it is possible to know the world in 
a fully determinate manner never even arises.
48 World: AN ANthroPologICAl ExAmINAtIoN
If, then, we ind that the postulation of a single external source of tran-
scendental truth—such as implicit in the Traditions of the Book—is no longer 
available to us, as it prevents us from making sense of too many other humanly 
desirable worlds, but we ind that Amerindian multinaturalism, or greek poly-
theism, are equally unavailable, then where are we going to search for the origi-
nal ground to the experience of transcendence that we no longer wish to treat as 
being somehow inchoate, primitive, or false, as did Mclennan, lubbock, Tylor, 
Westermarck, or frazer in their day? 
AnIMIST TrAnSCEndEnCE
his was an issue that troubled Evans-pritchard his life through. In a methodo-
logical paper written in 1973, he asks: “In writing about the beliefs of primitive 
peoples does it matter one way or the other whether one accords them validity 
or regards them as fallacious?” ([1973] 1976: 244). his decided conclusion is 
that it matters, but then he despairs over the fact that he cannot really believe in 
witches but yet he did learn a lot about god from the nuer. If indeed “witches” 
and “god” were mere representations, empirically encountered cultural items, 
they should have had the same truth status. It is a problem to which, he ex-
claims, he has no answer. his anthropological agnosticism is godforsaken.18 
As it happens, a similar quandary remains very present in the works of 
philippe descola, one of the most congenial anthropological accounts of world 
that has emerged over the past two decades (see, e.g., descola 2014). his is a 
minimalist realist account that is diversiied by the claim that humans exist 
within distinct “ontological ilters.” he suggests that “‘what is the case for us’ is 
not a complete and self-contained world waiting to be represented according to 
diferent viewpoints, but, most probably, a vast amount of qualities and relations 
that can be actualized or not by humans according to how ontological ilters 
discriminate between environmental afordances” (ibid.: 272–73, my emphasis). 
Unfortunately, this position also fails to advance our contemporary puzzlement 
with transcendence. first, one can see that descola is going over ground that 
Evans-pritchard had already covered in his interpretivist turn, but, second, one is 
struck by the “most probably” clause. his clause is a declaration of “withholding 
18. In that sense his personal (not anthropological) option for roman Catholicism can 
be seen as a deeply courageous response to metaphysical despair.
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of disbelief,” a declaration of agnosticism (to speak perhaps less metaphorically 
than it might at irst seem), and thus a recognition of godforsakenness. 
According to descola, human worlds can be composed according to “onto-
logical ilters” or “framing devices.” hese are “systems of diferences in the ways 
humans inhabit the world” and there can be four of them: animism, totemism, 
analogism, and naturalism, in that order (ibid.: 273–74). Irrespective of the pa-
tently heuristic value of the diferences that descola identiies, readers have to 
ask themselves where does he place himself when he proposes them. for where 
he places himself is where “we” are placed (we being his anthropologically in-
formed assumed audience, whether we are portuguese, as is the present case, 
Chinese, Amerindian, or whatever). hus, descola sees human diference when 
faced with world in a kind of continuum where animism is the farthest away 
from the description and naturalism/us is the closest. his is why the apparently 
discreet escape valve in the above sentence—the agnostic clause—turns out to 
be so relevant. naturalism is our own ontology but we can only really know it 
exists because we contrast it with that which is least “ours”: “naturalism inverts 
the ontological premises of animism” (ibid.: 277). 
Again, independently of the genuine heuristic appositeness of descola’s 
quadriculation of world, this account shares with that of Viveiros de Castro 
(and both of them with the Ur-myth: lévi-Strauss’s Mythologiques) what I have 
been calling over the years a “primitivist disposition.”19 hat is, the notion that 
collective others do it otherwise and anthropologists are not collectively part 
of those who otherwise it. In short, anthropologists are postulated as being col-
lectively and ontologically external to the human realities they describe—the 
latter, of course, being also described as eminently collective. I call this disposi-
tion primitivist not only because of its historical roots in the nineteenth-century 
evolutionistic history of our discipline, but principally because it associates es-
sentiality with primordiality (things that are most simple, are also considered to 
be more essential, and, therefore, anterior).
descola, for example, concludes his most recent account by stating that in 
order “to take stock of the fact that worlds are diferently composed,” we have to 
“understand how they are composed without automatic recourse to our own mode 
of composition” (ibid.: 279). hus, to take recourse to a metaphor, each collectiv-
ity of humans is itted into its respective ontological shelf, but no one is about to 
19. All this is made painfully clear in an interview that lévi-Strauss (1998) gave to 
Viveiros de Castro and that has been published in portuguese in Mana.
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account for the whole bookshelf. his kind of agnosticism, therefore, amounts in 
the end to a form of culturalist idealism to the extent that it forgets we do not 
import representations into the world, because we are always already part of it. In 
metaphysical terms, indeed, we are essentially back where Collingwood left us.
faced with the godforsakenness of such positions, it is no wonder that a 
number of colleagues are attempting to open ontological doors for “the pass-
ing of the last god.” Many, in the wake of the work of Bruno latour, are trying 
to postulate the bookshelf by radically and openly embracing transcendence 
(cf. Bennett 2010 or Connolly 2011). his, I insist, is quite as honest a theo-
retical option as the forms of agnosticism that Evans-pritchard, descola, and 
Viveiros de Castro espouse. William Connolly’s defense of what he calls “im-
manent naturalism,” which has received so much critical attention of late, is a 
case in point (Connolly 2001). Again, we are dealing with an author who, like 
Michael Taussig, takes the literal implications of his engagement with tran-
scendence by regularly slipping from philosophical analysis into poetry. 
In anthropology, the most creative postulation of this position is perhaps 
to be found in Eduardo Kohn’s book How forests think: Toward an anthropol-
ogy beyond the human (2013). he starts by manifesting his impatience with our 
contemporary quandary: “he recognition of multiple realities only sidesteps 
the question: can anthropology make general claims about the way the world 
is?” (ibid.: 10, original emphasis). In order to resolve it, he proceeds to develop a 
creative and highly idiosyncratic reading of peircian semiotics. he proposes to 
go beyond the human in order to “situate distinctively human ways of being in 
the world as both emergent from and in continuity with a broader living semi-
otic realm” (ibid.: 16). he sees life as causally producing thought. (Incidentally, 
for him too, stones do not think—which Connolly and Bennett would strongly 
dispute.) hus, he attempts to reunite thinking and understanding. 
So far so good, but then he claims that “if thoughts exist beyond the human, 
then we humans are not the only selves in the world” (ibid.: 72). In this way, he 
proposes to generalize animism: “If thoughts are alive and if that which lives 
thinks, then perhaps the living world is enchanted” (ibid.). hus, like Taussig, 
Viveiros de Castro, and so many anthropologists before them, Kohn wants to 
safeguard the genuine “strangeness” (and this seems to be one of his favorite 
words) of the way in which the world presents itself to the Ecuadorean runa 
among whom he lived. however, he is going one step further in his attempt not 
to dissolve, deny, or diminish the genuine mystery of what the forest and its be-
ings communicate to the runa. he is looking for transcendence in immanence.
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I must refer the reader to Kohn’s book for the complexity of his argument 
and the masterful way in which he intersperses dense ethnographic analysis 
with complex semiotic theory. for the purposes of the present argument, how-
ever, it is suicient to note that the coherence of his theoretical proposition 
depends on the manipulation of the meaning of two central words: self and 
representation. Kohn refuses to distinguish “representation” from “presentation” 
or “reference”;20 neither does he make the distinction between intentionality 
and propositionality (basic thought v. scafolded thought).21 In this way, he at-
tributes relexivity to forms of intentionality that, patently, do not possess it. So 
he confuses intentionality (being directed at the world, possessing a telos) with 
propositionality (the capacity to engage the world relexively, which can only be 
acquired through access to language). hus, for him, since all life demonstrates 
intentionality, all life thinks, and, since thinking is representing, all life manifests 
self: ergo, “dogs . . . are selves because they think” (ibid.: 73). 
Kohn deines self as “a form that is reconstituted and propagated over the 
generations in ways that exhibit increasingly better its to the worlds around 
it” (ibid.: 55). now, as it happens, he is not the irst to attempt to extend the 
meaning of self beyond consciousness in order to describe more generally life’s 
concern to exist or to carry on being. francisco Varela and his associates have 
been using the notion of a “primitive feeling of self ” to describe “a kind of primi-
tive self-awareness or animation of the body” (hompson 2007: 161). hey are, 
however, careful to dissociate such a use from a representationalist view of mind, 
such as Kohn adheres to, precisely in order to avoid the sort of abusive generali-
zations he engages upon.22
here is, furthermore, a problem of conceptual economy, so to speak, in this 
option to deine selfhood in such a deeply unconventional manner, so as to apply 
it to both persons and nonpersons: the original reason that the freudians gave 
for adopting and divulging the concept in the irst place was to refer to an entity 
that relects upon its own existence. he relexivity of self was self ’s deinitional 
distinction throughout the twentieth century. Some of us, such as myself, may 
20. See hompson (2007: 288): “A re-presentational experience constitutes its object 
precisely as both phenomenally absent in its bodily being and as mentally evoked or 
brought forth.” 
21. See hutto and Myin (2013). his is further developed in chapter 3 below.
22. In hompson’s words, “[It] seems unlikely that minimal autopoietic selfhood 
involves phenomenal selfhood or subjectivity, in the sense of a prerelective self-
awareness constitutive of a phenomenal irst-person perspective” (ibid.: 163).
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have doubts about the concept, in particular concerning the way it lends itself 
to forms of reiication of thought that fail to understand that self is essentially 
a positionality (an arena of presence and action, as Johnston [2010] puts it) and 
that tend to confuse selfhood with soul (see givens 2012). But the problem is 
that this is precisely what Kohn’s animism aims to do: he wants to reanimate 
the world and, in doing this, explain transcendence as a product of immanence.
As it happens, Kohn is indeed pointing in the right direction in attempting 
to resolve the quandary of transcendence; unfortunately, his animism stands 
or falls on what amounts to little more than a metaphor between how humans 
think and how semiosis operates in nonhuman life.
ThE onTologICAl proof
At this point, we might usefully go back to the roots of Evans-pritchard’s thought 
in Collingwood’s philosophy of history and its reliance on a very particular inter-
pretation of a philosophical form of proof that is generally known as the ontolog-
ical proof of god’s existence (henceforward op). Collingwood is hardly the only 
modern thinker to have entertained it, as a number of his more distinguished con-
temporaries, such as Bertrand russell and Kurt gödel, seem to have been equally 
fascinated by the implications of the proof (Southern 1990: 128). Collingwood 
argues convincingly that, of all of medieval philosophy, the op is perhaps the 
most valuable legacy to modernity. descartes, Spinoza, hegel, are some of those 
who explicitly took recourse to it. Indeed, as Collingwood puts it, Kant constitutes 
“perhaps the only occasion on which anyone has rejected it who really understood 
what it meant” ([1933] 2005: 126). Whilst, in its simplest form, the argument may 
appear to the uninitiated as almost puerile, we are well advised to look beyond 
that irst reaction if we take the history of philosophy as our guide. As Anselm’s 
biographer notes, whether or not we ind the argument logically convincing (and 
we have gödel as an authority on that, no less!), it surely has “some hidden source 
of life,” for it continues to challenge us today (Southern 1990: 132).
Anselm (1033–1109) was a Benedictine monk of Italian origin who, in 
1093, became the second archbishop of Canterbury after the norman Con-
quest.23 While his life in the monastery at Bec, in normandy, as a thinker and 
23. I am indebted to r. W. Southern’s exemplary personal and intellectual biography of 
Saint Anselm (1990)
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intellectual leader, had been deeply contemplative, his time as archbishop was 
troubled by serious political conlicts with the king. like so many English ec-
clesiastic leaders after him (Saint homas à Becket and Sir/Saint homas More 
being perhaps the more tragic examples), he found his allegiance to the pope 
conlicted with his allegiance to the king and he was forced into exile more than 
once. As he was a devout adherent of the Benedictine monastic ideal, Anselm’s 
tenure as archbishop was characterized both by to a reinforcement of the rights 
and independence of the monastic community at Canterbury and by a continu-
ation of his predecessor’s work of rebuilding the cathedral, which had burnt 
down in 1067. We owe to him much of the eastern part of today’s building 
(Southern 1990: 326–27).
Anselm was a devout and orthodox Christian believer, inspiring himself in 
the Augustinian theological tradition. his starting point is that, since thinking 
creatures were created by god, it should be possible for them to ind within them-
selves, by contemplation, god’s own traces (Connolly and d’oro in Collingwood 
[1933] 2005: xi). hus, he dedicated himself to the discovery of how “the reality 
of god’s existence is bound up with the very nature of human understanding” 
(Evans 1989: 106). As a result, his arguments are not dependent on authority; 
they are based on the examination of the sense impressions and on self-knowl-
edge, and aim to be self-authenticating (Southern 1990: 122). hus he called his 
irst treatise Monologion, precisely “because in it he alone speaks and argues with 
himself ”—explains Eadmer, his disciple and biographer (ibid.: 116). Apparently, 
the proof of god’s existence formed itself in Anselm’s mind one day at Bec, dur-
ing Matins, as Deo gratias was being sung, and he proceeded to expound it in his 
second treatise, Proslogion (Anselm 1998: 82–105). he two works were composed 
between 1076 and 1078. In what follows, I will also take recourse to his essay 
called De veritate, probably written three or four years later, where he expounds 
what we might call today his epistemological assumptions (Southern 1990: 172).
he op hinges on a deinition of god that Anselm possibly found in Seneca 
(that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought), but which he places in a 
radically new context (ibid.: 129–30). he essentially attempts to prove that the 
nonexistence of god is logically indefensible. he following is the argument in 
his own words: even one who denies the existence of god (the fool, as Anselm 
calls him, following psalm 13: 1) 
is forced to agree that something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought 
exists in the mind .  .  . [but] surely it cannot exist in the mind alone. for if it 
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exists solely in the mind, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater. 
If then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind alone, 
this same that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is that-than-which-
a-greater-can-be-thought. But this is obviously impossible. herefore, there is 
absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought 
exists both in mind and reality. (Anselm 1998: 87–88, original emphasis)
he concludes, it is not possible to deny god’s existence without entering into 
self-contradiction. And note, this is not a mere play on words, since the argu-
ment is logically coherent. What the op does not tell us about is the nature of 
its subject matter, which Anselm proceeds to develop in the rest of his oeuvre. 
once we distance ourselves from his particular conception of what god is, the 
op becomes a powerful argument concerning how essence (a being’s beingness) 
and existence (a being’s occurrence) are in fact related. It is in this sense that 
Spinoza uses it in the irst sentence of his Ethics, when he cites it indirectly in 
order to present his obscure but increasingly inluential deinition of god (Deus 
sive natura): “By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence 
involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent” 
(Spinoza [1677] 2013: I, deinition 1)
And this is where Collingwood takes up the argument. for people like him-
self, russell, or gödel, what is at stake in the ontological argument is not the 
nature of any speciic god. for them, the op does not prove the existence of the 
Christian god. What it proves is that, in matters of metaphysics, essence and ex-
istence must be thought of as ultimately inseparable—there is no pure ens rationis, 
thought is never free of objective or ontological reference (Collingwood [1933] 
2005: 127 and 124). Collingwood’s recourse to this argument in his Philosophi-
cal method prefaces his denial of philosophical skepticism in that it proves that 
thought “afords an instance of something which cannot be conceived except as 
actual, something whose essence involves existence” (ibid.: 131) Similarly, Evans-
pritchard’s point about his learning about god (his Ultramontane Catholic god) 
from the nuer suggests that his belief in god did not depend on any particu-
lar theological argument or speciic theological faith; it was something that he 
found when he was forced to immerse himself in human interaction—something 
the nuer demanded of him, as opposed to the Azande (Evans-pritchard [1973] 
1976). rather, he concluded, people do not live by reason. As he put it: “no one 
is mainly controlled by reason anywhere or at any epoch” (cited in douglas 1980: 
33). he Absolute—or transcendence, to speak more generally—is implicit in 
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human experience; we ind it within ourselves through meditation, for it is there 
in us before we have even started to reason about the world.
AnSElM’S InSIghT
now, only a few years after he discovered the op, Saint Anselm attempted an 
explanation of how he saw essence as implying existence by relation to the hu-
man person. his argument is particularly fascinating for anthropologists today 
because it sits on a notion of personhood that is radically distinct from the indi-
vidualist take that twentieth-century anthropology mostly assumed and which 
dates to the Enlightenment. Anselm operated with a notion of the human per-
son that is a relection of god’s person and he explains one by reference to the 
other. for him, the Trinitarian god is a partible person, so the dividuality of 
persons is an intrinsic part of his anthropology, so to speak.
In fact, the implications of this go deeper than mere theology, for they are 
patent in his letters to his friends. his engagement with his monastic condition 
was so deep and emotional that his letters to his monk friends evoke in us ech-
oes of homosexuality—which, according to his biographer, is a deeply irrelevant 
and chronocentric reading (Southern 1990: 149–53). Moreover, this partibility 
carries with it broader implications, since he saw in the pleasures of friendship a 
foretaste of the pleasures of heaven. hus, he postulates a joint soul as an essential 
characteristic of the monastic community and, therefore, for him, parting from 
his companions (as he had to do more than once in the latter part of his life, to his 
immense chagrin) was nothing less than a scissura animae (a breach of the soul).
In De veritate (Anselm 1998: 151–74), his inluential essay on truth, Anselm 
grounds reason in belief. he grants precedence to belief over reason, thus work-
ing on a tradition of thinking grafted to the platonic inspiration of Augustinian 
theology. In short, after having searched his soul in deep meditation, Anselm 
concludes that engagement with god is a precondition for cognition, not the 
other way round. Content and form coemerge; belief is a condition for reason, 
not its result. Anselm famously declared, “for I do not seek to understand so 
that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand. for I believe this also, 
that ‘unless I irst believe, I shall not understand’” [Isa. 7: 9]’ (ibid.: 87).
following on Collingwood, we must ask ourselves whether we can capture 
today that which, in Anselm’s insight, was so convincing that it continues to 
provoke our imagination. Sure enough, it might have been simpler to discard 
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his insight, but that would have left us anthropologically impoverished. After 
all, when Emmanuel levinas (1961) places alterity as anterior to identity, when 
Christina toren (2002: 122) argues that “mind is a function of the whole person 
constituted over time in intersubjective relations with others in the environ-
ing world,” or when developmental psychologists tell us that intersubjectivity is 
anterior to subjectivity (see Bråten [1998] 2006), are we not running surpris-
ingly close to Anselm’s insight? What we have come to discover of late is that 
personal ontogeny is launched before propositional thinking emerges. In other 
words, in order to have conscious thoughts, humans have had to be called into 
communication by other humans before them. language use is associated to 
personhood and each human does not invent language individually each time; 
rather, the members of the human species predicate personhood on a previously 
existent history of language use. (here language is being used in the broadest 
possible sense to include gestural communication as practiced by infants.)
Back in the twelfth century, Anselm wrought his arguments concerning 
truth and immanence by searching within himself for the origin of what al-
lowed him to understand the world. taking recourse to introspection, he found 
that the other, which he called god, was buried deep within himself and was 
anterior to his own thought. he saw it as constituting the origin of his being 
(fons et origo—cause and source). And, much like him, we are also disposed 
today to place belief before understanding, in the sense that we are willing to 
accept that, for each one of us, personal ontogeny started before reason. In other 
words, so as to think relexively (i.e., so as to engage in content-bearing proposi-
tional thinking), each human person has to have been previously inserted within 
a process of human communication. levinas’ observation that “human experi-
ence is social before it is rational” is probably the simplest way of capturing what 
is at stake here (finkielkraut [1984] 1997: 10). 
hus, much like Anselm perceived nine centuries ago, for each one of us, 
deinitions do impose themselves before reason. We do not irst learn the struc-
ture of grammar and then the meaning of words—both happen at the same 
time. In our post-darwinian age, each one of us is seen as a product not only of 
his or her own immediate microhistory (our personal ontogeny) but also of the 
history of our species (human phylogeny).24 As we are all called into humanity 
24. Evolution is human history. Ingold states this in a somewhat diferent manner: 
“history is but the continuation of an evolutionary process by another name” 
(1995:77).
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by other humans, communication is indeed a condition for existence as a world-
forming person and not the other way round. Sociality is anterior to personhood 
(see chapter 5).
As it happens, there is a further interesting lesson concealed within Anselm’s 
words. he latin sentence used by him to translate the prophet Isaiah’s words 
is nisi credidero, non intelligam,25 that is, “unless I irst believe, I shall not un-
derstand.” Yet, in the modern latin Vulgate, the sentence is rendered as si non 
credideritis non permanebitis, which the King James’ translators versed as: “If ye 
will not believe, surely ye shall not be established.” What, then, is the relation 
between understanding and being established in a land (in the sense of being 
a legitimate dweller, which is the meaning that modern translations give to 
Isaiah’s original prophecy)? In the diferent biblical renditions the passage is 
translated in many difering ways, but curiously always bearing the same seman-
tic slippage between inhabiting and being believed: “If you are not irm in faith, 
you will not be irm at all” (English Standard Version);26 “If you do not stand 
irm in your faith, you will not stand at all” (new International Version);27 “If 
you do not have faith, you shall not be believed” (Moeller haus publisher, based 
on the Qumran dead Sea Scrolls).28 Ultimately, however, we are learning here a 
lesson about the relation between dwelling and understanding that is at the crux 
of our present debate. Understanding—because it happens to persons—implies 
a sharing of place and there is no anterior moment in which one was ever alone 
within one’s reason before facing the reason of others.
far from me to try to engage in biblical exegesis or in the history of scholas-
tic philosophy, my aim here is merely to note that, as is often the case in the ety-
mology of individual words, in this web of related translations we meet up with 
a series of transformations that associate understanding to dwelling (being con-
vincing, being irm, residing, dwelling permanently, setting up roots in a land, 
being legitimately established as owner of a land). What links understanding to 
dwelling is that both imply a rootedness in a shared placed (iii—the conigured 
environment) and in the wider world (i—the embracing cosmos), combining to 
produce the social legitimacy of the agent (ii—the perspectival role of home). 
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in his discussion of “dwelling,” Ingold explains that “human children, like the 
young of many other species, grow up in environments furnished by the work of 
previous generations, and as they do so they come literally to carry the forms of 
their dwelling in their bodies—in speciic skills, sensibilities and dispositions” 
(1995: 77).
We conclude that to postulate an epistemological break between human 
content-bearing understanding and nature is to overlook the modes of opera-
tion of personal ontogeny and human phylogeny. If a condition for propositional 
thinking is to have entered thought by the hand of other humans within modes 
of dwelling that are never abstract but always historical, then the wider meaning 
of “world” will be necessarily tied up to the unicity and diversity of history in 
all of its complexity: cosmic history, sociogenetic history, phylogenetic history, 
and ontogenetic history—the cosmos, life and the social, the species, the person. 
AgAInST rEprESEnTATIonAlISM
reformulated in terms of our contemporary notions of personhood, Anselm’s 
insight was that his own internal arena of presence and action (his self or ego, 
cf. Johnston 2010) did not preexist world (origo), neither did it produce world 
(fons); rather it was grounded upon a previously existent conigured world. first 
he had to believe; only then could he engage in reasoning: existence preceded 
essence.
he central importance of this observation for anthropology is that it forces 
us to question our more established assumptions concerning the nature of the 
human mind. In default mode, anthropologists take cognition to be intellectual: 
content bearing, conscious, and linguistically shaped. Whoever counters these 
basic representationalist assumptions is just taken to be discombobulating. An-
thropological folklore, for example, takes it as settled that “people think in lan-
guages.” Multilinguals like myself are asked recurrently in what language do we 
dream, as if that question could make any sense. he reason people ask is that 
they take it for granted that if you dream in English, you think in English. I often 
have tried to explain that, yes, concepts and words speciic to particular languages 
do play an important part in one’s mental universe; but no, we do not “think in 
any one language in particular.” In any case, my own experience is that my re-
sponse always fails to register on my interlocutors; the intellectualist assumptions 
are too powerful, so they overrule. I am simply taken to be a confused person.
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In the same way, the ethnographic task is assumed to be that of capturing 
people’s concepts (normally represented in our texts by speciic native words 
that we take out of context) and explaining them to our learned public so that 
they too can “think” them. hese concepts that ethnographers learn are taken 
to be emic, that is, conscious, linguistic, representational. It is a constant sur-
prise to me how unremittingly resistant anthropological commonplace has been 
to the challenges posed by people like gregory Bateson or rodney needham, 
who crashed against the limitations of this view of mind various decades ago 
(Bateson 1972; needham 1987: 233; see also 1972), or people in other disci-
plines such as francisco Varela, Evan hompson, and Eleanor rosch (1991). In 
particular, more recently, the emergence of embodied cognition as an important 
actor in the philosophical scene has largely passed unnoticed (e.g. Clark and 
Chalmers 1998; hutto 2008; Chemero 2009; gallagher and Jacobson 2012; 
hutto and Myin 2013). recent eforts at providing an overview of cognition 
for anthropologists have once again indulged this representationalist tradition 
(cf. Bloch 2012). I am convinced, however, that it is high time that anthro-
pologists took on board the growing consensus among philosophers and neu-
ropsychologists that basic cognition is embodied, that is, it is not grounded on 
content-bearing representations. 
As the supporters of radical embodied cognition have demonstrated, the 
assumptions of the representational view are simply not warranted in the face 
of our present knowledge (see Chemero 2009 or hompson 2007: 267–311). In 
short, most thought processes are not of a linguistic kind, as assumed by the ma-
jority of anthropologists. his is not to say that there are no areas of mind where 
such content-bearing ideas exist supported by complex systems of reiication, 
including, of course, language. But even in such processes the possibility of one’s 
conscious access to one’s own thought processes should not be taken for grant-
ed, as there is little evidence that we can have integral direct conscious recall of 
our own thought processes, even those that take recourse to images mediated by 
language and symbolic forms (see frankfurt 2009). Indeterminacy operates not 
only between communicating persons, but also within single persons.
here is a way of circumventing this view of mind, if we accept that non-
verbal responding in everyday contexts is not to be understood as “a property 
of content-bearing mental states or representations” (hutto 2008: xii) rather, 
“nonverbal animals and preverbal infants .  .  . are intentionally directed at as-
pects of their environment in ways that neither involve nor implicate truth-
conditional content” (ibid.). over the past decade it has come to be increasingly 
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patent that meaning is not merely in our heads (Chemero 2003). rather, it 
is a function of the animal’s relation with the surrounding environment, as it 
responds to afordances. hese, in turn, are “animal-relative properties of the 
environment.” In this sense, therefore, they are not in the environment, but of 
it (lenarčič and Winter 2013). Scafolded (symbolic) mind is characteristic of 
humans who “have appropriately mastered certain sophisticated linguistic con-
structions and practices” (hutto 2008: xii), but it is based in the same processes 
of basic mind.
Anselm’s insight, therefore, helps us make sense of the fact that our basic cog-
nitive processes, those that lie at the root of the shared intentionality that started 
our ontogenesis as persons, are not representational processes (Tomasello 2008). 
rather, they are a direct embodied engagement with the world, a worlding, as 
we will later qualify it. It is on the basis of such processes of intentionality that, 
through a participation in complex human communication (central to which 
is the learning of a human language), human beings start building their arenas 
of presence and action (their selves) and start accessing propositional thinking. 
But even then, our self could never possibly be a semiotic machine, operating 
through logically associated conscious representations, as representationalists 
would have it. Basic cognition goes on operating all the time; without it we 
could not be minimally proicient as living mammals. 
In short, basic mind (i.e., most of our thinking) does not involve what an-
thropologists normally call “concepts”: it is intentional, not conceptual. neither 
does it follow the rules of some predetermined system of reasoning, some “log-
ic,” of the kind that lévi-Strauss assumed in he savage mind (1966). he point 
is that, in order to achieve conscious, content-bearing thoughts, we previously 
have had to be grafted onto a speciic world by means of basic mind. hat is, “our 
primary worldly engagements are nonrepresentational and do not take the form 
of intellectual activity” (hutto 2008: 51). nevertheless, the world we inhabit 
(and, in particular, the contexts in which we are cared for as a child) is marked 
by the history of sociality in speciic ways that constrain and mold our engage-
ments with world and, consequently, with other human beings. herefore, much 
like Anselm, later on in life, when we engage in relexive self-analysis, we dis-
cover that those dispositions, this scafolding of world, have always been there. 
In order to be able to think propositionally, we have had to depend on the tracks 
around world provided by nonrepresentational thought. We have had to believe 
so as to understand. 
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Now, all beliefs are propped on other beliefs—the condition donald 
davidson calls the holism of the mental (2001: 98–99). But it is important to re-
alize that holism predates the existence of proper truth-conditional beliefs and 
coexists with them at all times. mysteriously, it would seem, the world “worlds” 
(heidegger [1929/30] 1995): it was present in us in all of its complexity even 
before we realized that we were present in it. god, indeed, would have been a 
useful way of mediating such a mystery. But, in science, we are short of Anselm’s 
revealed god. herefore, we become dependent on the notion that humans 
master intentional thinking before and as a condition for exercising proposi-
tional thinking, as the self only emerges in the course of personal ontogeny. 
So now we ask: If the world was within us before we became persons, then, 
in precisely what way was it there? We emerge as persons in a world that is 
always historically speciic. herefore, the strict instructionalism of the repre-
sentationalists also needs to be abandoned (see hutto and Myin 2013: 49): it 
is not that we “learn a culture,” “learn a religion,” “learn a language”; it is rather 
that we ind ourselves in a world where that cosmology or language is present. 
We do not think those things before we use them; we ind ourselves using them 
before we relect on what we are doing. our houses, our streets, the rhythm of 
our days, our food, and so on, are immersed in historically shaped environments 
where the structuring of human action has happened long ago: as Jesse prinz 
puts it, “he world is not a blooming, buzzing confusion; it is an orderly net-
work of entities interacting in systematic ways” (in hutto 2008: 110). language 
is merely one of the many areas of reiication of past human actions that sur-
round us. hat is one of the reasons why we are so often struck by epiphanies—
suddenly we realize that the world is ordered; we are surprised to discover that 
there was meaning there, even before we postulated it. But the only reason we 
are surprised is because we had thought of ourselves as gods, as the originators 
of thought; we had cut ourselves of from human history.
In the same way, as ethnographers, we are puzzled when we ind that our 
informants are often incapable of telling us what they believe in. here is that 
famous example of Malinowski slowly and painstakingly piecing together the 
local theory of human reproduction that none of his Kiriwina contemporaries 
had been capable of explaining to him (1932: 11–15). Can we honestly claim 
that, if he had to piece it together, then it is because it had not been there? no, 
we cannot aford to claim that, as it would sound the death knell of all subse-
quent ethnographies, our own ethnographies included.
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If that, then, is the case, we are bound to agree that “culture”—that is, a 
semiotic system of representations—is probably not a useful way of describing 
what ethnographers are studying (cf. d. James, Plaice, and toren 2013). our 
subjects of study do not hold most of what we describe as conscious representa-
tions. And, contra Kohn, it makes even less sense to try to transform all forms of 
life into representational selves. rather, the writing of ethnography consists of 
proposing an abstraction of the way people’s world is shaped: it aims to inform 
about the way human action has reiied itself into a speciic local world, in the 
form of houses, objects, routes, names, languages, texts, gestures, rituals, and so 
on. Such things were going on all around our informants long before they even 
knew to distinguish them for what they are. Indeed, as Anselm discovered, each 
one of us had to have access to those things in order to develop propositional 
thinking, to come to be aware of our own selves.
TrAnSCEndEnCE And pArTICIpATIon
have we, then, made any improvement in resolving anthropology’s problems 
with transcendence? his is certainly the question that poses itself at this point, 
since to treat people’s experience of transcendence as somehow erroneous 
amounts to a serious abdication of our capacity to account for the world humans 
inhabit. Today, this is a consensual assessment throughout our discipline. In 
what follows, therefore, we will go on to propose that a nonrepresentationalist 
view of mind may help us respond better to that challenge.29
We must irst return to the notion of “participation,” particularly as devel-
oped by lucien lévy-Bruhl in his late personal notes (published posthumous-
ly—[1949] 1998).30 As Evans-pritchard saw when he was a young lecturer in 
Cairo, this can be a very useful door toward understanding how transcend-
ence is an inevitable part of personhood. In fact, the concept originated 
with plato to refer to the way particulars “participate” in the “ideas/forms.” 
Aristotle, later, famously refuted it in his Metaphysics. he important shift in 
29. his section follows on an argument already more extensively developed in pina-
Cabral (2014a).
30. note, this concept of participation is not at all, of course, the same that goodwin 
and goodwin (2004) develop in their essay on the subject, where they make no 
reference to lévy-Bruhl but rather cite gofman’s notion of participation Status.
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the meaning of the concept, however, occurred with Saint homas Aquinas, 
who held it to mean broadly “to receive partially what belongs to another in a 
universal way” (in Koterski 1992: 189). In the strongest sense, Aquinas uses it 
to describe how an efect shares in the perfection of its cause, not only in terms 
of its genuine composition (involving both its essence and its existence) but 
also in terms of imitation (i.e., the desire it experiences to return to its origin 
in god). 
for Aquinas, as indeed for lévy-Bruhl, participation is not merely a cogni-
tive disposition; it also involves a sense of embodied copresence. lévy-Bruhl 
takes the concept away from a Christian context and starts using it to refer to 
the way people (“primitives” at irst, but later on in his life all persons) perceive 
themselves to be intrinsically involved in other people (i.e., to be part of them); 
indeed, both with other people and with certain objects (namely, in the light of 
Marcel Mauss’ theory of the gift—[1925] 2016). 
for lévy-Bruhl, “participation” describes the fact that a person “frequently 
experiences participations between himself and this or that environing being 
or object, natural or supernatural, with which he is or comes to be in contact, 
and that, quite as frequently, he imagines similar participations between these 
beings and objects” ([1949] 1988: 52). hus, in the ethnographic record, we en-
counter many examples that conirm that “individual beings or objects are only 
represented within a whole of which they are, if not the parts, at least integrat-
ing elements, composing elements (les composants), or reproductions” (ibid.: 22). 
Karsenti, his editor, further clariies that what lévy-Bruhl had observed was 
that “the beings and objects which are associated in collective representations 
only reach representation on the basis of a link that makes them always already 
participating in one another, so that one can claim that this link is felt even be-
fore these objects have been represented and related to each other as represented 
objects” (Karsenti 1998: xxiv).
As we can see from this sentence, throughout the twentieth century, notions 
like representation and belief operated a kind of silent compacting between per-
sonal dispositions (features of thought of each one of us) and collective disposi-
tions (statistical tendencies observed among the mental dispositions of members 
of a group). however, to assume that personal mental processes (representations) 
and collectively shared dispositions (collective representations) are somehow 
phenomena of the same nature is to assume that groups have minds of the same 
nature as persons—a supposition that we are hardly entitled to make if we take 
embodied cognition seriously. 
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I am not the irst, by any means, to return to the concept of participation. 
Stanley Tambiah, for example, makes a singularly valuable contribution to this 
discussion, which is informed already by the reading of donald davidson and 
other philosophers of the period (Tambiah 1990: 117–18). Whilst Marshall 
Sahlins stresses that participation is at the root of kinship (2001a, 2001b), 
Tambiah shows how it “emphasizes sensory and afective communication and 
the language of the emotions” (1990: 108). hus, he claims, it is the basis of 
religious or magical phenomena (i.e., transcendental experience). his is how 
Tambiah redeines lévy-Bruhl’s concept: “participation can be represented as 
occurring when persons, groups, animals, places, and natural phenomena are in 
a relation of contiguity, and translate that relation into one of existential imme-
diacy and contact and shared ainities” (ibid.: 107). Unfortunately, once again, 
as in the case of Karsenti, Tambiah adopts the characteristic midcentury rep-
resentationalist and sociocentric approach, where both groups and persons are 
held to hold “representations,” and these are considered to be phenomena of the 
same nature. In the light of the critique of this model of mind that the theories 
of embodied cognition represent (see also Toren 2002), we are faced with the 
challenge of matching lévy-Bruhl’s profound insights concerning participa-
tion with contemporary approaches to cognition. To my mind, we can do this 
by proposing that his concept of participation synthesizes at least three major 
characteristics of the way humans respond to world as persons in ontogeny. 
he irst characteristic is the “mutuality of being”—that is, in Sahlins’ re-
cent formulation (2011a, 2011b), the way in which some persons are intrinsic 
to the existence of others. persons are constituted multiply and relationally, all 
singularity being approximate and evanescent. Marilyn Strathern’s concept of 
the “dividual person” helps us understand how plurality is anterior to singularity, 
always reimposing itself. her connected notion of partibility describes objects 
and persons as mutually constituted and conceptually interconnected (Strathern 
1984), and in many ways approaches Anselm’s own conceptions of personal 
partibility molded in the three persons of god. his has signiicant implications 
in terms of kinship theory that seem not to have been taken into account so far 
by most anthropologists. 
Indeed, mutuality leading to copresence in personal constitution means that 
persons inevitably form what mathematicians have been calling since the 1980s 
non-wellfounded sets. hese are sets which contain themselves as members, 
thus forming an ininite sequence of sets each term of which is an element in 
the preceding set. furthermore, this is the very quality that, according to Jagdish 
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hattiangadi, allows for the emergence of entities: “hough a whole is always 
composed of its parts, sometimes the types of things that constitute the parts 
cannot be fully described in all causally relevant respects without describing 
how they interact with the types of things that are wholes as wholes that are 
composed out of them” (2005: 89, original emphasis). propositionality must be 
seen as an emergent property that supervenes on intentionality. If we are to re-
constitute kinship theory within anthropology, therefore, we must abandon the 
supposition that persons constitute groups that are wellfounded sets and work 
into our analysis the kind of circularity that results inevitably from the mutuality 
of being that is constitutive of personhood (cf. Moss 2014). 
his leads us directly to an examination of the second characteristic of the 
relation between person and world. here, we must rely on rodney needham’s 
contributions toward the better understanding of the epistemology of everyday 
life inspired by the late work of Wittgenstein—namely, an approach to category 
formation that emphasizes the way in which concepts in natural languages are 
not subject to the rules of noncontradiction and the excluded middle, rather re-
lying on a notion of opposition that remains ever incomplete and approximate, 
and on unmediated notions of causality.31 he way in which cognition is essen-
tially embodied is an facet of needham’s inquiry that has come to be fully con-
irmed, three decades later, by the work of neurophysiologists and philosophers 
of cognition, such as Andy Clark and david Chalmers (1998) and Anthony 
Chemero (2009), or of vision, such as Susanna Siegel (2012). In needham’s 
words: “he principle of opposition is reversible direction; and (directional) op-
posites are based on the spatial experience of the human body” (1987: 71–72). 
his argument concerning notions of causality similarly stresses the relationship 
between cognition and embodiment (needham 1976). In fact, category forma-
tion will be approached by us in much the same way that fuzzy logic does when 
it exploits the tolerance for imprecision in dealing with complex problems of 
engineering (pina-Cabral 2010a; ross 2010). 
he third characteristic concerns the nature of human communication and is 
a disposition that can be called retentivity. here, we are inspired by the thought 
of W. V. Quine and donald davidson.32 hey argue that belief is essentially 
31. on polythetic categories and causality, see needham (1976); on opposition, see 
needham (1987).
32. A further inspiration is the way levinas uses “retention” as a part of personal 
constitution. husserl, too, deines retention as the way in which a phase of a 
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veridical, that is, “to believe is to believe true” (Quine and Ullian 1978: 4). 
herefore, a necessary condition for successful interpretation is that “the inter-
preter must so interpret as to make a speaker or agent largely correct about the 
world” (davidson 2001: 152). however, whilst belief does depend formatively 
on people’s assessment of what the case might be, one of the characteristics of 
humans is a proneness to favor belief coherence. here again, we are in a graded 
situation rather than one dominated by clear-cut binary opposites. Concerning 
belief, therefore, the rule of the excluded middle also makes no sense. 
hus, ostensivity—that is, the association of heard words with things simul-
taneously observed—is indeed the boundary condition of belief, but it is often 
side-tracked by the need for belief coherence, giving rise to retentivity—that is, 
the tendency for beliefs to interconnect with each other, tending toward sys-
tematicity (without ever actually fully achieving it). As Quine puts it, “We form 
habits of building beliefs such as we form our other habits; only in habits of 
building beliefs there is less room for idiosyncrasy” (Quine and Ullian 1978: 59). 
retentivity consolidates over time in processes of collective coherence that, 
when identiied by ethnographers, get called worldviews (see chapter 5). he 
experience of meaning is relational and holistic—there is no such thing as an 
individual belief, as all beliefs are dependent on other beliefs. his bears two 
signiicant implications. he irst is that we prop our beliefs on each other, as 
Quine used to explain (cf. Quine and Ullian 1978), but we also maximize their 
correspondence both to the way the world is shaped and to what other people 
close to us readily respond to (the habitus), since mutuality is the rule and the 
borders between their minds and ours are constantly being fudged. humans are 
prone toward favoring the maximization of meaning. his makes for psychic 
economy. 
he second implication of retentivity is that persons are constituted ini-
tially through relations of participation that include not only the other persons 
around them, but also parts of the world. As lévy-Bruhl had noted and then 
Mauss developed in the essay on the gift, participation also occurs between per-
sons and things. furthermore, personal ontogeny does not stop at childhood; it 
continues during the person’s lifetime (and even after death in the more public 
cases). personal ontogeny interacts with the scafolding of the world since peo-
ple are not only embodied but they also constitute arenas of presence and action 
perceptual act remains in our consciousness not as a representation but as a 
presentation (cf. ricoeur [1997] 2004).
67trANSCENdENCE
(see Johnston 2010) in terms of the habitus within which they are constituted 
(see mauss [1935] 2007). In short, retentivity and the constitution of world-
views are unavoidably correlated with the process of personal ontogeny. We will 
return to this formulation at a later point in the argument. 
As we have seen above, ever since Needham wrote his essay deconstruct-
ing the notion of belief (1972), we have had to rethink the category, separating 
very clearly between, on the one hand, the propositional attitudes that are be-
ing entertained—that is, what malcolm ruel ([1982] 2002) would have called 
“believing that”—and, on the other hand, the adherence to collective solidari-
ties propped on the world implied in the entertaining of such propositional 
attitudes—that is, “believing in,” or ideistic belief, to use Sabbatucci’s favored 
expression (2000). My argument here is that, if we are willing to engage fron-
tally with mutuality of being, polythetic modes of thinking, and retentivity in belief, 
we will realize that a proneness to experience transcendence is an inevitable 
product of the development of personal cognition. 
half a century ago, having thoroughly examined the literature then availa-
ble, gustav Jahoda critiqued those who continued to believe that education and 
the improvement of science would lead to a decrease in what was then called 
superstition. he concluded that “opinions of this kind are themselves irrational 
in nature,” and that “the propensity can never be eradicated because, paradoxi-
cally, it is an integral part of mechanisms without which humanity would be 
unable to survive” ( Jahoda 1970: 142, 147). Jahoda is not all that distant from 
frazer and Westermarck, half a century before him, much like Sahlins’ discus-
sions concerning mutuality of being are not all that distant from lévy-Bruhl’s 
concept of participation.33
Similarly, we are led to agree with Collingwood and his anthropological fol-
lowers that it is a mistake to pretend that scientiic rationalization can be the 
basis for a human form of life, since it is a technically speciic form of engage-
ment with the world that hardly satisies the intellectual and emotional needs 
of human beings in sociality. rather, scientiic reason must be seen as the excep-
tion—mediated by a series of methodological techniques that have been devel-
oped precisely to help us sustain it. In his critique of robin horton’s famous 
essays on African thought, Tambiah, quoting Alfred Schutz, similarly argues 
that “the activity of science is a circumscribed activity, undertaken in very special 
33. As Sahlins indeed acknowledges (2011a: 10).
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and restricted circumstances by partial selves of human beings, and . . . , there-
fore, this is a special ordering of reality, only one of several others” (Tambiah 
1990: 103).
furthermore, sociocentrism—that is, the modernist proneness to attribute 
to groups the characteristics of persons—prevented us from seeing that tran-
scendence in human sociality is not something that humans learn, that is im-
posed on them by religious or magical norms. It is a disposition that they form 
in the course of their own personal ontogenesis and that they can hardly dis-
pense with. durkheim’s foundational myth of society as expressed in the clan’s 
dance around the ire in he elementary forms of religious life has continued to cast 
its primitivist shadows over us to this day. But he was wrong, as Evans-pritchard 
clearly understood a long time ago.
What the ontological proof helps us to see today is that, if you withdraw 
everything, something still remains. When descartes tried that same exercise 
(the cogito), he too found something there. But, imbued by the spirit of modern 
individualism, he could see nothing but himself. To the contrary, Anselm is 
uncertain of his own personal unicity; after all, he is only a person to the extent 
that god is a person and, like god, he too is dividual. What he inds is that he 
transcends; at the bottom of his being he inds a door to world beyond himself. 
What we ind today is that, once the certainties of modernism have passed, we, 
too, look within our selves to horizons beyond ourselves. our internal arenas of 
presence and action have open doors, for they are rooted in world. he world 
worlds within us, to put this in a more heideggerian fashion. It would seem, 
then, that we will be much better of if we heed Anselm’s sense of transcendence 
and Collingwood’s corresponding anti-intellectualism.34 
WorldIng
let us now return to the relation between world and anthropology. Most uses of 
the word world carry with them the implication that world is somehow ordered. 
In fact, the very etymology of the latin and greek words points us in that 
34. But curiously Mary douglas did not, and that is one of the stranger features of her 
book on Evans-pritchard (1980), where she undertakes to take away from his work 
precisely those aspects of his theoretical thinking that are more interesting to us 
today.
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direction. Now if you make a quick mental experiment and ask yourself whether 
the “Nyakyusa/Ngonde world” was ordered (whether it did cohere in a struc-
tured manner), you have to answer in two apparently contradictory manners. 
on the one hand, yes it did: Nyakyusa persons worked hard at making their 
world cohere, and monica Wilson (1951) managed to capture a good chunk 
of that. All of us work at living in reasonably ordered, predictable, meaningful 
environments. on the other hand, no it didn’t. for example, it included bacteria, 
a feature the Nyakyusa did not account for, even although bacteria were cer-
tainly present in the margins of lake Nyasa in the mid-twentieth century and 
they determined important aspects of Nyakyusa lives, as Wilson would easily 
conirm.
It is important that we should realize that this paradox is nothing but a 
product of our holding a representationalist theory of mind. Whilst a person’s 
intentional engagement with world depends passively on the world being struc-
tured, the person’s propositional engagement with world actively promotes 
structure (we might choose to call it, with Anna Tsing, “iguration”—2011), ow-
ing to the inevitability of retentivity. But the possibility of the emergence of the 
second assumes that the irst is always already present. In short, the emergence 
of propositional thinking and personhood (i.e., the opening up of the arena of 
presence and action) is grounded on the kind of sociality that is characteristic 
of intentional thinking. hus, worlding is a precondition for structuring to oc-
cur (for the building of cosmology, the coniguring of a form of life) within 
the narrative forms of social engagement that take place among propositionally 
thinking humans in ontogenesis. As Tsing puts it, “he gift of worlding is its 
ability to make igures appear from the midst and to show them as no more than 
igures” (ibid.: 64, original emphasis). 
he notion of worlding originates in heidegger’s work, as part of his use of 
the verb “to world.”35 All commentators seem to agree that his concept remains 
to the end rather vaguely deined, so that, by the time it is taken up by a person 
like Tsing (2011), to account for her study of scientiic practice in a latourian 
vein, or by philippe descola (2010, 2014), in his attempt to outline diferent 
modes of ontological positioning, it acquires necessarily diferent meanings and 
implications. In our own particular case, it seems important to show that the 
ethnographic gesture depends on the fact that world worlds: that is, world “is 
35. Cf. Being and time (heidegger [1953] 2010), and “he origin of the work of art” in 
Of the beaten track (heidegger [1950] 2002). 
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more fully in being than all those tangible and perceptible things in the midst of 
which we take ourselves to be at home. . . . By the opening of a world, all things 
gain their lingering and hastening, their distance and proximity, their breath and 
their limits” (Heidegger [1950] 2002: 23). he ethnographic gesture is depend-
ent on the fact that the world worlds; it ofers itself to persons in ontogeny as a 
form of extension (space-time) where things are founded and order can be built. 
his is how the world comes to embrace us—it is aspect (i) of world, world as 
source.
In Emmanuel levinas’ formulation, intentional space is “above all an am-
bience made up of our possibilities of mobility, of distancing ourselves or ap-
proaching, therefore a non-homogeneous space with a top and a bottom, a right 
and a left entirely relative to the usual objects that solicit our possibilities of 
moving and turning” (1998: 36; see Caygill 2002: 21). for levinas, human free-
dom as an airmation of personhood is dependent on this anteriority because it 
transcends the propositionally structured ontologies. As such, “Unlike platonic 
transcendence, this version of transcendence is traumatic, emerging from the 
foreign that lives in the same” (Caygill 2002: 28–29). 
his is why transcendence both permanently challenges and airms person-
hood. As will be further examined in chapter 5, personal ontogeny is a process 
of construction of singularity that is ever incomplete, a process of constitu-
tion of presence that is ever challenged by dividuality and time (see de Martino 
[1959] 2001: 97–98). Indeed, presence emerges from the purposiveness of in-
tentionality, which is an orientation toward the future based on memory. In 
turn, the latter is an orientation toward the past. hus, presence—as well as the 
relative freedom that it opens up—is permanently dynamic and tensional. In 
personal ontogeny, the arena of presence and action remains always evanescent 
and prone to transcendence—it is “beyond ontology, otherwise than being.” In 
ontogeny, the postulation of personal presence is a discovery of oneself as other; 
to that extent, personal ontogeny is always an act of transcendence. he fact that 
it is permanently menaced and always incomplete, as demonstrated above, is 
what roots it in world.36 As heidegger put it, “he fundamental attunement of 
36. “Arising within the structure of the in and beyond, this freedom for human beings 
is at once a liberation of self and the possibility of ‘something binding.’ It is this 
simultaneous loosening and binding of dasein that heidegger goes on to describe 
by the well-known phrase ‘world never is but worlds’” (gaston 2013: 83, original 
emphasis).
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human dasein [is] that which has the capacity to be at once there and not there” 
(1998: 88, original emphasis). 
to my mind, then, transcendence must be seen as the very feature of thought 
that starts of both ordinary propositionality (as an open-ended efort, as a free-
dom), and self-constitution (the airmation or challenge of presence). But it 
is also what allows for ethnographic approximation (the open-endedness, the 
freedom to de-ethnocentrify). If the world did not ofer itself to persons in 
ontogeny as an extension (space-time) where things are founded and order can 
be built, the ethnographic gesture would be impossible (or, in any case, it would 
not de-ethnocentrify, as it would be trapped by ontology, by being). If persons 
(informant and analyst) were not prone to world (here used in the verb form), 
there would be no ethnography. 
Methodologically, ethnographic analysis depends on the assumed expecta-
tion (the charity) that people in speciic historically determined local contexts 
engage with a world which worlds, which can be holistically relational, and 
to which the ethnographer can eventually relate because she too is involved 
in worlding. In Anna Tsing’s words, “Worlding as a tool asks how informants 
as well as analysts imagine the relationality of worlds that are self-consciously 
unfamiliar whether across cultures and continents or across kinds of beings and 
forms of data” (2011: 50). In that sense, I ind myself closer to her interpreta-
tion of the word than to descola’s, for whom “there is another explanation for 
the very diferent ways, traditionally labelled ‘cultural,’ of giving accounts of the 
world in spite of a common biological equipment. let us call ‘worlding’ this 
process of piecing together what is perceived in our environment” (2014: 272). I 
would consider that to be iguration, whilst “to world” is to experience the space 
and time for the holism of the mental to operate, producing iguration. let 
it be noted, however, following Ernesto de Martino’s lesson, that “worlding is 
simultaneously orienting and disorienting” ([1959] 2001: 63). If people’s worlds 
were ontologically coherent, ethnographic ieldwork would also be impossible, 
as ethnographers would have no points of entry into another’s world. 
hat means that most of what exists around humans (a) is not fully coherent 
(it is underdetermined), (b) must be interpreted in a number of diferent ways (it 
is indeterminate), and (c) is indeed common to the whole human species. only 
owing to these three features can ethnographers learn to see the world from a 
new perspective when they “go out into the ield”—even in contexts of con-
siderable cultural distance, such as that met by Monica Wilson (1951) when 
she arrived on the shores of lake nyasa in the 1930s. hese conditions are the 
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conditions of possibility of the ethnographic gesture, as indeed of all proposi-
tional thinking. What is truly brilliant in Quine’s insight is that he taught us to 
see that indeterminacy and underdetermination are not impediments to proper 
understanding; rather, they are the conditions for human communication and 
thought (see Quine and Ullian 1978).37
CoNClUSIoN
he previous chapter came to the conclusion that “world, like persons, will ever 
waver in the unstable terrain that lies between singularity and plurality.” Such 
a statement assumes that there is an isomorphism between personhood and 
world. We are now in a better condition to understand that this results from the 
fact that the human condition is the condition of living embodied persons in 
world. human transcendence is the transcendence of propositional beings and 
involves centrally the operation of symbolic thought. his, however, should not 
distract us from the realization that there is “a deep continuity between life and 
mind” (hompson 2007: 149, 155). he living organism has to reach beyond its 
present condition in order to maintain its identity across time. human tran-
scendence is a “richer” variety of the sort of intentional transcendence that is 
characteristic of all life. he reason for this is that propositionality, as it emerges 
in secondary intersubjectivity, opens up the way for the constitution of the arena 
of presence and action, a matter we will examine further in coming chapters.
37. Witness a similar position being defended recently by lloyd (2014) in a rather 
useful discussion of translation.
chapter three
Imagination
In Collaboration with Joana Gonçalo Oliveira 
DAUGHTER: So what? You tell us about a few strong presuppositions and great stochastic 
systems. And from that we should go on to imagine how the world is? But—
FATHER: Oh, no. I also told you something about the limitations of imagining. So you should 
know that you cannot imagine the world as it is. (And why stress that little word [is]?)
– Gregory Bateson (1979: 205, original emphasis)
If the world does not simply ofer itself diaphanously to our gaze, as Bateson 
tells his daughter, how do we imagine the world? he notion of imagination 
remains a central category in anthropological theorizing, not only in the way 
ethnographers are increasingly engaged with image analysis, but also in that 
we have by no means resolved the age-old question of knowing how humans in 
sociality share imaginative proclivities. 
herefore, in this chapter we ask: What does the history of anthropology 
tell us about human imagination? he ethnographic record suggests that human 
imagination is not boundless, otherwise how would ethnographic verisimilitude 
be so easily achieved? Yet, if there are limits to human imagination, what is their 
nature? In what way are we disposed to think in some form rather than an-
other? Does it even make any sense to assume that the mind is absolutely free to 
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associate? Would this not be tantamount to assuming a disembodied mind? fi-
nally, as Bateson put it to his daughter, “And why stress that little word [is]?” We 
confront once again the old question: how do essence and existence interact?
According to Jean-Paul Sartre, who wrote a brilliant short essay on im-
agination in 1936, the reason why we stress “the little word” is because, on the 
whole, we continue to operate with a “naïve metaphysics of the image” (1936: 3). 
Inspired by husserl’s thought, Sartre introduces us to a new (post-Cartesian) 
way of approaching the topic that has become the assumed starting point for all 
the best thinking about imagination that has emerged in anthropology over the 
past decades. his is the case, for example, with tim Ingold’s seminal paper on 
“Building, dwelling, living,” where he argues that imagination is the distinctive 
human feature that diferentiates our way of being in the world from that of 
nonhuman animals. He claims that “human beings do not construct the world 
in a certain way by virtue of what they are, but by virtue of their own concep-
tions of the possibilities of being. And these possibilities are limited only by the 
power of the imagination” (2000: 177). If, then, there are limits to imagination 
as understood in this way, it would seem to be highly relevant to ask ourselves 
what they are. In this chapter, we look for guidance in Rodney needham’s claim 
that one may identify empirically limits of imagination. 
his claim has not received the attention it deserves. one reason for that, we 
can speculate, is needham’s conviction that we cannot determine these limits 
abstractly from irst principles and that they will not form a coherent mono-
thetic class. For him, the only way of knowing what they are is to research them 
empirically through the comparativist use of the ethnographic record. his turns 
the process into a messy empirical inquiry, rather than a nicely appealing exer-
cise of analytical imagination. 
WHAT IS An IMAGE?
owing to the impact of Husserl’s phenomenology, the conception of what a 
mental image is changed radically in the mid-twentieth century and, with that, 
should have changed our anthropological approach toward imagination. his is 
the main drive of Sartre’s L’imagination (1936), where he attempts a history of 
the concept, focusing in particular on the period that extends from Descartes to 
Husserl. As the relation between image and imagination is not really straight-
forward, we must start by attempting to clarify it.
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Sartre’s central concern can be captured by means of a brief ethnographic 
example. In studying personal names in Bahia (NE Brazil), we found that 
persons approached their names not as ixed signs representing them indi-
vidually, but as complexes of reminiscences. for example, as a response to being 
asked to draw a picture of the person who gave them their name, children 
freely associated: fostering grandmothers were associated to stoves, mothers 
were associated to suns and lowers, brothers to fancy clothing, fathers to cars 
and beer bottles, and so on (see Pina-Cabral 2013b). furthermore, when we 
asked Bahians for “the meaning” (signiicado) of or “the reason” (razão) for 
their name, they searched freely for the associations that their names evoked 
and they readily expressed these, normally with a kind of narcissistic glee: Is 
it a saint’s name, do I know the story? Is it an actor’s name, do I know what 
roles he played? Is it a politician’s name, a footballer’s name, the name of my 
grandfather, the name of my grandmother’s boss, and so on? Is it a “gentle” 
name? Is it a “posh” name? Is it a “gringo” name? Is it a “diferent” name (taken 
to be a positive feature)?
his being the case, one might have been led to think that personal names 
are marks of pastness; which they are, of course, but they are not at all only that. 
he very process of reminiscing—of evoking images that one retains from the 
past, that one “has stored within oneself,” as the traditional European meta-
phor would have it—is accompanied by what we call a destiny of openness. hat 
is, a process of imagination which is always open and permanently in gear. In 
short, reminiscing is transforming. And that is the reason for the narcissistic 
glee. In a culture, such as that of modern Brazil, where selfhood is a good that 
is openly cultivated, the opportunity of knowing more about “who you are” is 
welcomed with open arms. When the ethnographer felt free to give them some 
information about their name that they did not know (e.g., who Ruth was in 
the Bible or who Winston Churchill was), Bahians jumped at it with alacrity 
and one could witness them repositioning themselves in relation to these new 
reminiscences.
Personal names were being imagined in a way that evoked past images, 
but, in the process, they were being repositioned, changed, and transformed all 
the time. As the context of name use changed, so did the reminiscences. Each 
time you evoke an image, even silently to yourself, the image changes because 
it changes its position within the holism of the mental. now, as Sartre taught 
us, names are signs when they serve to communicate, but the images these 
names evoke are actually acts of the mind, not passive representations. hey are 
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presentations, that is, intentional acts which occur in relation to a world that is 
always anterior.
According to Sartre, the principal di culty in understanding what exactly 
it is to exist as an image results from a human proclivity to think of all modes 
of existence in terms of physical existence (reiication), and so, as noted above, 
to adopt a “naïve metaphysics of the image.”1 he central challenge that posed 
itself for the modernists originated in descartes’ attempt to resolve the am-
biguity that the image had in scholastic thinking, where it was seen as being 
half-material, half-spiritual (Sartre 1936: 7). he resolved it by declaring that 
matter and spirit are mutually exclusive: “he image, in as much as it is materi-
ally depicted in some part or other of your brain, could never be animated by 
thought (la conscience)” (ibid.). 
for descartes, therefore, although images are a matter of appearance, they 
have a kind of substantive existence in the brain; they are, in Sartre’s formula-
tions, sensations renaissantes (reborn sensations—ibid.: 57) or reviviscences de la 
chose (reviviscence of the thing—ibid.: 68). hat is, for the Cartesian tradition, 
images are of the order of things, for they are imprints in the brain caused 
by perception; they are re-presentations. Images were interpreted as signs or 
schemes and, in turn, signs were thought to be constitutively images. 
his idea of images was, in fact, dominant right until husserl challenged it. 
Attempts on the part of philosophers such as Bergson to grant greater mobility 
to images as facts in the mind (la conscience) ultimately faltered owing to the 
mechanical conception of the image as a ixed response to material stimulation. 
his conception created a kind of ixity to thought that was clearly incompatible 
with the mutability of what humans do with images, that is, imagination. “from 
the moment one sees images as signs that have to be understood, immediately 
one is putting images outside thought” (Sartre 1936: 75).
here is, of course, no doubt to anyone that consciousness includes images. 
But we must ind a way of freeing these from their Cartesian condition of me-
chanical manifestations of materiality, otherwise how can they change continu-
ously in the face of new circumstances? Sartre asks, “What if images are never 
copies of objects? Perhaps they are nothing but protocols aimed at, in a way, 
making objects present” (ibid.: 59). herefore, in the wake of husserl, he claims 
we must avoid seeing images as inert supports of thought. rather, images are 
1. A notion akin to what lakof and Johnson call “ontological metaphors” (cf. 1980: 
25f.).
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the very process of thought. As all thought is thought of something, so objects 
out there in the world are correlative to thought (conscience) but they are not 
thought (ibid.: 122). hus, Sartre concludes, “Images are acts, not things. to 
have an image is to be conscious of something” (ibid.: 136, his emphasis).
his view is in all ways compatible with the present state of afairs concern-
ing imagery. Evan hompson, for example, explains that “the visual experience 
is not the object of the imagining; the intentional object is the visualized object” 
(2007: 292). In the standard case of visual imagery what happens is nothing like 
the internal inspection of some sort of mental picture of the phenomenal world. 
Instead, “we mentally re-present an object by subjectively simulating or emu-
lating a perceptual experience of that object” (ibid.: 297). hus, he concludes 
with Sartre that “visualizing is not the inspection of a mental image, but rather 
the mental representation of what it is like, or was like, or would be like, to see 
something, given one’s tacit knowledge of how things look, how that knowledge 
is organized, and one’s sensorimotor skills” (ibid.: 298).
In short, we must get rid of the notion of imagetic representations that would 
somehow result from the impact of perception on the mind—“to imagine how 
the world is,” as Bateson’s daughter said. As Sartre would have it, “here is in-
deed a transcendental sphere of signiications, but they are ‘represented’ not ‘rep-
resentations’, and could never possibly be constituted by contents” (1936: 62).
Moving from Sartre’s critique to today’s concerns within anthropological 
debate, we are now in a position better to clarify what imagination can be held 
to mean for us. here are three principal features that have to be taken into 
account in deining it. he irst is the matter we have been discussing: image 
formation and its condition as enactment, not as semiotic object of the mind. As 
we have seen, this applies to visual images, of course, but it applies equally to all 
other kinds of imaginings. hus, the previously clear distinction between images 
(pictures in the mind) and concepts (meaning complexes, classes of objects) 
fades away. hought is now seen as foundationally relational and based on an 
activity of transformation of circumstances that were always already given. Since 
thought is always about something, there is no such thing as an isolated thought, 
an isolated belief, an isolated image—there is no thought without world. 
Furthermore, it is only by triangulating with world and by having a disposi-
tion for charity for the meanings of others that propositional thought can oc-
cur at all (cf. Davidson 2004; Pina-Cabral 2013a), which means that conscious 
thinking is an activity that can only be entertained by humans who have already 
entered into a linguistically shaped universe of communication (cf. Hutto 2008). 
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If, on the one hand, sociality both precedes personal ontogeny and is a precon-
dition for it, on the other hand, it is only by studying persons in ontogeny that 
anthropologists can acquire any understanding of the strains, recurrences, and 
proclivities that shape human mental life.
he second feature of imagination is the matter of transformation. Since im-
agining is a form of enactment (not an imprint on the mind made by material 
perception—as per naïve ontology), it is dependent on the world as its condition 
of possibility. he notion that we have “pictures in the head” that remain ixed 
through time simply does not apply. time being an essential feature of relating 
to world, and triangulation with the world being an indispensable feature of all 
communication (cf. davidson 2004), mutability is constitutive of all imagina-
tion. We are led to conclude that images are constantly evolving in tandem with 
our own changing involvement with our material condition in world. here is 
yet more to say about this aspect, as we will see later on. 
he third feature, inally, is classiication. he constitution of classes of enti-
ties (concepts) is carried out through a process of image association, of imagi-
nation. As davidson puts it, “to have a concept of a lion or of anything else 
is to have a network of interrelated concepts of the right sorts” (ibid.: 143). 
hus, all thoughts are partly dependent both on their relations to all other 
thoughts (without which they could not exist) and on their relation to world 
(without which they would have no meaning). If images are fundamentally a 
revisiting of reactions to perceptual experience, they are, then, essentially asso-
ciational and cannot be dissociated from the classiicatory process of concept 
formation.
here, then, we enter properly into the subject that most occupied Needham 
and that he stubbornly went on naming, using durkheim’s favored expression, 
collective representations. how is it that humans within sociality are prone to 
classify the world in similar fashions, sharing concepts and images? But perhaps 
this question is only possible to formulate at all because we inadvertently revert 
to our métaphysique naïve. to the contrary, we must remember that, if we place 
ourselves within such an individualist perspective, we will soon end up meeting 
the blank wall of interpersonal indeterminacy. And, contrary to many, we know 
that if “worlds” (as in another word for cultures) are incommensurable at group 
level, they would have to be very much more so at individual level, which would 
mean that there would be no way of producing collectively shared worlds—and 
much less of actually knowing that they exist. his is why we must opt for turn-
ing away from the case of a person thinking solipsistically and move toward the 
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matter of communication; attempting to clarify how company is a precondition 
for thought. 
donald davidson’s primary contribution to this debate2 is to encourage us to 
see that, in order to understand subjective thought, we have to depart from in-
tersubjective communication in a real world. In such an account, sociality is fore-
grounded. Imagination is never absolutely private, even when we are working out 
our darkest secret thoughts. hought is a by-product of sociality, which means 
that all imagination shares, to an extent, of the qualities of what used to be called 
“collective representation.” But we can no longer entertain the naïve notion that 
a group has thoughts (images, representations). his means that, for us today, 
the recurrence in attitudes and concepts that ethnography encounters among 
any locally deined group of persons can only be seen as a process of reiterated 
approximation, not a form of mechanical repetition. herefore, we are led to ask: 
What are the pathways of imagination as a social phenomenon? to what extent 
are we bound to move our imagination more in one direction than another? Can 
we ind proclivities of the imagination by studying the ethnographic record?
rElAUNChINg ComPArAtIVISm
A profound theoretical upheaval occurred in social anthropology from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1980s, which was a response to a moment of doubt con-
cerning the essential assumptions about human mind that dominated most of 
twentieth-century anthropology. his was occasioned by an intensive critical 
analysis of the late work of ludwig Wittgenstein. he irst person to brave that 
was gregory Bateson (1972, 1979), in the course of his radical distancing from 
the dominant anthropological discourse in the United States. But the process 
was led further within social anthropology when both rodney Needham and 
Edwin Ardener, albeit in diferent and contrasting manners, decided to under-
take a deconstruction of Evans-Pritchard’s 1950s interpretivism, which had been 
predominantly inspired by combining a Durkheimian analytic language inher-
ited from Radclife-Brown with R. G. Collingwood’s philosophy of history.3 
2. See, in particular, his brilliant 2001 essay “What thought requires”, (2004: 135–50).
3. For example, for a thorough rethink of Collingwood’s notion of “translation,” which 
was so central to Evans-Pritchard, see Edwin Ardener’s still thought-provoking 
essay “Comprehending others” (2007).
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his 1980s poststructuralist drive and its profound insights failed to be fol-
lowed through by the next generation of anthropologists for a number of rea-
sons, some institutional (the vagaries of departmental politics in oxford), some 
personal (the early death of Ardener and the early retirement of Needham), but 
most important of all the fact that anthropological fashion in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, coming from the United States, turned the most visible debates of 
anthropology away from the process of questioning representation. Insightful 
analyses, such as robert feleppa’s critical engagement with Quine’s notion of 
indeterminacy of meaning (feleppa 1988), were largely overlooked by “the se-
miotic turn.” moreover, in the 1990s, the durkheimian terminological mold in 
which Needham’s and Ardener’s disquisitions were framed found little echo in 
colleagues who unwittingly associated this style with what they called “struc-
tural functionalism” and, thus, failed to engage meaningfully with the deep the-
oretical implications of what was being proposed. As it happens, in the case of 
Ardener, the esoteric nature of his formulations makes them exhausting reading 
still today.
he questioning that was being made at the time concerning the nature 
of representation, the nature of classiication, and the constraints to imagina-
tion can now be picked up with new conviction. here is, however, an aspect 
to Needham’s and Ardener’s forays that is bound to lead to misunderstandings 
today. he oxford poststructuralists were solidly grounded on the rich analytic 
terrain that they had inherited from a century and a half of ethnographically 
inspired social analysis. he universalist tone in which they set their arguments 
runs counter to the rhetoric preferences of those who, in the wake of the “semi-
otic turn,” and then the “ontological turn,” are not eager to think of humans as a 
uniied category. to the contrary, together with a growing number of colleagues, 
we feel that it is high time to go back to a self-consciously comparativist study 
of the human condition and of the nature of scientiic thinking that allows for 
anthropology to place itself at the center of its own history and for anthropolo-
gists to choose again to address anthropological questions informed by the con-
stantly growing ethnographic canon. Not the canon of this or that anthropology 
(inevitably one of the four imperial traditions, cf. hann 2005), but the canon 
that we are constantly rewriting from within the practice of an increasingly 
globalized anthropological debate (see Pina-Cabral 2005, 2006).
In Needham’s late writings on imagination we ind insights of central rel-
evance to the debates that are going on today in anthropology concerning em-
bodied mind and personhood. one preliminary comment, however, needs to be 
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made. Needham’s thought evolved very rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
but he continued to use the time-honored terminology of earlier anthropological 
schools. So, it seems necessary to start by clarifying that, in spite of freely tak-
ing recourse to terms like collective representation, image, archetype, system of 
classiication, and so on, Needham had turned the corner of representationalism 
sometime in the early 1970s or even before that. Already in his introduction to 
Primitive classiication he had complained that durkheim and mauss assume 
incorrectly that “conclusions derived from a study of collective representations 
. . . apply directly to cognitive operations” (1963: xxvi). he concludes his article 
on synthetic images (1978), that is, on the limits to freedom of imagination, with 
a quote from Wittgenstein that we do not hesitate to repeat here, for indeed it 
grounds all further arguments about mind, thinking, and belief:
No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the 
brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible 
to read of thought processes from brain-processes. I mean this: if I talk or write 
there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated 
with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the system continue fur-
ther in the direction of the centre? .  .  . It is .  .  . perfectly possible that certain 
psychological phenomena cannot be investigated physiologically, because physi-
ologically nothing corresponds to them. (Wittgenstein [1953] 1967: §§ 608–9)
In this passage, Wittgenstein is suggesting that mental processes may not be 
imprints on the mind resulting from the impact of perception (as in naïve on-
tology, as per Sartre), but that they may be the aggregate result of the holism of 
the mental in its relation with an ever-evolving world. hus, in attempting to 
plot out the limits of freedom of imagination, needham was approaching the 
comparative task from a position that rejects a representationalist view of mind. 
he one notable predecessor in this approach is, as is so often the case, Bateson, 
who develops the concept of “stochasticism” to describe precisely the way in 
which such processes may occur. He claims that “thought and evolution are 
alike in a shared stochasticism” (1979: 162), which he deines in the following 
manner: “Stochastic (Greek, stochazein, to shoot with a bow at a target; that is, to 
scatter events in a partially random manner, some of which achieve a preferred 
outcome). If a sequence of events combines a random component with a selec-
tive process so that only certain outcomes of the random are allowed to endure, 
that sequence is said to be stochastic” (ibid.: 245). We conclude, therefore, that 
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all beliefs (thoughts, images, concepts) that a person can entertain are propped 
on numberless other beliefs but that the processes of thought are stochastic, 
that is to say, they do not “continue further in the direction of the centre,” as 
Wittgenstein would have it. 
he stochastic approach means that we do not attempt to postulate the ex-
istence of universal forms of social imagination. following husserl’s lead, we 
see the human condition as historically produced, “from our genes to the very 
neurological processes that provide for brain function, to all our ideas of the 
peopled world” (toren 2012: 64). hus, we aim to draw out to what extent hu-
man imagination shows evidence of being limited, that is to say, to what extent 
human societies are prone to recur and recidivate in the formulations they favor. 
for Bateson this was a feature in relation to which evolution and human mind 
operated in the same way. As he put it, “random changes occur, in the brain or 
elsewhere, and . . . the results of such random change are selected for survival by 
processes of reinforcement and extinction” (1972: 255). Note that, immediately 
upon writing this, he goes on to argue that a speciic meaning is here given to 
random, arguing that “the probability of a given change is determined by some-
thing diferent from probability” (ibid.). And, out of that, he then develops his 
idea of “an economics of adaptability” associated to habit formation (ibid.: 257). 
he argument is not about singular persons, but rather it is trying to address the 
same problem as Durkheim and Mauss in their Primitive classiication: How is it 
that socially shared classiications impose themselves on people’s imagination? 
Instead of assuming that such images “exist” in the mind as cognitive entities, 
rather this view sees them as the stochastic product of complex determination. 
Durkheimian sociocentrism granted precedence to group processes of classi-
ication over personal processes of thought, but relied on the notion that collective 
representations and individual representations were isomorphic and that, indeed, 
they were both representations, entities of the mind (cf. Durkheim and Mauss 
[1903] 1963). Bateson’s stochastic approach radically altered the terms in which 
collective and individual were conceived in twentieth-century social science. 
THE PEG-ASPECT oF BELIEF
he turning point of needham’s thought on the matter is his long essay Belief, 
language, and experience (1972), where he asks: Why am I led to suppose that the 
verbal concept “belief ” designates a set of experiences, propositions, or actions 
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that denote the same human capacity or the same internal state everywhere 
around the world? Why is it that I suppose that the Penan concept Peselong, 
which I loosely identify with the English concept of god, is bound to activate 
in the Penan the same kind of response as would be activated in me if I were to 
say or to hear the sentence “I believe in god”? 
his puzzle, which is the point of departure for his book, is not unlike a set 
of other such philosophical parables that marked deeply the questioning of the 
nature of human mind in the second half of the twentieth century. We are re-
minded of Quine’s famous discussion of the meaning of gavagai ( [1960] 2013: 
23–72). Where Needham diverges from most philosophical authors is that he 
makes his question from the point of view of ethnographic theory. his is a radi-
cally empiricist approach, where theorization emerges not from irst principles 
but from actual ethnographic comparison. 
to return to his Penan parable, Needham sees that when he supposed that 
the Penan would know what it is to believe, he was taking belief, in all the multi-
plicity of its expressions and manifestations, as an invariant or natural capacity of 
humans. But even if one can translate the word belief into diferent languages, is 
that enough to suppose that such a word designates a clearly determinable mode 
of conscience of human experience (needham 1972: 136)? Can one simply take 
for granted that particular belief statements constitute a plethora of occurrences 
that, from the deepest past to the furthest extreme of sublunar space, denote a 
capacity or faculty that determines all possible human thought and action? 
In Structure and sentiment (1962), needham had already started to produce 
concepts in which we see his distinctive mark, such as “primary factors of ex-
perience” or “proclivities of thought and imagination.” here, he irst engages 
the need to question the role of language in light of his study of the late work 
of Wittgenstein. He is progressively led to question critically the certitudes 
concerning the nature of human thinking that lay behind twentieth-century 
anthropological structuralism; certitudes about the relation between language 
and experience. He is eventually led to abandon the idea that the human mind 
is nothing but a set of (entity-like) categories whose processing depends on a 
determinable set of faculties. his means that the multiplicity of the expressions 
of belief is not relected, nor is it regulated by either experience or language. In 
itself, this feature of the concept belief should immediately make us wary of the 
way it is recurrently used in ethnographic interpretation. 
What characterizes concepts such as “belief ” is that they operate in a very 
special manner. his is how Friedrich Waisman qualiies such words:
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here is a group of words such as “fact”, “event”, “situation”, “case”, “circum-
stance”, which display a queer sort of behaviour. one might say of such words 
that they serve as pegs: it’s marvellous what a lot of things you can put on them 
(“the fact that—”). So far they are very handy; but as soon as one focuses on them 
and asks, e.g., “What is a fact?” they betray a tendency to melt away. he peg-
aspect is by far the most important of all. (1968: 59, original emphasis)
Because the concept of belief shares this peg-aspect, it produces the illusion 
that there are certain speciic manifestations that result from a fundamentally 
immutable condition of belief. In social anthropology, this illusion generates the 
assumption that diferent cultures, diferent societies—multiform and variable 
as they may be—denote something that can be immediately translatable by 
the psychological vocabularies with which we are familiar. he peg-aspect leads 
us to believe that there are actions and expressions that refer back to the same 
set of categories ordering collective ideas, in such a way that to translate would 
imply to ind something on the basis of which the actions, expressions, and even 
thoughts would become stable aspects of human experience.
However, in light of the examination undertaken in Belief, language, and 
experience, even a translation would always be a manifestation of a mutual un-
derstanding derived from a presence, an activity, or a substance that we do not 
succeed in circumscribing either to experience or to language. herefore, ac-
cording to needham, when psychology is at stake, “translation” has to be substi-
tuted by “interpretation” of the verbal concepts in question. hese considerations 
about “to believe” apply equally with to act, to see, to mean, to think, and so on. 
Imagination, however, constitutes a sort of outlying example, for it prom-
ises to lead us to the matter of classiication (needham 1972: 134–35). For 
needham, classiication constitutes one of the principal challenges that any eth-
nographer or comparativist can encounter—that of translating the peculiarities 
of a classiicatory ideology on the basis of one’s own language (cf. ibid.: 133). 
now, since that is not really a very steady base, needham is led to question 
the certainties that anthropology assumes concerning what it is to classify. He 
asks himself whether the multiple experiences, propositions, or actions that are 
currently associated to imagination can be taken to suggest the existence of 
something determinable, of some speciic activity within the vast domain of 
human experience. 
Social anthropologists have inherited a set of conceptual images from their 
disciplinary tradition (our toolkit of analytical concepts: e.g., clan, taboo, person, 
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iliation, descent, segmentation, structure, transformation, etc.). We must inquire 
as to the efective validity of their generality, that is, their analytical status. It 
would seem to be necessary to determine what such concepts actually denote; 
otherwise, owing to the ininite variability of connotations that apply in each 
particular ethnographic context, we run the risk of simply being ethnocentric. 
one of the principal contributions of Wittgenstein’s thought to social anthropol-
ogy would then be the call to undertake a critique of individual concepts. Such 
concepts are necessarily misleading since they “are taken to denote monothetic 
classes of social facts, whereas actually they are highly polythetic and cannot 
therefore have the uses that are normally ascribed to them” (needham 1985: 150).
In a monothetic classiication, groups are supposed to be formed by logical, 
rigid, and successive divisions, in such a way that the possession of a unique set of 
characteristics is simultaneously suicient and necessary in order for a member 
to be included in the group thus deined. To the contrary, a polythetic classiica-
tion associates entities that share a number of characteristics, but no singular 
characteristic is essential or suicient in determining the inclusion of each indi-
vidual member within the group. needham defends that, from the point of view 
of anthropological comparativism, when what we want to compare are stochastic 
dispositions, the classiicatory style must be necessarily polythetic. owing to the 
nature of human communication, we will have to take recourse to a technique of 
comparison that contemplates the broadest possible number of variables.
needham inds in Wittgenstein the inspiration for the answer to how we 
form the concepts that we use in anthropological analysis. He quotes the fa-
mous example: 
he tendency to look for something in common to all the entities which we 
commonly subsume under a general term.—We are inclined to think that there 
must be something in common to all games, say, and that this common property 
is the justiication for applying the general term “game” to the various games; 
whereas games form a family the members of which have family likenesses. . . . 
he idea of a general concept being a common property of its particular instances 
connects up with other primitive, too simple, ideas of the structure of language. 
It is comparable to the idea that properties are ingredients of the things which 
have the properties. (needham 1985: 17)
To sum up, the phenomena that we classify, for example, under the label kin-
ship may be related to each other in any number of diferent ways. Kinship, 
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therefore, is an odd-job word, an empirical generalization. An odd-job word is 
any phenomenon that shares a given set of distinctive characteristics, without 
it being necessary for all the members of the set to possess all of the distinc-
tive characteristics. Such verbal concepts are formed by concatenation and spo-
radic similarity: they are formed by means of family resemblances. hat is what 
Wittgenstein meant when he said: “[We elaborate our concepts] as in spinning 
a thread we twist ibre on ibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside 
in the fact that some one ibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlap-
ping of many ibres” ([1958] 1967, § 67: 32). In other words, concepts cannot be 
deined absolutely: they chain up, they hook onto each other, they superimpose 
like the strands of iber that make up the rope. 
Needham concludes from this that we must reinvent a new kind of com-
parativism that is not foundationally theoretical, because our analytical concepts 
are not immune to the distinctive characteristics of any other verbal concept. 
his is essentially the proposed change of aspect that is enshrined in Belief, lan-
guage and experience. to wit, the need for a comparative epistemology that is 
divorced from the idiom of certainty. his would, 
on the one hand, [bring] us more immediately, with systematically reduced prej-
udices, into relation with the distinctive features of those alien ideologies that 
we desire to understand. on the other hand, [it would] increase our knowledge 
of the most constant forms that cultural classiications may assume, and succes-
sively test their correspondence with our empirical appraisals of human nature, 
so we can elaborate a set of critical expectations that will prepare our perception 
of alien realities. In other words, comparative analysis can be pursued, by means 
of this dialectic of observation and self-observation, as a technique of appercep-
tion. (Needham 1972: 204)
PrImArY fACtorS of ExPErIENCE
Anthropological comparativism, therefore, would be a “technique of appercep-
tion” to the extent that it would be a way of situating new experience in rela-
tion to past experience. As much as it might distance itself eventually from our 
everyday experience of the world, the task of scientiic or academic comparativ-
ism must be seen as originating in the same history of humanity as all other 
thought, not in a petition of irst principles. But this means that we can only 
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undertake the comparative task in the irst place because there are recurrences in 
the way humans operate, that is, proclivities of thought and action, that allow us 
to recognize the humanity of what we observe, thus mobilizing our interpretive 
charity in speciic ways.
human experience manifests and is dependent upon these recurrent forms. 
hey are very frequently encountered in the ethnographic record. But, more 
than that, they are a necessary condition for ethnographic verisimilitude: that 
is, in writing our ethnographies we take recourse to them (mostly implicitly) to 
help our readers and ourselves make sense of what is being said. he central ar-
gument here is that human beings within sociality are not simply free to exercise 
their imagination: they are constrained by predispositions that are inherited, not 
in any genetic or normative sense of the word, but in the sense of conditions for 
personal ontogeny; features of thought which are always anterior to any propo-
sitional thinking owing to the fact that sociality is a precondition. 
he anthropologist is comparing forms of life that she wants to get to know 
on the basis of other forms of life that she already knows. But she cannot hope 
to achieve constant meanings concerning the human condition. Social life is 
highly unstable: one can observe rapid changes in the meanings of words and 
other symbolic elements; there are constant reformulations of social institutions; 
our intentions are innumerable and unpredictable (cf. Needham 1981: 17). In 
spite of this, however, experience does suggest that a high level of redundancy is 
present. Needham exempliies this by reference to anthropological supervision:
A particularly surprising realization is that often it is possible for an academic 
supervisor to guide and correct research into a society with which he has no di-
rect or scholarly acquaintance. It is very perplexing, and against expectation, that 
this should be possible; for the more we think of men as directing their actions 
by free decision, and in the light of conlicting interests and purposes, the more 
striking it is that they should so regularly end up with very similar institutions. 
(1981: 20)
In short, we must avoid at all costs the all-or-nothing fallacy. While the recog-
nition of a contextual correlation between the forms taken by institutions and 
thoughts does not allow us to entertain any expectation of prediction, we also 
have no certain reason to postulate absolute unpredictability. In fact, we observe 
a surprisingly high number of stochastic regularities and recurrences in the 
forms assumed both by social institutions and by classiicatory ideologies. We 
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cannot say whether it is collective thought that is free of institutional condition-
ings or whether it is the structural dispositions of collective life that determine 
the institutional variation; what we can say is that there are relational constants 
that underpin both instances. 
hese universally distributed regularities and recurrences are what Needham 
wants to capture with his idea of primary factors of experience (cf. 1972: 216–19). 
By that he means the constants of human imagination that seem to be present 
both in classiicatory ideologies and in social action. We are not faced here with 
the continuous development of a single form of classiication, nor are we trying 
to it diferent forms into one mold by means of which other forms might be 
compared; nor yet are we trying to establish two broad realms of comparison 
that it into each other. 
needham contrasts his idea of primary factors to the traditional idea of in-
nate ideas by means of ive negative features:
1.  hey are of diferent types: perceptions, images, abstractions, logical con-
straints.
2.  hey are independent of the will; intrinsically they are neither created nor 
altered deliberately, but they originate unconsciously. 
3.  hey are not a class connected into systems, but they can be variously com-
bined.
4.  hey are primary but not elementary; each is analysable into a complex of 
grounds or possible determinants.
5.  Characteristically though not exclusively, they are manifested in symbolic 
forms, not in cognitive or rational institutions. (1985: 70)
To start of with, when the anthropologist faces the symbolic elements that can 
be encountered in the ethnographic record, these appear to diversify themselves 
into a multiplicity of diferent human igurations of life. After a while, however, 
it becomes apparent that there are constancies and regularities. It is as if there 
were a repertory or a common ground of semantic units that human thought 
and imagination have at their disposal: the right and the left, the color triad 
(white, back, and red), the use of percussion, some recurrent geometric forms, 
and so on, and so forth. owing to their constancy, these allow one to have 
a glimpse of what such a common repertory of symbolic components might 
look like (needham 1981: 34). It seems that what is required, therefore, rather 
than trying to ind a common code for the whole of humanity, as structuralism 
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attempted, is to try to identify and quantify semantic units or symbolic elements 
and whether there are speciic recurrent (stochastic) relations among them.
his quantiication constitutes a new mode (a poststructuralist one) of ab-
stracting the qualities of the symbolic elements to which human thought and 
imagination take recourse. he systematic application of the method of poly-
thetic classiication will substitute the semantic study of symbolic elements, but 
it will do so in a diferent mode from that which is used in correlational analyses. 
If the symbolic elements are studied quantitatively, it is because the aim is to 
grasp the global incidence of particular elements and relational constants, not 
their coherence and/or their logical character within the general ield of systems 
of classiication. In Primordial characters, therefore, needham insists that prima-
ry factors of experience “are heterogeneous: the contrast of textures pertains to 
touch, colours to vision, numbers are abstraction, percussion depends on hear-
ing” (1978: 11) hen he goes on to argue that “they are vehicles for signiicance 
but they do not convey explicit universal meanings” (ibid.). Although they can 
be encountered widely around the world, “it does not follow that they will have 
further semantic properties in common” (ibid.). 
It would seem, then, that, contrary to what is normally thought, in order to 
study human imagination we do not require a systematic approach to primary 
factors; to the contrary, we need a factorial analysis, which will reveal how these 
are condensed and concatenated owing to sporadic resemblances in such a way 
that they emerge as phenomena that can be grasped autonomously (cf. ibid.: 11, 
17; 1980: 59–60). In factorial analysis we are not concerned with the classi-
ication systems; rather, we aim to grasp the syntheses that emerge from the 
general picture. hus, needham proposes a major methodological change: to 
invert the analytical strategy that characterized modernist structuralism. Rather 
than starting from irst principles, the comparativist must start from our own 
capacity to recognize sporadic resemblances and work empirically at identifying 
where these emerge and how they are concatenated.
In turn, as his examination of the primary factors progressed, needham 
concluded that there are two basic kinds of primary factors.4 he irst kind of 
primary factors he identiies are abstract ones. of these, he only explores bi-
nary opposition (namely in his 1987 collection Counterpoints), but others might 
4. It should be noted that he does not close of the comparativist task. He is perfectly 
open to the possibility of anthropological comparativism eventually coming to 
discover a much larger number of such factors.
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be suggested, as we will see below. he second family of primary factors is of 
a perceptual nature. hey are human proclivities to react to recurrent changes 
in the world. hey must be understood as stochastic events, not as automatic, 
mechanic, or in any way deterministically necessary. rather, they are recurrent 
compound manifestations of very complex processes of human sociality in a 
world that is structured in similar ways: that is, similar answers to similar con-
ditions. he most classical case Needham explored was the propensity to react 
to percussion as somehow triggering transcendence (cf. 1967), but others to do 
with basic colors (white, black, and red), texture, and so on, might be found. 
Again the list is purposely left open, as it is up to the comparativist enterprise 
to identify the existence of these and, ofhand, we cannot predict where they 
will emerge. 
SYnTHETIC IMAGES
In Primordial characters (1978) and Reconnaissances (1980), needham moves to 
outline the synthetic character of some of the products of imagination, namely 
in terms of the concept of synthetic image and the correlated notions of arche-
type and paradigmatic scene. Distancing himself from the more commonly 
known use of the word by C. G. Jung, he deines an archetype as a primordial 
mental image, but not in the representational (ontologically naïve) sense of im-
age, rather in the sense of a proclivity of the imagination, a recurrent and com-
plex associative product. In fact, these archetypes are forms of collective mental 
behavior; they are cognitive institutions. hey are synthetic images to the extent 
that they are dispositions to combine things in recurrent ways. needham calls 
them “natural imaginative impulses,” where natural is taken to mean unavoid-
able, recurrent, and inescapable. 
In Primordial characters, he examines the synthetic image of the witch. He at-
tempts to outline the most distinctive features of this synthetic image by taking 
recourse to factorial analysis. It is a synthetic image because, in a recurrent man-
ner, images of witches involve opposition (of good and evil), inversion (a spatial 
metaphor), darkness, blackness, certain types of animals, light, nocturnal travel, 
and so on. “I do not mean by this,” he claims, “that the components of the image 
of the witch are always the same in number and character, from one tradition 
to another, but that there are characteristic features which combine polytheti-
cally (that is, by sporadic resemblances) to compose a recognizable imaginative 
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deinition of the witch” (1978: 33). Such a synthesis (because it is recurrent 
within a culture and across cultures) cannot be seen to depend either on speciic 
individual cognitive operations, or on the collective manipulation of elements 
and relations, since the image is, on the whole, consistent with itself across a 
broad ethnographic spectrum. 
he recurrence of the synthetic image of the witch (or of the half-man, 
which Needham explores in Reconnaissances, 1980) does not depend on the 
ideological or institutional arrangements of the particular ethnographic context 
from which it was gathered. Needham’s hypothesis, which he is attempting to 
test with such cross-cultural comparisons, is that this is a series of elements, 
relations, and principles that constitute 
a common repository of factors to which men resort in the construction and the 
interpretation of social reality. he impression produced on the comparativist is 
that diferent traditions combine these factors, together of course with a great 
deal else that is contingently generated, by concatenation or by sporadic conjunc-
tion rather than by arrangement into discrete systems . . . and underlying many 
remarkable syntheses and extreme elaborations, certain factors have combined 
polythetically. (1981: 24–25) 
hese factors, and their condensation into synthetic images, can be recognized 
across the ethnographic register. hey escape decidedly the sociocentric dis-
tinction (and isomorphism) between collective representations and individual 
representations that is so characteristic of twentieth-century anthropology. hey 
are neither the product of a society that forcefully molds the intellect of an in-
dividual, nor the fruit of individual imagination or artiice (cf. 1978: 49–50). To 
that extent, they must be seen as a kind of collective unconscious; or, rather, they 
are recalcitrant to local deinition (cf. 1981: 86–89; 1985: 66). 
To conclude, needham sustains that the notion of imagination can ac-
tually be taken to mean something truly intrinsic to the human experience 
(1978: 21), but the identiication of imaginative syntheses requires the use of 
factorial analysis in order to show how the primary factors come together and 
link up stochastically on the basis of sporadic resemblances. hese are fully poly-
thetic conceptual processes that correspond to unconscious imaginative synthe-
ses. here are no speciic techniques that can help us identify them, since the 
method required—to take “social facts” as polythetic combinations—does not 
really tell us what we must look for, what characteristics are bound to be more 
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distinctive or relevant (ibid.: 67). In order to unearth them, therefore, “a great 
deal depends . . . on an imaginative acuity such as is called for in the ultimate 
test of translation” (ibid.: 75).
his imaginative acuity consists in being able to identify the primary fac-
tors of experience at diferent levels of abstraction, since the condensation of 
symbolic elements or synthetic images is autonomously distributed, acquiring 
meanings that go way beyond particular local factors. his being said, it is nec-
essary to stress that synthetic images are nothing but proclivities; they have 
no inherent or ultimate meaning. As such, they cannot be used to constitute a 
metaphysics (they will not bring together one human world). 
Finally, if comparativists can succeed in sharpening their imagination in or-
der to abstract the distinctive recurrences of human imagination, it is because 
they themselves are grafted onto world and onto sociality: “Fabricators, audi-
ences, and analysts are bound together by common criteria of fantasy and com-
mon imaginative predispositions” (ibid.: 59–60).
METAPHoRS
In the year needham published Reconnaissances (1980), George Lakof and 
Mark Johnson published a book called Metaphors we live by (1980), which was 
destined to have a major impact in philosophical and literary circles. heir basic 
starting point was that human conceptual systems are essentially structured by 
metaphorical thinking and, as thinking is part of the same “conceptual system” 
as communicating, language is par excellence the ield where such metaphori-
cal structuring of thought is seen to occur. hey conceive their book, therefore, 
around the exploration of a set of linguistic commonplaces characteristic of 
West Coast everyday English, which they ind to be structured by some ma-
jor implicit (unstated) metaphors such as Ideas are objects, or linguistic 
expressions are containers, or time is money, and so on (note their use of 
capitals as diacritics, suggesting the uncertain epistemological status of these 
“metaphors”). hey then proceed to explore a series of diferent instances where 
such “metaphors” can be postulated to occur. he book is full of very useful eth-
nographic insights concerning the worldview of the contemporary urban united 
States. Our argument here, however, is that the texts by Donald Davidson of the 
same period (e.g., 2001: 245–61), albeit less easy to read, bear a far more promis-
ing theory both of metaphor and of the veridical nature of belief.
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he use of the concept of metaphor that lakof and Johnson propose is, to 
our mind, deeply problematic; let alone their attribution of determinate mean-
ing to metaphors. As they deine it, “Metaphor is principally a way of conceiv-
ing of one thing in terms of another and its primary function is understanding” 
(1980: 36). We do not have any real problem with the notion that understand-
ing is associational; still we remain unconvinced that the authors really mean 
metaphor stricto sensu when they use the word throughout their book. Much 
like our colleague James Fernandez (1991), whose work on the subject was also 
very inluential in its day, they use metaphor metonymically to mean analogi-
cal thought in general (thus both metaphor and metonymy, but also analogical 
mediation more broadly). Whilst they do have a short chapter on metonymy 
(1980: 35–40), the fact is they revert immediately after it to a use of the word 
metaphor that conjoins all forms of symbolic association and in particular those 
that take recourse to analogy. 
he main problem with this is the lack of clarity concerning the epistemo-
logical status of the categories they use. his lack of clarity is not of a polythetic 
nature; rather it is the contrary, as they treat metaphors as if they were mono-
thetic. For example, when they say, “he most fundamental values in a culture 
will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental con-
cepts in that culture” (ibid.: 22), they are implicitly diferentiating metaphors 
from concepts and treating value as a kind of adjectival adjunct to such concepts. 
hey sustain that “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing 
one kind of thing in terms of another” (ibid.: 5). But the problem is that, for hu-
man beings engaged in personal ontogeny, all ideas only exist because there are 
other ideas; the associational process by which each idea, image, concept, belief, 
exists is only possible because there are many more other such that support it.
he most problematic aspect of Lakof and Johnson’s proposal, however, 
is their treatment of metaphors as somehow existing as semiotic entities un-
derneath cultural interaction: that is, their failure to understand the stochastic 
nature of mental processes and, in particular, of the constitution of meaning. 
now, this reiication of particular metaphors is of a piece with their proneness 
to condense analogical thinking into “metaphor,” for if they had not done that, 
and had accepted that all human thinking is necessarily associational in analogic 
ways (with the inevitable indeterminacy associated to the holism of the mental), 
they would not be able then to go on to identify and give entity status (by plac-
ing them in capitals) to the metaphors they claim to unearth. hey transform 
recurrent associations into images and then they postulate the existence of these 
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as infrastructures of narrative proclivities. rather than seeing human meaning 
proclivities as emerging stochastically from the immense complexity of asso-
ciational forms of behavior that humans engage in when faced with a socially 
always preconigured world, they are proposing that somewhere in the depths of 
each person’s thought are inscribed these metaphors—some are universal (such 
as good is up, Bad is down) but others are really West coast-speciic (such as 
Inflation is an entity, or time is a machine). moreover, these metaphors 
we are supposed to possess have a kind of collective existence; they are some-
how the same in the mind of all the people who hold them (who have “learned” 
them), much like Durkheimian collective representations were meant to be.
contrary to that, we propose that there is no such thing as collective think-
ing, properly speaking. persons think, collectives do not. propositional thinking 
is an activity that can only be entertained by singular persons who are engaged 
in personal ontogeny within human sociality. here is no such thing as collective 
thinking and indeterminacy and underdetermination cannot be pushed aside in 
terms of either intersubjective communication or subjective thought. herefore, 
whatever recurrent features we may come to identify in the thoughts of a set of 
persons can only be of a stochastic nature. he kind of metaphorical recurrences 
that lakof and Johnson identify cannot be anything other than proclivities. 
In the end, their narrativist notion of metaphor amounts to a version of what 
Sartre called a naïve metaphysics of image. We agree, therefore, with Davidson 
when he insists that metaphors are to do with the use of language and that, 
for their occurrence, they depend as much on who produces them as on who 
receives them. hus, metaphors are “brought of by the imaginative employ-
ment of words and sentences and [depend] entirely on the ordinary meanings 
of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they com-
prise” (Davidson 2001: xx).
here is one aspect, however, in lakof and Johnson’s book that we ind par-
ticularly useful.5 In their exploration of what they term ontological metaphors, 
some really signiicant insights emerge concerning what needham called the 
abstract primary factors of experience. he only one of these that needham 
did explore in any signiicant way was binary opposition. In Counterpoints, he 
attempts to decipher the meaning of the human propensity for thinking in 
terms of oppositions and dyads. he concludes, however, that opposition “has no 
5. We are grateful to Giovanni da col and Alex ceccheti for having called our 
attention to this.
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intrinsic logical form.” It is “in practice an odd-job notion seductively masked 
by the immediacy of a spatial metaphor” (1987: 228). he principle behind the 
proclivity to think in terms of opposition is reversible direction; and that, in 
turn, is directly associated to our experience of our own body (ibid.: 71–72). It 
is, indeed, a spatial intuition (ibid.: 236).
lakof and Johnson propose that we should explore the idea that humans 
are prone to “impose artiicial boundaries that make physical phenomena dis-
crete just as we are: entities bounded by a surface” (1980: 25). he resulting 
broad dispositions may be treated as having the same status as needham at-
tributed to opposition: that of abstract primary factors of experience. here are 
two such features that emerge from Lakof and Johnson’s eforts: on the one 
hand, the proneness for reiication—that is, the treatment of abstract entities as 
if they were material entities; on the other, containment—that is, “We are physi-
cal beings, bounded and set of from the rest of the world by the surface of our 
skins, and we experience the rest of the world as outside us. . . . We project our 
own in–out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces. 
hus we also view them as containers with an inside and an outside” (ibid.: 29). 
Both processes involve a manipulation of time and space: reiication is a 
transformation of a recurrence into a spatial entity; containment is the trans-
formation of a spatial proximity into a temporally recurrent entity.6 It might be 
argued, as Lakof and Johnson do, that these proclivities are metaphors, and it 
is undeniable that they are products of analogical thinking. But they are not 
metaphors in the narrativist sense that Lakof and Johnson propose (e.g., Time 
is money or love is travel), for they do not get learned as metaphors. Rather, 
they result from the recurrent (stochastic) way in which our embodied condi-
tion predisposes our cognition, loosely determining our thought dispositions.
We propose, therefore, that reiication and containment should be treated as 
abstract limits of the imagination in the sense of proclivities of thought that 
can be detected in human modes of thinking fairly much everywhere in much 
the same way that needham treats opposition. he very centrality of metaphor, 
metonymy, and analogy in human communication is dependent on these pro-
clivities of thought. We have to stop seeing such rhetorical features as actual 
mechanisms of thought, and instead view them as the recurrent result of the 
stochastic operation of a myriad of processes.
6. We are grateful to Joan Bestard camps for calling our attention to this.
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CoNClUSIoN
At this point, the reader may well be asking whether the sense of imagination 
that we have been exploring in this chapter has anything to do with the more 
common use that is given to the word: namely, to refer to the propensity humans 
have to design plans of action for the future and, in particular, ones that had not 
been previously entertained. ontological naïvety encourages us to assume that 
we have ideas, concepts, or images in our minds and that these are transformed 
by imagination into new ones. his, however, as was argued above, is not how we 
should proceed if we want to avoid the dead end of representationalism.
our argument in this chapter is that the two meanings of imagination are, 
in fact, deeply intertwined and that it is indeed only by reference to the transfor-
mational meaning of imagination that it makes any sense to call limits of imagi-
nation to the primary factors of experience. once we give up on the Cartesian 
idea of images in the mind as imprints of perceptual experience, and thus we rid 
ourselves of the idea of there being such things as determinable metaphors in 
our minds, we then become free to see imagination as the associational process 
that situates thoughts within the holism of the mental. And, of course, there-
fore, there is a deeply ontogenetic side to imagination since it always sits on top 
of a history of personhood. 
We are only free to imagine (new things, that is) because our thought is 
veridical—it engages the world of which it is a part. As in fuzzy logic, we are 
constantly correcting for error: “A creature that cannot entertain the idea that 
it might be wrong has no concepts, no thoughts” (davidson 2004: 141). It is by 
questioning “what is” or “what is not” that we can entertain what might not yet 
be. hus, there is a direct relationship between reminiscing and imagining as 
a destiny of openness; between pastness and futurity. We break with the naïve 
conception of mental images as somehow ixed. time and space, as parameters 
of our human condition of embodied historicity in world, are always unfolding, 
thus giving rise to the dynamic process of worlding that we thematized in the 
previous chapter. 
What we have discovered in the work of the oxford poststructuralists is that 
humans are not just free to move anywhere they like. In order to imagine things, 
we are constrained by the fact that we live in a world with speciic characteristics, 
that we are persons in ontogeny (i.e., in space-time), and that human sociality 
and its complex histories (forms of life) are the absolute condition for the very 
possibility of propositional thinking. he primary factors of experience limit our 
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imagination to the extent that we are biological humans in sociality and that our 
personal ontogeny takes place in a common world. But so do synthetic images, 
paradigmatic scenes, and worldviews. he limits of imagination are constraints 
on our futurity—that is, on the way in which purpose (intentionality) is con-
stantly part of our engagement with world and others. his does not mean that 
they have to be seen as a sign that there is no freedom in the human condition. 
rather, it means that absolute freedom, like absolute truth, or absolute world, is 
an unthinkable goal. It is not only that they do not exist, but that they could not 
have existed. he ideas of absolute truth, of absolute freedom, or absolute world 
are contradictory in themselves; they are oxymoronic. 
he sociocentric and representationalist dispositions that so deeply marked 
our discipline are correctly associated with the structuralist theoretical herit-
age inspired by the works of durkheim or Simmel. It is legitimate to ask at 
this point whether a critique of sociocentrism and representationalism, such as 
proposed in this book, requires the wholesale abandonment of anthropology’s 
structuralist heritage. We would be obliged to cast aside such precious jewels as, 
to pick a few examples, lévi-Strauss’ canonical formula of myth, gluckman’s 
“peace in the feud,” Gofman’s analysis of stigma, or Viveiros’ demonic alliance. 
If, however, we take structuralism not as a theoretical starting point but as a 
methodological disposition, this need not be the case. While a new methodo-
logical structuralism will have to be analytically mitigated, there is no good 
reason to suppose that we cannot return to such tools as sources of inspiration, 
namely in our ethnographic analyses, for they remain brilliant windows into the 
human condition and its more recurrent proclivities.
chapter four
Person
We are so both and oneful
night cannot be so sky
sky cannot be so sunful
i am through you so i
– e. e. cummings
At the beginning of this book, we observed that world is not only human but it 
is also personal. It is now time to take on the full implications of that and ask 
ourselves: If world is formed1 by humans and if personhood is the characteristic 
condition of humanity, then how do persons come about in human sociality? 
his is a necessary step for querying how humans inhabit world.
he starting assumption is that, in the world around us, mind and body are 
one; therefore, it is not a question of matter, as there is no question of spirit.2 
1. Note, we use the expression “formed” in its literal sense of “given form,” not in the 
sense of “created.”
2. his is one side of what Donald Davidson attempted to explain by means of 
his notion of “anomalous monism”: “Mental states are as real as physical events, 
being identical with them, and attributions of states are as objective” (2001: 72). 
Contemporary eforts to reenliven panpsychism, and particularly attempts to 
grant substance to spirit (and notably in the shape of Geist—Gabriel 2015), are 
unwarranted, both empirically and ethically.
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life is a mode of in-forming the world that, once it accumulates, gives rise over 
time and in space to the consolidation of ontological scales of iguration. In turn, 
these can combine in complex ways, giving rise to the emergence of instances 
of dynamic stability: personhood is one such. As a process of life, personhood 
occurs in a human being who communicates with other humans, evolving pro-
gressively toward a person capable of relexive thinking (we call that ontogeny). 
hus, the mere existence of a live human being is only a necessary condition for 
personhood; it is not a suicient one. We should not speak of the person aside 
from the process of her/his constitution in time: that is, we must reject the no-
tion that there is any ahistorical essence or inevitability to personhood. 
In the previous chapter, we saw that there are cross-cultural recurrences and 
similarities in the ways persons engage world and proposed that the notion of 
primary factors of experience could help us account for these. In particular, we 
concluded that personhood should not be approached as a neo-Kantian3-type 
entity (a category of the mind), but rather that it should be seen as a synthetic 
image, a stochastically recurrent set of features of thought and experience that 
operate by the combination of primary factors of experience within historically 
particular forms of life. 
he occurrence of these synthetic images is directly related to the embodied 
condition of humans and the afordances that they encounter in world, but not 
as logical impositions or preconigured molds. to the contrary, synthetic images 
emerge in a complex stochastic manner out of the myriad forms that commu-
nication within human sociality assumes in history. Now, if this applies to the 
more abstract proclivities (containment, binary opposition, reiication), it must 
also apply to personhood, where, as Mauss highlighted from the beginning of 
the discussion, the variability in modes is immense within the ethnographic 
record. his variability, however, is not complete; there are limits to it. hat is, 
there are recurrences and proclivities that can be observed to operate in all con-
texts of human sociality. 
We start, therefore, from the idea that there are limits to the ways humans 
imagine their social condition and that one of these is the proclivity to assume 
entities of a kind that anthropologists have chosen to call “person.” Departing 
3. Note, however, how Godlove argues convincingly that Durkheim’s French neo-
Kantianism was inspired by Charles renouvier and, in these matters, actually 
dependent on an incorrect interpretation of Kant (e.g., Godlove 1996: ix; see also 
Keck 2008). 
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from personhood as a factor of experience, this chapter dialogues with a num-
ber of attempts to reformulate the theoretical bases of the comparative study 
of kinship. It aims to emphasize the central relevance of personal ontogeny to 
human sociality. It is an efort to bring a series of critical insights to bear upon 
the age-old anthropological questions concerning kinship in terms of iliation 
and alliance.
PersoNhooD
humans act collectively but always through the agency of the person. All that 
is human arises from the person, each and every one of us inescapably personal. 
It is to persons that we can trace back the path of all the amazing marks hu-
mans have left in the world throughout the history of their species. Note, this is 
not a declaration of individualism or even of personalism; it is nothing but the 
empirical recognition that human sociality (emerging from the evolution of our 
species) inheres in the person and can never exist beyond it. human sociality 
as we have known it since the development of language and the inception of 
Homo sapiens sapiens is rooted in the action of persons endowed with relex-
ive thinking. Persons are emergent entities that arise within human sociality 
(cf. hattiangadi 2005).
While we disagree with Durkheim’s sociocentrism, we validate Mauss’ origi-
nal observation that all known human forms of life have depended on some 
shared agreement about what it is to be a person. In spite of interpersonal inde-
terminacy, there is no doubt that, when you become a person, you do so within a 
narrative context where what it is to be a person is already a largely determined 
ield. Furthermore, the expectations associated to personhood are echoed in all 
sorts of other facets of a form of life, which present themselves to the person as 
afordances (see Chemero 2003), such as modes of dwelling, forms of care, gen-
der relations, relations of kinship, and so on. he boundaries of personhood may 
be questioned (as in slave-holding societies), the nature of what makes persons 
operative may vary (as in diferent forms of conceiving of spiritual essence), even 
personal embodiment can assume diverse aspects (as when Ingold argues that 
we do not all see in the same way—2010). he ethnographic record, however, 
leaves us in no doubt: the existence of globally recurrent values and associations 
concerning personhood is a central element of all forms of human life. More than 
that, across diferent sociocultural contexts, it has been systematically observed 
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that these values and formulations of personhood are of foundational impor-
tance for human forms of life. 
In chapter 2, we observed that the world ofers itself to persons in ontogeny 
as a form of extension (space and time) where things are founded and order can 
be built—that is, worlding is a central part of human existence. his process of 
worlding is the result of a disposition that humans share with all animal life to 
relate intentionally with world. I was inspired here by the account of intention-
ality and purpose as the bases of all meaning that t. l. short (2007) derived from 
a historical reading of Peirce’s late “semeiotic.”4 short deines intentionality as 
the act of being attentive to an object. Any act of attention interprets a facet of 
world, but it need not be a component of a thought in the propositional sense. 
As intentionality is an active engagement with world, it implies a constant as-
sessment of the impact that features of world have on the agent. In intentional-
ity, the act of attention presupposes purpose. his means that error assessment 
is necessarily the ground upon which thinking is based, that is, intentionality is 
veridical. Furthermore, inasmuch as “meaning is not contained in a moment but 
is future-directed” (ibid.: 44), space-time is part of all thinking, and worlding 
ensues. 
such a view of intentionality can be very useful for the anthropological pro-
ject, since it opens up the way for a theory of meaning that is naturalistic and yet is 
not limited to mechanistic notions of causality. All animal life is based on sociality 
(the achievement of collective action), and this depends on information sharing 
(communication). In turn, communication is not primarily a dyadic relation 
between two agents. rather, as Davidson has taught us, it is a triangulation 
with world; it requires world (2001: 128). Intentionality is what makes possible 
communication among the members of a species, for it is what opens up world. 
sociality and intentionality, therefore, are codependent. 
his is the reason why there are serious problems with proposals that aim 
to extend the irst-person plural of scientiic analysis (the so-called “ecumenical 
4. According to short, the principal problem with Peircean “semeiotic” is that “it has 
gotten amongst the wrong crowd” (ibid.: ix), that is, it has been made implicitly to 
converge with the kind of saussurian semiotics that constitutes the epistemological 
bread and butter of most anthropological undergraduate degrees. Furthermore, 
short’s more abstract version of intentionality seems better suited to our project 
than that proposed by Alessandro Duranti in his recent book on “intentions” 
(2015), where the concept is treated primarily to refer to dispositions of human 
consciousness of a representational kind.
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we”—see Praet 2015) to include, for example, whole planets, way beyond what 
has been considered life. he issue is not if planets, as the example goes, are “like 
us,” since all things are “like” all other things in some way; but whether a planet 
is capable of “we”—in other words, whether it possesses the capacity to address 
and respond to the afordances provided by world through a system of com-
munication among members of a species and beyond it. If it does, it is capable 
of “we” (as lévi-strauss argued for amoebas—2000); if it does not, then to 
classify it as “we” or “us” is to engage in metaphorical, poetic thinking. In short, 
the social teleology of intentionality—Peirce’s “purpose”—is a condition for the 
very occurrence of a “we”; beyond teleology there is no sense in talking of “we/
us,” for this is not simply a deinitional matter.
In contrast, one must be equally weary of the anthropocentric proneness 
to identify intentionality with “the mental” or with consciousness. In humans, 
intentionality is a central feature of everyday life that continues to operate 
throughout a person’s life as a basic disposition. Processes of sociality occur 
among other species; other species also have complex forms of information 
sharing; what there is not in other species is thinking relexive subjects endowed 
with presence, such as fully formed persons. While intentionality is a character-
istic of all animal life, relexive propositional thinking is exclusive to persons. 
he entry into personhood, however, is a staged process that requires us to be 
in sociality with other humans who have already been called into personhood. 
he material person is born as a member of the human species but it is only in 
personal ontogeny that it enters fully into human life by postulating its own pres-
ence. he intersubjectivity of others provokes the intersubjectivity we share with 
them. his is the marvelous result of the evolution of our species (see schaefer 
2007). human sociality has much in common with all other forms of sociality, 
but it is distinctive in that way: children in human sociality are prone to develop 
propositional thinking out of a joint engagement with world. 
We are born wired in such a way that we have a propensity for entering hu-
man communication (edelman 1992) and remain within it through memory 
(Kandel 2006). For that, however, we have to be called into personhood by other 
humans who had already been called by others before them, in a long chain of 
mutuality. If the proverbial catastrophe were to occur and only newborn babies 
were to survive—however many of them might survive, however many books 
and computers survive with them—that would be the end of humanity, for it 
would be the end to an uninterrupted history of transgenerational personal 
mutuality.
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By human sociality, therefore, we mean the ongoing contexts of information 
sharing as instituted in the history of our species (cf. Ingold 1996). It is very 
important to understand that this is not limited to matters of propositional 
(symbolic) thought.5 rather, communication involves the possibility of achiev-
ing joint action, and that is a feature of most life forms. Sociality, as the passing 
of information between the members of a species in order to achieve collective 
action, is the root of intentionality. And, as we saw above, intentionality as-
sumes space and time, it involves pastness and futurity—that is, the variation in 
mode that results from the causal trace of both efective and possible intentional 
engagements.
Contrary to intentionality, propositional thinking as it evolves in human 
infants from about one year of age is something that only persons can do: not 
parts of persons, not groups of persons, not books, not computers (see hutto 
2008). Persons and only persons. And, in order to be a person, we have to be 
called into personhood by other persons; not only one other but various oth-
ers. his is why levinas (1996) claims that being called into personhood by 
other persons constitutes an anterior alterity: “anterior” in the sense that it is not 
symmetrical with identity, for it is, rather, constitutive of identity. he point is 
that I can only become aware of myself as a counterdistinction. Intelligibility 
always precedes me; I am not the ultimate source of my own thinking, because 
it is from within narrative that I emerge—this is how we propose to read today 
Anselm’s insight concerning belief and reason.
to recapitulate: intentionality (basic mind) is a precondition for proposi-
tionality (scafolded mind). As humans, when we are born, we possess capabili-
ties that distinguish us from other species. human babies have a disposition 
to sense what others are experiencing—developmental psychologists call this 
alteroception (Bråten [1998] 2006). his disposition means that humans are 
prone to respond together with others in the world, engaging the world jointly. 
his shared intentionality is an embodied disposition that evolved phylogeneti-
cally, not some sort of mental or spiritual disposition, as we were told of old 
(see tomasello 2008). hrough it, we integrate our own perspective with that 
of those with whom we are experiencing alteroception. here is nothing con-
scious about it—at least before we become fully persons. shared intentionality is 
what allows humans to come together in the world, to ind each other’s rhythm 
5. I speciically avoid here a semiotic account of human sociality—much like, in fact, 
the older Peirce also did (see short 2007).
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without even trying to do so, to sense each other’s needs; whether one is cooper-
ating for action or whether one is ighting each other to death. It is as important 
in love making as in karate.
humans have been endowed by evolution with a proclivity to respond to 
world in joint perspective with our close partners in that world (Chemero 2009). 
his process is what makes us prone to learn how to communicate as humans: 
that which has been called intersubjectivity.6 Child psychologists have dem-
onstrated that intersubjectivity is the door through which human babies enter 
the process of communicating by means of gestures and, eventually, through 
language (trevarthen 1980). As we have learned of old with the instances of 
feral children (enfants sauvages—Newton 2002), if one is not called into this 
form of primary intersubjectivity with humans, one will never develop human 
thought processes fully. 
his process of entering into communication by engaging in intersubjec-
tivity with others in a dwelling environment occurs in steps, and it is what 
makes us become persons and, eventually, fully thinking persons with a relexive 
knowledge of our own existence in world. Intersubjectivity, however, is operative 
in each of us even before we develop any notion of our own separate existence 
as persons; before each one of us has constituted his or her own singular arena 
of presence and action before world (Bråten [1998] 2006). his is why “being-
in-the-world” is inevitably a “being-with-others,” to use heidegger’s dictum.
In order to understand this, we must grasp that the emergence of the per-
son (personal ontogeny) is a layered process. he distinction between primary 
and secondary intersubjectivities can help us grasp this layered coming into 
being of the person. shaun Gallagher proposes that, being based on intention-
ality, primary intersubjectivity is already present in the newborn and never stops 
throughout life. It is a nonmentalistic, perceptually based engagement with the 
intentions and attitudes of others. eventually, for a child who is cared for by hu-
mans, this is superposed by a secondary intersubjectivity that evolves from around 
one year of age and that already assumes the scafolding of world to the extent 
that it involves engaging persons and their intentions in light of their contexts 
of action (see Gallagher and Jacobson 2012). 
6. Contrary to Alessandro Duranti (2015: 7), I do not believe that the word should 
be synonymous with shared intentionality. he two notions refer to processes that 
overlap signiicantly but have very diverse implications, as shaun Gallagher’s 
distinction between primary and secondary intersubjectivities highlights (Gallagher 
and Jacobson 2012).
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his secondary intersubjectivity, in turn, involves two layered modes: irstly, 
the child moves from understanding others to making sense of the world—
through shared intentionality, the child becomes aware of the way others grasp 
pragmatically the afordances in the surrounding environment; secondly, the 
child moves from understanding the world to making sense of others—it comes 
to grasp the roles that others play out in the world by engaging in the every-
day pragmatic routines of the dwelling environment (the “jobs” that the child 
so wishes to accomplish, according to trevarthen7). In short, there never is an 
original moment in which the child is itself alone facing others; being-in-the-
world is being-with-others from before the child constitutes its own presence. 
And then, throughout life, as we engage new situations, the layered process of 
personal ontogeny never stops, so that anterior alterity is a feature of person-
hood that is constant, not only at the beginning of life.
the eMerGeNCe oF sINGulArIty
In light of that, plurally cohabiting the world—company—is the inescapable 
condition of personhood. he arousal of subjectivity in the person—that is, the 
oncoming of propositional thinking—happens through an engagement with a 
plurality of human beings, as the result of triangulation.8 singularity and part-
ibility coexist in the human condition, mutually creating and destroying each 
other (strathern 1988: 11–14). Meyer Fortes ([1973] 1987) has famously dem-
onstrated that, for the tallensi, it is only after death that a man can fully achieve 
the status of full personhood. As it happens, there is a profound universalism in 
that particular aporia, since it highlights that personhood is a variable, even in 
contexts where it is not presented as such. As a matter of fact, in the course of 
personal ontogeny, each one of us will never be more than an almost-one, that 
is, singular but only almost so, because indeterminacy and underdetermination 
are inescapable conditions of propositional thinking. We can only think to the 
7. extract of oral communication in
 http://www.educationscotland.gov.uk/earlyyears/prebirthtothree/
nationalguidance/conversations/colwyntrevarthen.asp (accessed 30 November 
2014—no longer available ).
8. For the backing to this account in studies of cognition and developmental 
psychology, see hutto (2008), and trevarthen (1993, 1998), respectively.
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extent that we are within sociality, and that is a communicational condition that 
has to happen in a historically speciic location, in a world of becoming. 
In his foundational lecture on the category of the person, Marcel Mauss 
noted that there never has been 
a tribe, a language, in which the word “I”, “me” (je, moi) . . . has never existed, or 
that it has not expressed something clearly represented. . . . As well as possessing 
the pronoun, a very large number of languages are conspicuous for their use of 
many “positional” suixes, which deal for the most part with the relationships 
existing in time and space between the speaker (the subject) and the object about 
which he is speaking.. ([1938] 1985: 2–3) 
While this is true, it must also not be forgotten that pronouns do not all 
function in the same way. long ago, Émile Benveniste demonstrated that the 
irst-person and the second-person pronouns operate diferently from the third-
person pronoun (he/she) in that they are “empty,” as he put it: “heir role is to 
provide the instrument for a conversion .  .  . of language into speech” (1966: 
254). In short, he argues that while I and you are positional indicators, he/she are 
substitutes for objects of speech (as in, “Peter ate the apple. He loved it”). I and 
you are positional, they do not demand a reference external to the speech act; to 
the contrary, he/she stands for something that is external to it.
here is, indeed, a profound truth to this observation, for it has implications 
in the matter of early personal ontogeny. We must not assume that there is any 
anteriority to the irst or second persons, for if we did we would be falling into 
the trap of separating language use (speech) from the historical process of the 
constitution of the speaking person, both in ontogeny and in phylogeny. We 
have to understand that the “substitution” that the third person operates, to use 
Benveniste’s terms, is the original process that allows for the constitution of the 
other two: as we have come to know, primary intersubjectivity antedates subjec-
tivity, not the other way around (see trevarthen 1980).
Dividuality results directly from the process of being called into personhood 
by one’s early carers, which is not something that is planned or consciously 
enacted each time. Adults call children into personhood because they too expe-
rience alteroception, that is, they too are prone to include babies in their lived 
worlds through the efects of shared intentionality. Intersubjectivity is not a 
choice; it happens. It is all rather inevitable once a baby is among humans and 
is being cared for during the long period of maturation that the human species 
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demands. he oncoming of relexive thought is what allows for the arousal of 
subjectivity in the person. he child experiences shared intentionality with those 
carers who are physically closest to it. It experiences that as participation (à la 
lévy-Bruhl), to the extent that it sees itself and the carer as being intrinsically the 
same before the word. he child is encouraged in that by the fact that the carers 
themselves are also prone to this same process of participation.
Now, as donald Winnicott (1971) came to understand when studying chil-
dren, there never is only one other. It is when further carers—third parties in 
the theater of personal ontogeny—come into contact with the child and with 
its initial closest carer that it experiences for the irst time that terrible sense of 
betrayal, of aloneness, which levinas (1996) theorised. his is what William 
James called “the law of dissociation”: “What is associated now with one thing 
and now with another, tends to become dissociated from either, and to grow 
into an object of abstract contemplation by the mind” (1918: 506). In sum, 
memory of crossed identiications is what produces personhood: the emer-
gence of presence is a function of the aloneness of being singularly identiied in 
the world. 
his is a process that depends on the spontaneous operation of the abstract 
primary factors that we listed in the previous chapter: opposition, reiication, 
and containment. hese three modes of operation come together in a process of 
triangulation that is never completed: ontogenic triangulation goes on happen-
ing for as long as the person remains alive; and, in turn, participation reimposes 
itself after separation. he person will face an other (person or, for that matter, 
animal) and experience again alteroception leading to shared intentionality—
and intersubjectivity starts once more! 
What this means is that there is a permanent evanescence to identity. James’ 
law of dissociation is a continuous dynamic of human creation. Alterity—the 
fact of having been called into being from the outside—will never fully resolve 
itself into identity; it will always remain anterior. herefore, there is no stabil-
ity in identity, as levinas (1961) has demonstrated. he asymmetry of alterity 
imposes itself at every new encounter and humans will have no rest as humans. 
Persons as relexive agents will ever be the unsteady products of sociality.
here is, in short, a fundamental ambiguity in personhood that never re-
solves itself throughout ontogeny, for if I were to become “one,” I would be-
tray the other in me and, in that way, I would lose the possibility of being 
myself. Personhood, as an emergent property, is never unitary; it is always 
an almost-one. In the theatre of personal ontogeny, I am close to another 
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(contiguity, neighborhood) but I am also another (substitution, surrogation—
see Pina-Cabral 2013b). In that sense, participation (à la lévy-Bruhl—see 
[1949] 1998) involves both proximity and substitution (as levinas identi-
ies—see 1996). 
In fact, I can only come to communicate propositionally with other hu-
mans because primary intersubjectivity disposes me congenitally to assume 
that others around me may make sense because they are with me. Mutuality is 
foundational of the person: at the root of propositional communication there 
is the ethical posture of Quine’s interpretive charity. ethics, therefore, is not a 
contract that the person enters into, nor is it a set of rules that the person has 
accepted to follow in order to be a member of the social.9 At root, correspon-
sibility is there as a condition for me to become a person. herefore, it is an 
imposition. 
Much like with meaning, where we discovered that indeterminacy and un-
derdetermination were conditions of, not impediments to, thought, so here, 
in personhood, the ineradicable presence of the third party in the theater of 
ontogeny, leading to the challenge posed by anterior alterity, must be seen not 
as a source of invalidation of the human, but as its very condition of possibility. 
he compositeness and ambiguity of the person are the source of ethics and 
politics. 
he person discovers him- or herself as other, and as other of another. In 
propositionality, the presence from the start of the third party, questioning the 
identiication of the intentional engagement with world, is the mechanism 
that launches relexivity, making possible the scafolding of thinking. hus, the 
emergence of personhood as singular is experienced as a disturbance, an uncer-
tainty, a contradictoriness—the emergence of personhood is traumatic.
his kind of language may discomit anthropological readers, who are bound 
to ind it too abstract, bordering on meaningless. But it is an unavoidable mo-
ment of anthropological thinking, for part of the problem we have identiied 
with our disciplinary tradition and its incapacity to register some of the more 
provocative indings of poststructuralism is precisely its proneness to reify ex-
cessively and to avoid the conclusion that transcendence in personhood is a part 
of becoming a person, not a “culturally” imposed mode.
9. Philippa Foot’s disquisitions about goodness can be read as implications of this 
feature of personhood (2001).
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StEPS of oNtogENY ANd World
our motto in the following section is heidegger’s assertion that, by relation 
to stones, persons are world forming;10 and by relation to animals, they do so 
in a richer fashion ([1929/30] 1995). We will transform that observation into 
contemporary anthropological terms by demonstrating that coniguring world 
occurs in full isomorphism with coniguring personhood; the two processes are 
codependent and they occur through a series of four steps that we will now iden-
tify. For obvious explanatory reasons, we do so from the perspective of early 
ontogeny; but the reader must keep in mind that the process that launches 
ontogeny and gives form to world goes on happening for so long as the person 
remains alive. owing to the unfolding of personal ontogeny, the person is a con-
stant engine of world building; thus, the steps we abstract below are happening 
all of the time. hat is, they are not chronological steps in any strict sense, but a 
process of constant implication. he chronological sequence we propose below, 
therefore, is essentially expository.
he gateway to personhood—the irst step of ontogeny and world—is the mo-
tivated perception of others that is based on an immediate response to the oth-
er’s body movements (trevarthen calls it alteroception—see 1980 and Bråten 
[1998] 2006). By means of it, the newborn child is drawn into identiication 
with its proximate others. his occurs primarily with its irst carer (often the 
breastfeeding mother), and subsequently with more and more persons in its 
immediate dwelling environment. hese relations of participation (speciically 
of surrogation—see Pina-Cabral 2013b) are driven by shared intentionality and 
give rise to primary intersubjectivity. Clear boundaries are not demarcated and 
worlding occurs in a difuse manner as a process of extension outward in time 
and space. he world is lit, as it were; it embraces the emerging person as an 
awareness of an area of possible movement: world arises as source (as aspect [i] 
of world, as elicited in chapter 1 above). 
he second step is when the child is confronted with its carers interacting 
with each other and performing “tasks” in its immediate dwelling environment. 
10. “Forming in the multiple sense that it lets world occur, and through the world 
gives itself an original view (form [Bild]) that is not explicitly grasped, yet functions 
precisely as a paradigmatic form for all manifest beings, among which each 
respective Dasein itself belongs” (heidegger 1998: 123). once again, we meet here 
with the principle of non-wellfoundedness—i.e., a part that relates to a whole of 
which it is a part—as the mode of emergence.
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As the carers interact with each other, manipulating separately the diverse fea-
tures of the dwelling environment, the child is treated as a third person. It too 
engages actively with surrounding afordances, thus discovering its own agen-
cy.11 In this process, the child’s original participations with its immediate carers 
are challenged owing to triangulation. hus, the child confronts its absence from 
its primordial participations. 
his is the moment when duality emerges, for the child is split from itself 
(itself as one with each of the immediate carers). It is the ethical moment of 
betrayal when the emerging person is confronted by the possibility of its own 
absence. It is a breach of continuity, like dividing the left side of the body from 
the right side of the body. It is at this point that perspective on world arises. By 
relation to a world that no longer includes it, the person becomes a perspective 
on world, which is now an encompassing world that is placed not in mere con-
tinuity with the person, but by contrast with him or her—that is, as domain, as 
aspect (ii) of world.
he third step is when the child discovers him- or herself as other. his is the 
moment of emergence of the arena of presence and action (see Johnston 2010). 
he process is one of both reiication and containment. hrough memory, an 
internality takes shape that relates spatiotemporally with world. hat is, I look 
at myself like yet another thing in the world—a world which contains diverse 
things; a world divided by boundaries. he now reiied person can engage the 
world relexively from the point of view of his or her internal arena of pres-
ence and action, his or her self. he scafolding of mind—in Peircian terms, the 
achievement of symbolic thinking—occurs concomitantly with the emergence 
of the arena of presence and action. language acquisition is part of this process 
of scafolding, which is a process of acceptance of limits upon world. limits that, 
much as they are formative of the person in secondary intersubjectivity, appear 
as external to the person’s actions—it is the arising of aspect (iii) of world. 
he fourth step is when the person discovers him- or herself as internally 
complex by crossing his or her reiied existence with the identiication he/she 
has with those with whom he/she shares the world. he plural emerges as an 
extrapolation of self-identity, a symmetry between levels. Persons form non-
wellfounded sets (cf. Moss 2014) to the extent that they create wholes together 
11. By taking recourse to the neutral pronoun here we seek to achieve two things: (a) to 
postpone the attribution of personhood at a point when it is being constituted and 
(b) to postpone the attribution of gender at a point when it is being negotiated.
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with wholes of which they are a part (hattiangadi 2005: 89). he person’s own 
disposition for dividuality comes to mirror the collectivity’s internal plurality. 
Sociality is no longer just a disposition to collaborate for self-interest (as in 
intentionality) but becomes a relation between hypostatized dividual entities.
he singular and the plural, therefore, are copresent. It is the interaction be-
tween duality and singularity/plurality that leads, through broken symmetry, to 
the process of transformation that hompson (2007) calls morphodynamics.12 
opposition shatters continuity as alterity shatters participation; it creates rela-
tion (which occurs within propositional, symbolic thought). But, as there is a 
constant reengagement, owing to the constant operation of intentionality and 
alteroception, the whole process always starts again. for this reason, the rela-
tions between internally plural hypostatized entities resulting from the fourth 
step are ever incomplete. 
lévi-Strauss warned us famously against putting the focus on entities and 
not on relations, but then he went on to enshrine absolute duality as the primary 
relation. marilyn Strathern, on the other hand, pointed out that, in human soci-
ality, the founding opposition is not between the “one” and “others,” but between 
the “one/many” and the “dual”:
In one sense, the plural and the singular are “the same”. hey are homologues of 
one another. hat is, the bringing together of many persons is just like the bring-
ing together of one. he unity of a number of persons conceptualized as a group or 
a set is achieved through eliminating what diferentiates them, and this is exactly 
what happens when a person is also individualized. . . . In other words, a plurality 
of individuals as individuals (“many”) is equal to their unity (“one”). (1988: 13–14)
here is, therefore, a dynamic process that is operated by opposition and reiica-
tion. strathern again: “to be individuated, plural relations are irst reconceptu-
alized as dual and then the dually conceived entity, able to detach a part of itself, 
is divided. he eliciting cause is the presence of a diferent other” (ibid.: 15). his 
12. In this, hompson is inspired by Merleau-Ponty, but opts for a deinition that uses 
the language of physics: “structures are essentially dependent on critical phenomena, 
i.e., on phenomena of symmetry breaking which induce qualitative discontinuities 
(heterogeneities) in the substrates.  .  .  . Discrete structures emerge via qualitative 
discontinuities .  .  . a system of qualitative discontinuities in a substrate is called 
a morphology and dynamic theories of morphologies belong to what is called 
morphodynamics. here is therefore a close link between the concept of ‘structure’ 
and morphodynamics” (Petitot quoted in ibid.: 71, original emphasis).
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dynamic of partition is a dynamic of mutuality, as explained above; it operates 
continuously and is at the root of sociality to the extent that there is no point in 
which a number of separate entities get together to form a collectivity. group-
ness and personhood (collective and singular) arise out of each other. his is why 
groupness is not the same as sociality, for the latter is constitutive of the very 
persons who form groups—something that twentieth-century sociocentrism 
failed to grasp. he neighbor is always already there, to revert again to the more 
poetic language of levinas.
Notice that, in describing the steps of ontogeny and world, we hesitated on 
the attribution of gender (it, he, she). his is a matter of enormous relevance, as 
we will see in the remainder of this chapter. It is indeed in the dynamics of trian-
gulation through which the person emerges that gender identity starts to consoli-
date. In fact, there are no ungendered persons, although there may be all kinds of 
gender complexities, as we have come to know. gender presents itself from the 
start as a factor in the theater of ontogeny and never leaves it again. It is a central 
facet of the process through which the self emerges in alterity and all persons are 
gendered persons, since the immediate environment of caring where the child 
experiences its original moments of ontogeny is already divided in that way. 
Step 1. (xB) (xC)
here is an identiication of the emerging person (x) with proximate others: the 
irst carer (B) and, progressively, other close carers (C) in the theater of ontogeny. 
Alteroception is the gateway to personhood—world (i) as source.
Step 2. (BC) ¬ x
In witnessing B and C participate in each other and the surrounding environment, 
x is excluded from its earlier participations (¬ x), it is treated as a third person. Tri-
angulation gives rise to dividuality—world (ii) as domain.
Step 3. x  A
he emerging person (x) discovers him- or herself as an other (A). he emergence of 
presence—world (iii) as limit.
Step 4. (A + B + C)  A’
Dividuality emerges at the same time as plurality. It is the child’s own participation 
that challenges its arena of presence and action and allows for a constitution of 
identity at a superpersonal level. Relations arise.
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ASPECtS of PErSoNhood13
As outlined above, an awareness of one’s own separate presence—one’s singu-
larity as an arena of presence and action—is a central feature of personhood. 
Contrary to what we normally assume, this process of discovery of one’s own 
singularity in the world as person is not merely “mental,” as it is both narra-
tive and organic (it is inscribed in the world—presence implies action and vice 
versa). It can only happen to embodied humans, and it happens in all historical 
human social contexts known to us, albeit in a diversity of ways. We must keep 
in mind the indings of embodied cognition, which tell us that “Mind .  .  . is 
congenitally predisposed to seep out into the world” (Clark 2010: 8; see Clark 
and Chalmers 1998). In short, propositionality is not merely an “internal” mat-
ter; as cognition occurs in world, propositional mind inheres in the socialized 
world where human persons constantly pursue their ontogeny (cf. hutto 2008; 
Anderson, richardson, and Chemero 2012). he person’s mental life has to be 
seen as a form of communication in sociality.
We know of the examples of cultural contexts where personhood has been 
attributed to beings that are not embodied, to material features of the environ-
ment, or even to animals (e.g., the famous case of the tallensi sacred croco-
diles—see Fortes [1973] 1987). Furthermore, we know of many ethnographic 
cases of persons who are not treated as being persons, or to whom some part of 
personhood is denied, or who are undergoing liminal processes during which 
the normal attributions of personhood are not held to apply to them. All of these 
are familiar instances in the ethnographic record. Moreover, we are not claiming 
that all such attributions or denials of personhood are metaphorical in the sense 
of staged or artiicial; all we observe is that the focal meaning of personhood is 
associated to human persons and that other uses are extensions of this focal us-
age that are dependent on it. It is only to the extent that we (i.e., ethnographers, 
anthropologists, comparativists) are persons that we can achieve a notion of 
what it is to be a person (both in “our” and in “other” cultures). 
It is not because they know that the crocodiles are persons that the tallensi 
attribute personhood to human persons, but the other way around. he cultural-
ist suggestion that, for the tallensi, crocodiles are as personal as human persons 
does not actually stand up to the ethnographic evidence as Fortes presents it. 
13. In parts of this section we rely on arguments already developed with other intentions 
in Pina-Cabral (2016).
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Similarly, whether the tiger is a person to a person and the person is a tiger to 
him or her, or whether the person is a person to him- or herself and a tiger to 
him or her, might be held to depend on a kind of free signiier: personhood. 
But does this interpretation withstand scrutiny? Would we (i.e., I and my read-
ers) be able to understand the essential anthropomorphization of animality that 
Amerindians undertake if we started from tigers instead of persons? In short, 
how would we query a tiger about what it is to be a tiger when faced with a hu-
man? We only know that tigers think they are persons because we know what 
it is to be a person when faced with a tiger, and this we know because we share 
our condition of being a person with the Amerindians and we can communicate 
propositionally with them and learn from them what it is to be a person when 
faced with a tiger.
It is not a question of defending some kind of ahistorical or objective 
knowledge of personhood; no, indeterminacy rules. And yet we know that we 
can achieve quite large measures of mutual understanding across the cultural 
(and historical) divide.14 Furthermore, there are no persons in general but only 
speciic persons made diferent by their speciic personal history, their ontog-
eny (cf. Bloch 2012: 33). In short, since there is a foundational alterity in per-
sonhood, it makes no sense to assume that it has a clean beginning. Not only 
do persons emerge from the embrace of earlier persons in child-rearing, but 
they also see themselves as causally linked to earlier persons (that which an-
thropologists usually refer to as “iliation”). such a process is not a generalized 
condition; rather, it is grounded on speciic human relations whose history is 
unique in the case of each one of us: our personal history of ontogeny. Whilst 
the history of each one’s existence as a determinable person is immersed in the 
long history of sociality, none of us can be reduced to a simple manifestation 
of an overarching totality—our carers are particular others, not a generic other 
(see Pina-Cabral 2013b). 
In his book about the challenge that developments concerning human cog-
nition represent to anthropology, Maurice Bloch (2012) aims at providing a 
formulation of what constitutes a human person. As is necessarily the case in 
a ield with a history as long as ours, he is immediately confronted by termi-
nological problems. Words, as they have a history, carry with them a bagful of 
14. Not ever completely, of course, but then again the notion of complete understanding, 
where human communication is at stake, is itself absurd, owing to the exigencies of 
the very nature of communication, that is, the inevitability of indeterminacy.
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implications. What word should one use to describe a phenomenon the nature 
of which one is precisely trying to extricate from previous formulations? his is 
a challenge that anyone who attempts analytical deconstruction characteristi-
cally meets. In the past, a number of rhetorical strategies have been devised to 
deal with it. In this case, Bloch wants to examine “what kind of phenomenon 
human beings are.” he immediately meets with a large list of concepts, such as 
“self, the I, agent, subject, person, individual, dividuals, identity, etc.” (ibid.: 120). 
Instead of picking one of these old words and reformulating it, he decides to 
bracket the issue, to sidetrack the categorical problem by using the empty word 
“blob.”
I contend that this stratagem failed him in this instance. In English, blob 
is primarily “a drop of a thick liquid or viscous substance” from which derive 
two secondary meanings: “a spot of colour”; and “an indeterminate roundish 
mass or shape” (OED). Immediately we realize that the word implies unicity, 
identiiability, and palpable materiality. A blob is no longer when it gets divided 
into two blobs. Bloch, thus, short-circuits from the start the very purpose of his 
exercise by attributing easily identiiable, material unicity to the understanding 
of singular humans.15 
to the contrary, in line with a poststructuralist procedure, I suggest that 
we should go about this otherwise: instead of characterizing from the start the 
unicity of what we are about to discuss, we must group the whole range of 
phenomena we want to discuss adjectivally. For example, instead of speaking 
of societies or cultures, words that were becoming so problematic for anthro-
pological theory in the 1990s, strathern chose to speak of socialities, and, as we 
have seen, sociality is not to be confused with groupness. It seems reasonable 
to follow this lead: instead of speaking of selves, individuals, agents, or subjects 
. . . blobs, as our subject matter, let us advance laterally by debating conditions 
of personhood. 
If, then, we do not take for granted the blob’s unicity, we come up with an 
interesting observation: it is not the object itself which fades away, but rather 
our epistemological disposition toward it that gets profoundly altered. As with 
strathern’s socialities, societies and cultures remain roughly identiiable pro-
cesses in history and their existence is not put into question. rather, it is our 
15. After all, it would seem, the repeated recourse to the word “individual” throughout 
the book carries greater implications than the mere practical strategy of using a 
word that we all can be expected to understand (Bloch 2012).
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epistemological relationship toward them that alters. Similarly, we discover that 
much of what was observed for “selves, persons, individuals, agents, blobs, etc.” 
continues to be valid, but we discover that within the general ield of person-
hood that those concepts elicit, there are phenomena of diferent epistemologi-
cal statuses that call for analytical diferentiation.16 Moreover, in this regard, the 
word person has clear beneits over alternative words, for reasons that have to do 
with the history of the discipline (back to leenhardt, Fortes, and Mauss, but 
further back still to Kant and even spinoza); but also because this was the word 
that allowed us to start criticizing the individualist ideology that was at the root 
of the individual versus society/culture polarity, which structured all sociocen-
tric thinking throughout the twentieth century.
As an emergent entity that arises within sociality, then, personhood presents 
three diferent aspects of interaction with world (see diagram 2). hese three as-
pects17 are all coterminous and interdependent to the extent that they are difer-
ent perspectives on historically singular processes:
(_)  the organic human person in ontogeny—broadly speaking, an individual 
phenomenon; 
(`)  the “arena of presence and action”—a dividual and partible phenomenon; 
(a)  the historically constructed frameworks of personhood that pervade the 
environment within which personal ontogeny occurs—here individuality 
and dividuality are combined in very many diferent ways, depending on 
the variation between what anthropologists normally call culture. 
he three aspects, it must be stressed, are aspects of each and every person, they 
do not exist per se; even the frameworks of personhood produced by human 
sociality (a) are only present to the extent that they are present in actual persons. 
Aspects _ and a are in constant interaction with world, and they are subject to 
the dynamics of worlding. his means that the forms of life produced by human 
sociality (a) come to be hypostatized in the world as habitus and, in that way, 
they present themselves as afordances to the organic person (_). 
16. For example, we can now see that Bloch’s blob remains essentially throughout 
his book a “cognitive” phenomenon, which is a rather unfortunate aspect, for it 
reproduces the individualist, cognitivist, mind-versus-world polarity that we all 
agree needs to be overcome.
17. I am using here the word “aspect” in the sense that Wittgenstein gave to it when he 
proposed the famous example of Jastrow’s duckrabbit ([1953] 1967: II xi, 193–229) 
and that Needham further developed in Against the tranquility of axioms (1983).






Diagram 2. he partible person.
Persons are constitutively “amidst,” as heidegger liked to stress, and that is one 
of the reasons why pastness in humans is inescapable. his is also the reason 
why simply separating between individual and individualism, as Nigel rapport 
(2001) proposes, is not enough to solve the matter of personhood, since even 
our formulation of personhood a could raise problems, for it might be inter-
preted as implying that people have concepts in their heads that their culture 
gave them as concepts and that they share with the other members of their 
culture as concepts, having learned them as concepts. And yet such a represen-
tationalist approach is false, as we have seen: the cognitive processes of each 
one of us are indeterminate and cannot be repeated. he integration of mean-
ing within language (the scafolding of mind) is fully personal. Contemporary 
philosophy, inspired by phenomenology, has been calling our attention to the 
need to overcome this limitation and to assume a “radically embodied” notion of 
personhood where meaning is seen as relational (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; 
Chemero 2009; hutto and Myin 2013). 
hus, the “Nuer notion of the person” is nothing but the identiication by 
the ethnographer of a statistical recurrence among the Nuer in the ways they 
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cope with personhood: it is the fact that, in order to circulate in a Nuer world, 
one must assume a determinable but open-ended set of associations and recur-
rences that amount to broad parameters of what persons are in that particular 
human historical setting. We have been alerted to this for a very long time—it 
was, after all, the central quandary that engaged robert feleppa (1988) in his 
important book on the philosophical problems that face the comparative study 
of culture—but most of us took a while to come round to admit that we needed 
to face the problem of representation head on. We have been too slow to take 
the conclusions required by the shedding of of what sartre, as noted above, 
called a “naïve metaphysics of the image” (1936: 3).18
It is important not to jump to the conclusion that the organic person (_) is 
universal; the arena of presence and action (`) is individual; and the historically 
constructed frameworks of personhood (a) are culturally unique. his would 
be to assume both a mind–body polarity and a representationalist model of 
mind—analytical dispositions that we reject. We should be clear, therefore, that 
the material person in ontogeny, the relexive person, and the culturally shared 
frameworks of personhood are all both universal and historically speciic. he 
notion that human inherence in history is divided into neatly separable cultural 
worlds (“ontologies”) is a primitivist mirage that has produced much misunder-
standing and hindered our anthropological theorizing very seriously over the 
years. But so is the notion that one might be able to have any grasp of a cultur-
ally shared framework of personhood (e.g., the Nuer notion of person) aside 
from its instantiation in actual singular human persons (_ + ` + a). It would be 
like suggesting that there are cultures whose identity lies outside of history, the 
complex history of human interaction. only organic, relexive, and interactive 
persons can come together in culturally identiiable modes of being a person. In 
short, there are no generic Nuers. 
he person, therefore, is an ontological hybrid, an emergent entity that is 
consolidated over time—personal death is the collapse of that efect. What 
makes the person speciic among other forms of life is that it is a combination 
of phenomena occurring at three diferent scales of iguration: the person is a 
hybrid between an organism (_), a complex of cognitive attitudes (`), and a 
combination of hypostatizations of cognitive attitudes (a). ontologically, all the 
three are similar, for they are space-time phenomena, to the extent that they are 
18. For a more contemporary take on the issue, see hutto, Kirchhof, and Myin (2014).
120 World: AN ANthroPologICAl ExAmINAtIoN
stochastically emerging recurrences. his is as much the case for the organismic 
life as it is for the mental actions and the hypostatizations—in a sense, the latter 
are the more “material” of the three kinds of processes. 
he organismic (_) and the cognitive (`) are combined with the histori-
cally preexistent modes of species-speciic response to environment (a) in 
all forms of intentional life; but in the human person in ontogeny there is 
a further complexiication of the processes of sociality owing to symbolical 
scafolding—that is, the hypostatizations resulting from habitus that accu-
mulate over time as the result of human forms of linguistically conigured 
communication. Presence is a combination of the three factors and it is what 
allows the person to transcend his or her immediate conditions of life and 
participate in forms of sociality that overreach time and space. Note, person-
hood never escapes time and space, but persons can operate beyond them in 
an indeterminate manner. here is a freedom to all forms of life, as spinoza 
discovered and the enactivists stressed; but, because personhood transcends, 
human communication achieves a yet greater freedom. As we have seen, this 
is never absolute freedom; there are no absolutes in the world of live beings to 
the extent that time and space (death, to put it succinctly) will always reairm 
themselves. 
Many contemporary psychologists (e.g., D. siegel 2016) have chosen to 
refer to the relevant level of emergence as “mind.” his raises two problems 
when we consider personal ontogeny as a process rooted in space and time—
that is, in worlding as it occurs with all live beings. on the one hand, it fails 
to diferentiate between what we have been calling basic mind (the modes of 
intentionality) and scafolded mind (those of propositionality), whilst we have 
seen that the former supervenes on the latter. Moreover, these psychologists’ as-
sociation of mind with consciousness is deeply anthropocentric and, therefore, 
poses problems to an anthropological analysis. on the other hand, as far as 
personal ontogeny is concerned, it concentrates our attention on ` (the arena of 
presence and action), dissociating it from _ (the organismic aspect) and a (the 
efects of the habitus). Although these authors make a whole lot of the embodi-
ment of mind, they fail to understand that ` is a property that only emerges in 
_ in the presence of a and cannot ever be dissociated from them, for there are 
no persons outside sociality. Anterior alterity—the non-wellfounded nature of 
personhood—is the very mechanism of personal ontogeny and there is no such 
thing as mind outside of it.
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Since the person is constituted in the way described above, the original experi-
ence of being a person is marked by links that the person will carry throughout 
his or her whole life. No one, therefore, can cast away the constitutive implica-
tions of the initial processes of self-constitution, one’s personal primary solidari-
ties (see Pina-Cabral 2002b): that is, personhood is of necessity familial. hese 
identiications connect the person not only with one carer, but also with a mul-
tiplicity of carers. he plurality of the family is part of the theater of ontogeny; it 
is implicit in the role of the third person that elicits the founding triangulation. 
As Fortes (1969) argued long ago with his notion of amity, at the root of all 
family behavior (what anthropologists have called “kinship”) there is a disposi-
tion to feel that the other is part of me: that is, my condition and that of the 
proximate other overlap constitutively; mutuality occurs. 
Cohabiting, therefore, cannot be dissociated from kinship, for kinship is 
something that only occurs to persons, and personhood is constituted in in-
tersubjectivity: place and company interact; being-in-the-world is being-with-
others. one of the principal sources of analytical confusion in the history of 
kinship studies is the propensity to polarize kinship and residence, dealing with 
them as phenomena of radically diferent natures (cf. what I called “the herit-
age of Maine” in Pina-Cabral 1989). I propose to overturn that by focusing on 
the evidence that personhood is never a self-enclosed, neatly bounded, unitary 
phenomenon. Plurality and singularity are constantly reinstituting themselves 
through living together in close cohabitation. owing to James’ law of dissocia-
tion, personhood is intrinsically approximate, almost-one—not only personhood ` 
(the relexive, interactive person), but also personhood _ (the organic person in 
ontogeny), since the diference between _ and ` is one of aspect to the observer. 
It is an analytical distinction; a matter of essence, not of existence, so to speak. 
In ontogeny, therefore, at one moment, I am one with Mary, then one with 
John, then I emerge before myself as rita. But, just at the same time, I realize 
that Mary, John, and rita all feel they are, in some sense, together. hen relation 
emerges, that is, mutuality institutes family as collectivity: (A + B + C)  A’. Be-
ing together in a dialectic of mutuality is continuously reenacted and reenforced 
by living together in an ever-complexifying chain of relations that, as they are 
invested in the dwelling environment, become increasingly independent of the 
actual persons involved. singularity emerges from plurality; the thinking person 
emerges from an experience of mutuality of being (see sahlins 2011a) just as 
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much as plural entities (familial entities) arise from singular persons. he pro-
cess is one of being together whilst being diferent; of having the same perspec-
tive upon the world and yet inhabiting diferent places.
Now, as rodney Needham has demonstrated in Counterpoints (1987), dual-
ity is always indeterminate and binary opposition is always incomplete. Whilst 
thinking indeed operates through the creation of caesuras (breaches that cre-
ate meaning in the world by separating sides—hompson’s “morphodynam-
ics”), these are ever evanescent for the reason that anterior alterity (i.e., the 
ground upon which all human thinking is constructed) ever reimposes itself 
(Pina-Cabral 2010a). hus, the essential condition of all dyads is their ultimate 
indeterminacy (Needham 1987: 236). All singularity returns to plurality and all 
plurality is incomplete, in-becoming. 
For persons, to be is to start being, and identity only exists as a relational 
inscription. his, in any case, seems to be what modern mathematics has come 
to discover after Gödel. totality is what there is, and it is incomplete in its in-
determinate multiplicity. When Marilyn strathern declares that “the eliciting 
cause is the presence of a diferent other” (1988: 15), she is right, of course, but 
not in any sense of closure. hat is, ontogeny never stops; the eliciting cause 
remains a cause both historically as a memory, and prospectively as part of daily 
interaction. otherness is anterior but it also constantly reairms itself. he 
clear-cut opposition of the duo and the closure of the duo’s integration into a 
higher-order unity are mirages if seen in the course of time—and time cannot 
be stopped, not even in the make-believe world of synchronic structuration. 
space-time is all there ever is for humans; indeterminacy and irreversibility ul-
timately rule. hus, all duos eventually dissolve into pluralities and all singularity 
is relational—a igure upon an indeterminate ground. 
As we have seen, personal existence starts within triangulation in a process 
characterized by friction and ambivalence (as with the example of Mary, John, 
and rita). his is an emotionally charged process that can be understood as a 
type of betrayal, in the terms proposed by levinas. his menaced ambivalence 
remains ever part of personhood and institutes a complex dynamic to the inter-
action between the three diferent aspects of personhood: the organic (_), the 
cognitive (`), and the social (a).
Although humans have a propensity for thinking in opposites, the fact is that 
“the relationship between [two terms] has no intrinsic simplicity” (Needham 
1987: 224). his means that opposition as a factor of experience is grounded 
in the human body and on the way in which causal relations are present in 
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perception (see also S. Siegel 2010: 117f.). “he principle of opposition is re-
versible direction; and (directional) opposites are based on the spatial experience 
of the human body” (Needham 1987: 71–72). As we saw, a similar argument can 
be built for reiication and containment, the other two abstract primary factors 
of experience identiied above.
As such, human categories are guided by practical reason and are, therefore, 
ever prone to being polythetic categories (Needham 1975); propositional think-
ing is a form of acting within sociality, in the sense of engaging in language 
games. his should be seen not as a human shortcoming, but as humanity’s great-
est strength, as its ultimate capacity for creativity and imagination. As we have 
seen above, humans think approximately, through assessment of relative error, in 
the sense that fuzzy logic has tried to emulate (cf. Zadeh 1987; Kaehler 2015). 
What I have been describing for the person’s coming into being applies 
indeed to all forms of institution: that is, all processes through which sociality 
grants entity status to certain features of the world (cf. Pina-Cabral 2011). to 
institute is to prop up, to hypostatize by situating contextually certain portions 
of the world. It is an exercise in prospective memory, as it involves recogniz-
ing that a set of patterns will thenceforth concur. Instituting, thus, is a future-
oriented gesture that invests a set of patterns with conditions of continuity: it is 
a project in singularity. 
Furthermore, humans are in the world socially owing to the nature of inten-
tionality; thus, the project-nature of instituting (its purposefulness) is necessar-
ily coextensive with sociality.19 he world’s difuse multiplicity is the basic and 
ever-recurring condition; singularity and its partibilities are what human life 
produces. Instituting is a process carried out by persons who, being mutually 
constituted, are always in the process of becoming singular persons in “pres-
ence.” What gives rise to the expectation of singularity is what James called 
the law of dissociation: the overlap by triangulation of memories between the 
persons involved (Mary, John, and rita, as above). 
As such, the condition of instituting is mutuality, not some kind of nego-
tiation between dyadically related partners. his is why a vision of collective 
19. Cf. Peirce’s notion of purpose: “If an interpretation can be grounded, then it must 
have a purpose; for a ground is something that justiies with respect to a purpose. It 
follows that interpretation is purposeful and, hence, that signiicance exists relatively 
to a possible purpose. But sign interpretation is not limited to human consciousness 
in Peirce’s mature semeiotic. hus, there must be at least the possibility of purposeful 
action without consciousness of purpose” (short 2007: 54).
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rationality as proposed by Jon Elster, for example, will never satisfy anthropolo-
gists, as it naturalizes modern Anglo-American individualism and fails to see 
that sociality is immanent to the person (1983, I.5: 33–42). he mutual engage-
ment between the persons involved is rooted in early ontogeny, a form of pri-
mary intersubjectivity anterior to any conscious, linguistically shaped decision 
making: it has less to do with thinking than with being in company. In this sense, 
the environment of cohabitation where personal ontogeny is launched (the casa, 
maison, the primary social unit—see Pina-Cabral 1989) is the original ground 
for institutional construction. 
It is the intentionality of basic mind (i.e., the proneness to address the world 
by forming purposes) that allows the child to engage with the afordances that 
the dwelling environment and the adults within it provide it with, turning them 
into invitations for action (cf. Gibson 1979 and Ingold 2000). But, in turn, for 
those who surround the child, the potential of fertility in sexual reproduction 
and eventually the actual newborn child constitute afordances that adults can 
choose to engage with in the process of family building. Children, thus, as they 
become persons, do so through a process in which they aford familial related-
ness to adults. herefore, persons are existentially familial, since they are cen-
trally involved in the modes of participation, collaboration, and authority that 
familial life presumes.
his is a matter that robert Parkin (2013) addresses in a paper in which he 
attempts to extricate anthropology from the old dichotomy between “culturally 
held notions of reproduction” and “biological reproduction” that so engaged cul-
turalist relativists in the second half of the twentieth century. Indeed, we agree 
with Parkin that this polarity is false (as it sits on the emic/etic distinction) 
and that it is not necessary to engage it if we realize that transcendence is an 
inherent part of kinship. Parkin notes that relations of kinship always involve 
spiritual, ritual, or cosmological formulations that, on the one hand, interact 
creatively with local understandings of organic reproduction and, on the other 
hand, operate as modes of association/dissociation of particular persons from 
relevant contexts of action. For him, kinship transcendence opens up the possi-
bility of “the overcoming of potentially but not necessarily divisive dichotomies 
to ensure the production of harmony and unity in any collectivity” (ibid.: 10). 
his stress on transcendence is much to the point, but personal transcend-
ence as an embracing disposition of persons should not be limited to spirituality 
or religion: what gives rise to transcendence is the person as it emerges in per-
sonal ontogeny (as heidegger insisted—1988: 299). transcendence is central to 
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kinship in that a person’s capacity to be relexively aware of his or her own exist-
ence (the dissociation that institutes “presence”) is a condition for the process of 
scale-change that institutes collective existence: (A + B + C)  A’.20 
In one sense, of course, collectivity preexists the person in ontogeny, but 
at the same time it is conditional upon personal transcendence: that is, what 
mobilizes the institution of collective identity is presence, the capacity of the 
person in propositional (symbolic) thought to rise out of his or her own world-
immersion and relexively hypostatize his or her own existence. As a function 
of the process of personal ontogeny, transcendence opens up the way to collec-
tive inherence and, therefore, enhances considerably the potential for collective 
action that distinguishes human sociality from other forms of animal sociality. 
Kinship, as Parkin intuits, is the essential mode through which separate person-
al presences come to cohere into collective presences by means of transcendence.
fIlIATION AS CAuSAlITy
Persons are placed before human reproduction in one of two ways: males and 
females. hat is, in terms of the conception of new humans, males and females 
are marked by distinct roles, corresponding to distinct bodily features. here 
are, of course, a number of humans whose bodies are ambiguous, but these are 
suiciently exceptional for the binarism of sex to impose itself overwhelmingly: 
sex is an overriding afordance. his, however, is no exception to other dualities: 
as it becomes a part of the process of ontogeny, sex becomes gender. he reason 
anthropologists emphasize this diference is not due to some sort of vacuous 
political correctness, but because the ethnographic evidence collected by profes-
sional ethnographers throughout the twentieth century strongly suggests that, 
at the onset of personal ontogeny, the original binarism of body shape and func-
tion is turned into a polythetic classiication open to redoubling, to complex 
resigniication, to ambivalence, to manipulation. 
In short, as with everything else in personal ontogeny, the organic dualism of 
sex dissolves into the complex mutuality of gender once propositionality estab-
lishes itself and presence arises. In particular, the constitutive role of intersub-
jectivity means that persons are copresent: that is, their sense of personhood is 
20. We are reminded here of strathern’s notion of holography as explained by Alberto 
Corsín (2004).
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porous and mutually engaged. Since we are all partible, and since we are formed 
in bigendered environments, no gender identity can be exclusive, unitary or 
clear-cut.21 All gendered diferentiations will be incomplete, temporary, and ap-
proximate in spite of the foundational role they play in sociality.
he second major diferentiating feature of early human ontogeny is the 
fact that humans are not all born at the same time and that some are born as 
a result of gestures undertaken by others who, in the largest majority of cases, 
are conscious of the fact that the acts of mating they undertake may redound in 
the possible afordance of the emergence of a future person. he actual circum-
stances of conception and gestation may turn out to have important implica-
tions later on in the person’s life; however, on the whole, in matters of personal 
ontogeny, these are secondary aspects. rather, it is the early acts of nursing and 
caring for the child within a context of cohabitation that institute the major 
marks of generational diferentiation which shape the child’s irst social associa-
tions: that which anthropologists have called “iliation” (see Porqueres 2009). 
Filiation, therefore, is a form of futurity; yet, seen from the angle of pastness, it 
is a kind of causal attribution. Mary and John recognized an afordance in their 
reproductive potential and caused rita to become a person. In time, the rela-
tions of iliation come to be instituted in the dwelling environment, and in this 
way become increasingly independent of the actual persons involved. hey are a 
personally constitutive attribution of causality.
In diferent cultures and at diferent times the formulations of iliation dif-
fer considerably, as persons are products of profoundly diversiied sociocultural 
histories. And yet no one denies that a “family resemblance” can be observed 
among all forms of human iliation. Part of this resemblance certainly results 
from the fact that sexual reproduction constitutes an “afordance,” in that it is 
both a ready potential for the creation of new persons and a limitation upon 
social imagination. In fact, primatologists argue that this family resemblance 
connects us directly with our evolutionary history, for it is due to the speciic 
nature of primate sexuality (e.g., Gettler 2010).
Deinitionally, iliation (the parent/child link) embraces maternity, paternity, 
and iliality. But while the former two are endlessly discussed in the literature, 
the integration of the three into a ield mobilized by the occurrence of iliality 
is seldom analytically considered. Most social and biological anthropologists 
simply assume that we all agree concerning the meaning of the word iliation. 
21. For an ethnographically based demonstration of this point, see Pina-Cabral (1993).
127PErSoN
Yet, anyone who has been attentive to the history of kinship studies in twen-
tieth-century anthropology will agree that the concept has been “a fountain of 
aporias” (Bonte, Porqueres, and Wilgaux 2011: 16). When we attend to details, 
we ind that there is no agreement at all concerning its meaning or implications. 
he matter is especially polemical in relation to so-called “biological” and “so-
cial” understandings of iliation, namely in the interdisciplinary clash between 
sociocultural anthropology and evolutionary psychology (shapiro 2008). 
Filiation links people with each other in such a way as to constitute histories 
of causal linkage: rita, daughter of Mary, daughter of herbert, and so on. As 
Donald Davidson has put it, “A male is a grandfather if he has helped cause a 
child come into existence who has helped cause another child into existence” 
(2005: 287). Collective belonging is marked by the generational inscription of 
the person within a familial history of personal causation. he number of per-
sons who are responsible for bringing the child into the family and for nursing it 
can be anything from two to many. Filiation, therefore, is not a relation between 
persons, as it used to be presented by the european legal tradition; rather, it is 
an abstract term that refers to a network of causal relations between persons 
across time.22 In the ethnographic record, iliation is often typiied as maternal 
or paternal, but it can be both or neither (see chapter 5): it is a diversiied ield 
of relations that place the person vertically in time in terms of a causal history 
of personhood. he important thing to note is that all historically evolved forms 
of sociality that have come to the attention of anthropologists and historians 
present strong typiications of a ield of relations of this nature. his conforms 
to the kind of factor of experience that Needham called a paradigmatic scene 
(1985: 67–69). he modes of relating that such traditions of iliation trigger 
of carry a long and lasting impact on the person and on the way people come 
together in collectivities. In turn, in their plurality, such collectivities come to 
acquire aspects of singularity (A’—even what anthropologists have called cor-
porateness; see Fortes 1969: 308). 
recently, the study of the complexities brought about by assisted repro-
duction has highlighted how the participations out of which the child emerg-
es as a person cannot be typiied in the simple triangular terms of what used to 
22. his is an issue about which we can no longer agree with rodney Needham. 
surprisingly, he seems to have held on to his high structuralist convictions 
concerning “descent” even in the face of his own later indings concerning human 
thinking (e.g., 1985: 65).
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be called “the nuclear family” (e.g., Edwards and Salazar 2009; contra Shapiro 
2008). rather than focusing on maternity and paternity, as was characteristic 
in the twentieth century, we must be especially attentive to the conditions 
of iliality. he infant becomes a person out of a complex process that in-
volves a number of people engaging in practical activities and interacting with 
each other in the caring environment. his even goes beyond the immediate 
dwelling group: the permanent presence of more than one family (typiied in 
anthropological history by the igure of the mother’s brother) must be taken 
into consideration. he person is familial both because he/she is brought to 
personhood within a familial environment and because he/she perceives him/
herself as the causal product of participation: from the beginning the child 
both stands with and stands for other persons (contiguity and surrogation, 
respectively). he person is a familial person because his or her own sense 
of who they are, what responsibilities they have, and whom they can close-
ly depend upon is shaped by those who brought them into the family—by 
the causal history of personhood enshrined in iliation narratives. Diferent 
cultural traditions have widely diversiied modes of shaping such processes. 
european tradition, for example, is prone to treating relations of cohabitation 
as being of a radically separate nature from those of iliation (falsely, as it turns 
out, even for itself—see Pina-Cabral 1989). to the contrary, the constitution 
of contexts of cohabitation into collective singularities (maisons, households, 
and suchlike) is the very essence of processes of constitution of the familial 
person.23
Whilst gender belonging appears to be unitary and then turns out to be 
a central ield for partibility, iliation appears to be a multiple, difuse process 
and then turns out to be one of the principal processes of producing collective 
singularity, that is, of producing suprapersonal social entities (A’). to that extent, 
the two major axes of personal diferentiation (gender and generation) are to be 
seen as synthetic images. hey cross each other in one of the most constitutive 
processes that the ethnographic register has encountered: what we have learned 
to call, after lévi-strauss (1973), alliance. 
23. his is how emmanuel levinas puts this idea in his characteristic language: “he 
‘moments’ of that identiication [of oneself ]—the body, the house, work, the 
economy—must not be conceived as contingent and empirically given, as if they 
were stamped on the formal scafold of the same. hey are the articulations of that 
structure” (1961: 27).
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AllIANCE ANd thE dIVIdUAl
human sociality is characterized by a horror of the individual, that is, of entities 
that are not partible. he confrontation between two such entities would be a 
dead-end; it would yield no fruit. his horror vacui is not a charter of some sort, 
inscribed by a structuralist demiurge upon the heads of humans. rather, it is the 
necessary outcome of the need for intersubjectivity in order to produce relexive 
persons and to reproduce the species. As a body, a human being is not very di-
vidual, to the extent that one cannot cut it into parts and keep these parts alive. 
All parts that one slices of a human body are dead waste, and if that partition is 
suiciently radical, the whole body even ceases to function. A person (_ + ` + a), 
however, is far more dividual, since slicing the person, reconnecting the person, 
mixing the person, superimposing the person, and so on—that is, the acts of 
partibility—are the very constitutive processes of personhood. Persons are di-
viduals, therefore, to the extent that they cannot ever survive as persons whilst 
remaining closed onto themselves (Mariott 1976; strathern 1988). his being 
said, the singularity of personal presence does have to be protected. Although 
it is permanently challenged through the acts of partibility, personal singularity 
cannot be simply abolished without serious consequences for the person’s social 
interaction (see de Martino [1959] 2001). his does not apply only to Melanesia 
or to the depths of Africa; rather, it is a universal condition that applies to every 
person everywhere—even those who, being enthralled by the utopia of moder-
nity, fancy themselves as fully independent individuals.
long ago, lévi-strauss called our attention to an interesting facet of the 
ethnographic register. Whilst, biologically speaking, persons are like individual 
lowers, like specimens of a variety, the fact is that the way societies deal with 
persons is more akin to the way they deal with species than with individual 
specimens: “social life,” he argues, “efects a strange transformation in this sys-
tem, for it encourages each biological individual to develop a personality; and 
this is a notion no longer recalling specimens within a variety but rather types 
of varieties or of species” (1966: 214). In the two memorable chapters of he 
savage mind that he dedicates to personal naming, he observes a set of regulari-
ties that are conirmed by my own material concerning the comparative study 
of personal naming in Portuguese-speaking contexts:24 social practices relating 
24. Cf. essays on naming in Portuguese-speaking contexts (Pina-Cabral 2010c, 2010d, 
2012a, 2013b, 2016).
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to the naming of persons (and domesticated animals) are ambivalently placed 
before singleness and plurality. Proper naming works actively at constructing 
dividuality, airming the intrinsic plurality of what is identiied as single.
What this means is that the history of our species, as a history of sociality, 
has come up with modes of producing persons that ensure the intrinsic plu-
rality of the person. his is primarily done through iliation, as deined above. 
If contexts of cohabitation leading to human reproduction were closed onto 
themselves (i.e., if “houses” were individual entities), they would be closed to 
the ever-pulsating dynamic of history: a history of sociality; a history of relat-
ing; a history of humans causing other humans to exist. I suppose that was 
the principal lesson that radclife-Brown and lévi-strauss had to deliver to 
us concerning kinship and the role of the mother’s brother (raclife-Brown 
[1940] 1952; lévi-strauss 1973). two objects that are closed within themselves 
may confront each other but they cannot connect. he human species would 
not have survived, considering the enormous dependence that it has on social-
ity (and communication) for survival, if its constitutive elements, persons, were 
individual units.
As such, throughout history, we observe that new persons are never pro-
duced by issiparous processes out of singular persons. similarly, at a supraper-
sonal level (A’), the entities of cohabitation where early ontogeny unfolds (the 
primary social units—the house, maison, the kraal; see Pina-Cabral 1989) are 
also necessarily plural. As radclife-Brown commented long ago, all social con-
texts known to anthropologists and historians have instituted modes of iliation 
which ensure that each person is connected to at least two diferent histories 
of sociality (radclife-Brown and Forde 1950: 4). one may lack a father or a 
mother (to simplify the description), but one is better of if (having both) these 
come from diferent historical chains of iliation.25 
What seems relevant to retain here is that, whilst scholars have normally 
described this feature of human history as a prohibition (the incest prohibition), 
it seems more adequate not to see it as a prohibition but as an afordance: the in-
creased beneits to human communication derived from persons being founded 
on essential partibility, on a diversity of the histories of personhood (iliation). 
25. Nevertheless, it is probably necessary to insist that we are not here keeping to lévi-
strauss’ original deinition of alliance as the exchange of women among groups of 
men. We have come a long way since then. A much closer source of inspiration is 
viveiros de Castro’s discussion of “cannibal alliance” (2007; for an ethnographic 
instancing of the argument, see Pina-Cabral and silva 2013: 123–43).
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Alliance, therefore, as a constitutive process of human sociality, is rooted in per-
sonal ontogeny and not in “marriage.”26 his position is a radical break with the 
basic assumptions that dominated anthropological kinship theory throughout 
the twentieth century. Whether a society has or fails to have an institution akin 
to the institution of marriage that evolved in Europe from the late middle 
Ages is beside the point (cf. rivière [1971] 2004). he central feature is that a 
person’s integration in sociality is maximized by their being constitutively plural. 
Children’s dual life connections (double ailiation) must be seen not as an in-
stance of ambivalence (as Sahlins suggests—2011b: 236) but, to the contrary, as 
the very ground on which sociality is stochastically constituted and collectivity 
instituted—that is the upshot of lévy-Bruhl’s and Strathern’s prophetic lessons. 
he latter formulated this dialectic of mutuality in the following terms: “Sin-
gle, composite persons do not reproduce. Although it is only in a unitary state 
that one can, in fact, join with another to form a pair, it is dyadically conceived 
relationships that are the source and outcome of action. he products of rela-
tions—including the persons they create—inevitably have dual origins and are 
thus internally diferentiated” (strathern 1988: 14). his internal diferentiation 
is the dynamic principle (the spring, fons) that ensures the continuity of human 
sociality in history; and whilst that was already the case in all forms of sexed 
reproduction in the animal kingdom, in the case of humans it is a condition for 
the emergence of the more complex (richer) forms of human communication 
and, in particular, language.
CoNClusIoN
he dividuality of the person means that those who, as a result of the operation 
of iliation, are brought up together in a context of cohabitation are again deeply 
divided by gender, as the earlier generation also was. he sibling group emerges 
out of the crossing of iliation with generation and constitutes the founding 
nucleus of larger superdomestic kin groupings (kindred, lineage, clan, etc.). 
When I speak of sibling group, I mean to deine it, of course, not as the 
children of a common mother and father, but rather as the group of contempo-
raries who have been brought up together by the same persons in close prox-
imity of cohabitation and care. each cultural tradition has diferent forms of 
26. For an ethnographic instancing, see Pina-Cabral (2010d).
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deining these modes of association, but their being rooted in the sibling group 
must be seen as broadly general to the human condition, as a primary factor of 
experience—much as indeed radclife-Brown ([1940] 1952) found out when 
he argued for the unity of siblings. such siblings cohere into a kind of unity, 
but they are constitutionally plural, since they bring together in themselves the 
separate familial histories of their parents—they are bearers of more than one 
continued identity. Gender, however, comes again between them, for their own 
children, much like them, have to have diferent historical sources (owing to the 
advantages of alliance), so the sibling group has to split in some way or another 
(often along gender lines).
And, whilst the plurality of siblingship is reinstated upon adulthood, its es-
sential singularity also reimposes itself; siblings remain company to each other 
in some sort of constitutionally deep form to the end of their lives—their pri-
mary solidarities do not simply vanish into thin air with the onset of adult-
hood. Furthermore, as classiicatory fathers or mothers, or as mother’s brothers 
or father’s sisters (these are used here as conventional anthropological labels to 
describe vast areas of similarity in the ethnographic register), they reproduce 
their condition of company (their histories of personhood) to the following 
generation. 
In this way, families over time are structured by a criss-crossing of continued 
identities: a set of markers in the world that frame people’s constitutive actions 
of personhood in terms of the constitutive actions of those who preceded them 
in the causal chain of personhood: as the lovedu of northern south Africa used 
to say, the bride follows the cattle’s footprints upon the sand—she follows the 
traces of her own mother’s marriage payment (Krige and Krige 1965). upon 
such simple props are constructed the gigantic ediices of kinship systems that 
continue to puzzle anthropologists today quite as much as they did in the past. 
Much of our puzzlement, however, continues to be driven by our distaste for 
fuzziness, polythetic classiication, partibility, dividuality, non-wellfounded sets, 
incompleteness, and indeterminacy. We are prone to search for structuration, 
equilibrium, and unitariness, and, as we do that, we turn what is complex and 
ultimately indeterminate into a paradox to be struggled against.
And so, at the end of this summary statement, we come back to Donald 
Davidson’s notion of company—as when he claims that “the possibility of 
thought comes with company” (2001: 88). But while company—cohabiting the 
world—is the indispensable condition for personhood, personal transcendence 
is what institutes collectivity. In this chapter, we have dealt with personhood 
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from a comparative perspective. In tracing the steps of ontogeny, we saw how 
they were also steps of world constitution. he aim, at every point, was not to 
sever from each other the three aspects of personal ontology (_ + `  + a). In order 
to do that, we relied on the lessons concerning embodied cognition accumulated 
from previous chapters. In the chapter to come, we will focus on world again 
and how human social life is necessarily based on collectively shared conigura-
tions of world. hese, in turn, assume speciic modes of personhood.
chapter five
Worldview
he ideal is to return home, for 
“he only place one never returns to is the womb.”
– Eileen and Jacob Krige (1965: 323)
In his introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault stresses how the aging mas-
ter’s lectures about world were structured by three concerns that were transfor-
mations of the three original questions that had guided his youthful Critiques: 
he corollary of the possibility of conceiving of other worlds—this one being, 
de facto, only a domain—is the impossibility of moving beyond the world we 
inhabit and the imperious necessity of accepting its frontiers as limits. hus the 
world, once again taken to mean the “Inbegrif des Daseins,” appears on the basis 
of the three-part structure . . . of source, domain, and limit. (Foucault [1961] 2008: 
82, original emphasis) 
hus transformed, Kant’s critical questions become the guiding concerns for 
the establishment of his Anthropology, that is, an undertaking for which, by 
its very nature, human being “is neither a homo natura nor a purely free subject; 
[rather] he is caught by the syntheses already operated by his relationship to 
the world” (ibid.: 54–55). Foucault explains that anthropology works with the 
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broken symmetry1 resulting from the unsteady conjugation in presence (`) of 
the synthesis produced by the organism (_) and the limits imposed by human 
interaction (a).
As it happens, this classiication echoes closely heidegger’s three moments 
of occurrence of the dasein: “(1) holding the binding character of things to-
wards us; (2) completion; (3) unveiling the being of beings” ([1929/30] 1995: 
348). however, heidegger’s formulation turns out to be less convenient than 
the one proposed by foucault/Kant (cf. godlove 1996), since our contemporary 
discovery that intentionality refers to phenomenal experience that does not in-
volve mental content—that is, representation—will necessarily alter signiicant-
ly heidegger’s understandings of being-in-the-world (hutto and myin 2013). 
In fact, contemporary biologists have been demonstrating how surprisingly 
complex forms of collective behavior depend not on preconceived patterns or on 
central control, but on the chain reactions of local responses among the diferent 
participants in a set environment. Ants, birds, and ish (and, of course, humans 
in crowd behavior) move not according to previously conceived (collective) de-
signs but by assessing each one’s convenience in the surrounding world.2
our personhood is indissolubly linked with the world we live in and its 
history. people’s world worlds in a social way; it is held by persons whose on-
togenies are perspectivally focused on dwelling environments and histories of 
personhood that preexist the person. As davidson put it, “he correct interpre-
tation of what a speaker means is not determined solely by what is in his head: it 
depends on the natural history of what is in his head” (2001: 44). Pastness is the 
feature of world that allows the person to carry out his or her path of ontogeny 
within the complex jungle of broken symmetries that we are bodily endowed to 
attune to (lederman and hill 2004; hompson 2007: 71). 
In the above chapters, as we examined the conditions of possibility of per-
sonhood, we came to the conclusion that there were three aspects to person-
hood and that these correspond closely to aspects of world. In short, the world 
of persons worlds in three principal modes that correspond to the three aspects 
of personhood (see diagram 3): 
1. he calls it “dissymmetrical symmetry.”
2. See Iain couzin: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_2Wqh_hUxz8; or deborah 
gordon: http://www.ted.com/talks/deborah_gordon_what_ants_teach_us_about_
the_brain_cancer_and_the_internet#t-59396 (accessed January 11, 2017).
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(i/_) world ofers itself as a space-time of existence (it embraces as source); 
(ii/b) world places the person perspectivally (it encompasses as domain); 
(iii/a)  world establishes modes of containment (allowing for limits to emerge 
stochastically over time). 
Į
world as domain






Diagram 3. he aspects of person and world.
he arena of presence and action (`) constitutes the mediating process—the 
root of propositionality—that allows for the other two aspects (_ and a) to co-
here. But personal presence is also what allows for world to encompass person 
as a domain of action (ii) and thus to mediate between the world that worlds 
(i, world as source), and the bounded world of shared human imagination (iii, the 
limited world), that is to say, for essence to emerge out of existence. hus, as the 
world of persons is ontologically dependent on personal presence, which is a 
form of transcendence,3 it is ever moved by the unstable dynamics of personal 
partibility. herefore, as we will see in this chapter, it is a matter not of there 
being many worlds rather than one, but of world being metaphysically plural.
3. As heidegger put it, “If it is indeed in transcendence alone that beings come to 
light as beings, transcendence comprises an exceptional domain for the elaboration 
of all questions that concern beings as such, i.e., in their being” (1998: 123, original 
emphasis).
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Where our contemporary understanding parts ways with the long and pres-
tigious tradition of querying world that Kant, heidegger, foucault, or derrida 
represents is in the matter of consciousness (cf. gaston 2013). In the wake of 
francisco Varela, many of us have come to question the anthropocentric ten-
dency to see relexive consciousness as the deining instance of thought and 
thus to distance ourselves from the founding assumptions of the European 
philosophical tradition. António damásio, for example, makes a clear distinc-
tion between core consciousness, that is, the relexive awareness of thought in 
human adults, and extended consciousness, the difuse sense of self-interest that 
is associated to intentionality (1999: 15–19). In this book, we have avoided the 
word consciousness precisely because of the way it creates the conditions for us to 
fall back on anthropocentric assumptions concerning mind, which unwittingly 
naturalize Augustinian notions of “soul” (cf. givens 2009).
his chapter will move from the personal to the collective, attempting to 
show how the two scales are mutually dependent. An examination of what con-
stitutes sociality will open the way to the formulation of a methodologically 
richer notion of worldview. he chapter concludes with an examination of relat-
edness as the central formal tool of social analysis.
SocIAlIty 
to be alive is often deined as “accurately transmitting a genetic blueprint” 
(Kirschner, gerhart, and mitchison 2000: 79); that is, living beings are self-
organizing to the extent that they operate a continuity of form in the face of a 
constant change of composition. organisms operate a boundary system: “A cell 
. . . is a self-sustaining unity, a unity that dynamically produces and maintains 
its own identity in the face of what is other” (hompson 2007: 147). his means, 
as Kant had already noted, that organisms are endowed with purpose. herefore, 
intentionality (in the sense of acting with purpose) is a constitutive property 
that is immanent to all living organisms and is implicit in their operation. nev-
ertheless, it is very important not to assume that “purpose” here means conscious 
reason: even in humans, collective behavior is often ruled by interactions that 
are not consciously held (see dyer et al. 2009). 
According to Francisco varela, the purposiveness of living organisms im-
plies two complementary modes: identity, the maintenance of sameness be-
fore dynamic change; and sense making, the establishment of an organizational 
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perspective achieved through attraction or repulsion, that is, a scale of value (see 
hompson 2007: 147, 154). Such are the roots of intentionality, out of which 
evolved the intentionality of more complex species and, eventually, after language 
emerged, human propositionality. In a very inluential paper called “Biological 
foundations of individuality” (1968), the philosopher hans Jonas characterizes 
this identity of living beings and the corresponding relation of self-isolation 
from the rest of reality as a form of “individuality” (“he realm of individuality, 
in all its grades, is coextensive with the biological realm as a whole”—ibid.: 233). 
In his view, to the extent that organisms enjoy “an independence from the same 
matter of which [they] nonetheless wholly consist” (ibid.: 237), one is entitled 
to speak of a “sort of freedom.” organisms are purposeful to the extent that they 
exercise this freedom: that is, they respond to a necessity, “namely, the need for 
constant self-renewal, and thus need for the matter required in that renewal, 
and thus need for ‘world’.” (ibid.: 241) one may, therefore, conclude that, in its 
more embracing aspect (i), world is a function of organic life.
continuity in living organisms is no longer achieved by “the mere inertial 
persistence of substance,” as in heidegger’s proverbial stone, but requires ex-
ecution, that is, an efort to remain the same. World and its worlding are thus 
implicit in the very efort that organisms undertake to maintain their internal 
system when faced with their changing constitution. As Jonas puts it, the organ-
ism’s being, “suspended in possibility, is to be actualized by the use of the world” 
(ibid.: 242, original emphasis). he roots of the simplest forms of transcendence, 
therefore, lie in this kind of being-projected-beyond-oneself of intentionality as 
mental directedness (see hompson 2007: 156–57).
his process, however, is importantly qualiied when multicellular organisms 
emerge, as they depend on “a partial obliteration of that degree of individuality 
which had been achieved already in the original, protozoic units of life” ( Jonas 
1968: 244). hus, sociality involves importantly the qualiication of the unicity 
of the organism, and, in particular, it involves the need for information. note, 
information here is meant in the sense of what is conveyed by a particular ar-
rangement or sequence of things, not in the sense of an item of propositional 
knowledge. 
In Jonas’ formulation, individuality is deined as “discontinuity with the 
world.” hus, he believes that the early multicellular condition is an interruption 
of a process of growing “individuality” in evolution. he argues, however, that 
individuality imposes itself again in more organized forms of life and eventually 
achieves itself in humans. As a matter of fact, he formulates the passage from 
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vegetable to animal life in such terms. It is principally in this insistence on the 
unitariness of individualism that we must part ways with his proposal. Although 
he agrees that the organism cannot be seen as a monad, he then fails to address 
the ambivalent and complex nature of interaction involved in cell constitution 
and reproduction (see Kirschner, gerhart, and mitchison 2000). 
When people choose to use the language of individuality, they are forced 
to play down how, in living processes, singularity and plurality constitute cor-
related modes, not separate conditions. In assuming individuality, we are then 
obliged to see sociality as a process that does not simply supervene upon but ac-
tually exists beyond the emergence of life. his, however, creates more problems 
than it solves. he identity and sense making of living organisms does involve a 
process of boundary maintenance, but organisms (and particularly multicellular 
organisms) cannot be conceived as separate or closed onto themselves, other-
wise how would they reproduce? hat means that the existence of organisms 
hovers between singularity and plurality, in an unstable dynamic that is better 
qualiied as dividuality than individuality. 
In this way, one is bound to agree with Jonas and varela that life implies 
sense making; which, in turn, implies world. he problem is, again, if this sense 
making is seen in individualist terms, we are stuck with a formalist deinition of 
life (“an island of form amidst a sea of matter and energy”—hompson 2007: 
152) that runs counter to what we know about evolution. It would seem, then, 
that the widespread adoption of the concept of “individual” in recent biological 
debates is less innocuous than it may at irst seem. As we have seen, in the case 
of human beings, the concept fails to describe the essential constitutive dy-
namics of personhood. But, once transposed to debates about other organisms, 
it is no more satisfactory and it carries with itself profound anthropocentric 
implications.4
Keeping in mind davidson’s warning about the dangers of the scheme/con-
tent opposition (1974), life’s dependence on self-identity and sense making is 
best seen in terms of in-formation—a process of response to world that relies 
on symmetry, the reproduction of sameness, an original feature of all matter 
4. As when, for example, one moves seamlessly from discussions of collective movement 
in animals to considerations concerning American-style electoral democracy—see 
Iain couzin’s lecture on democratic consensus:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzvtmwBd0ZA&nohtml5=False (accessed 
January 12, 2017).
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(lederman and hill 2004).5 “In many biological systems the irst step in gen-
erating spatial complexity is the breakdown of a symmetrical into a more or-
ganized asymmetric or polarized structure” (Kirschner, gerhart, and mitchison 
2000: 80). hus, the primitive type of self which varela proposes should not be 
interpreted in terms of an opposition of individual versus collective, for that 
would have closed us in a mechanical process of symmetric alterity, where iden-
tity and alterity alternate and the units become isolated monads. rather, the 
primitive selfhood of life’s sense making is better qualiied as a dynamic di-
viduality which is stochastically moved (the result of world’s worlding, that is, 
the constant production of broken symmetry leading to asymmetric alterity). 
I believe this is the ultimate drive of lévi-Strauss’ lesson in that beautifully 
evocative note, one of the last things he ever wrote, that he calls “An apology of 
amoebas” (2000).
In sum, as a disposition to act jointly for a shared purpose, that is, to act 
collectively for survival, sociality should be seen as the way dividuality operates 
in intentionality. It requires the passing of information between the singular 
members of the species by relation to that purpose. he world into which each 
member of a species enters is already marked by the modes of communication 
of that species. to that extent, when a new member emerges to life, the path-
ways of sociality are already outlined in the world and in the behavior of other 
members of the species. So much applies to all forms of life, as lévi-Strauss 
argued. In humans, sociality occurs because intentionality potentiates worlding. 
he whole ediice of personhood and propositionality, as described in chapter 4 
above, is only possible owing to the dynamics of life.
Sociality, therefore, antedates historically the emergence of the human spe-
cies and, through intentionality, it remains active in humans beyond the emer-
gence of conscious thought. By refusing to polarize the individual v. group 
opposition, the focus of our analysis shifts from essence and identity to trans-
formation and alterity. We reject a symmetric, essence-driven view of the hu-
man condition. As we move back away from essence, human existence comes 
to be seen as one among many manifestations of life. Following on this path, 
mind reveals itself as an embodied, indeterminate, and underdetermined pro-
cess that reaches beyond the boundaries of the organic person and, therefore, is 
5. “metazoan multicellular development, as it has evolved in the past billion years, 
is an accomplishment in the informational realm, that is, of organizing cellular 
processes spatially and temporally” (Kirschner, gerhart, and mitchison 2000: 83).
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constantly moved by the anterior alterity of worlding. Emphasis is given to the 
way thought is embodied and how it must be understood as a form of action 
(see Prinz and Clark 2004). 
Kant’s three original questions in the Critiques (What can I know? What 
must I do? And what can I hope for?—foucault [1961] 2008) are decentered 
by such a view of sociality; one that fully owns up to an ambivalent response to 
a fourth question that integrates the former three (What is man?). from a post-
structuralist perspective such as espoused in this book, “person” not “man” is the 
relevant level. Yet personhood lacks essentiality. So, even though it is ambivalent 
and indeterminate, the subject does not simply vanish. rather, as person, he/she 
turns out to be metaphysically plural.
thE SCAffoldINg of mINd
human mind is extended in that mental operations are not closed within the 
brain. rather, recently, we have come to accept that, to the extent that it is em-
bodied, cognition “seeps out onto the world” (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 
2010). By that, we mean that, on the one hand, the brain is not the exclusive 
seat of cognition and, on the other hand, mind’s operation depends crucially 
on a whole realm of nonconscious processes and forms of long-term stored 
information (see Chemero 2009). once we realize that mind is an interactive 
process with world that occurs in the brain, in the body, and beyond the body 
in the afordances of world that constitute vital information to live beings, the 
very meaning of cognition is radically decentered. his has an important impli-
cation, which is that lévy-Bruhl’s insight that persons participate in each other 
and in the objects around them ( [1949] 1998) is to be seen no longer as some 
sort of symbolic or metaphoric event of consciousness, but instead as rooted in 
the process of constitution of information that founds our very embodiment. If 
mind seeps out onto the world, it is not only the prostheses of modernity (the 
mobile phone, the computer, the spoon, the pen) that come to extend it, but also 
the seepages, so to speak, that have always been part of our personal ontogeny. 
his makes participation a far less mysterious occurrence, but it also goes a long 
way in helping us see how complex is the scafolding of mind.
As outlined above, during early personal ontogeny, the child discovers itself 
as other—that is, anterior alterity launches presence by means of a process of 
triangulation. he person is distanced from him- or herself, not internally—as 
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a self-contained process—but by relation to world. It is a structuring of scales. 
As arenas of presence and action (`), persons approach themselves from the 
outside, as if they had been other. Propositionality implies an inscription of 
mind in the world. his scafolding of mind involves both a closing in on the 
arena of presence and action and a distancing from it. his statement may seem 
paradoxical, but the impression vanishes once (a) we realize that ontogeny is a 
temporally complex process and (b) we abandon the all-or-nothing fallacy and 
accept that _, `, and a occur stochastically, not mechanically (i.e., in terms of 
greater or smaller recurrence rather than in terms of dualistically formulated 
oppositions). 
What this means is that, in ontogeny, the person acquires the means to 
store meaning in objects, and thus the world is invested with meaning. It is no 
longer only the person addressing world, but world now that addresses the per-
son. his is why presence is world forming, as heidegger insisted. he access to 
symbolic signiication (as opposed to iconic or indexical signiication—as per 
peirce; cf. Short 2007) involves a scafolding of mind, of which language is the 
principal but not the only tool. A hole in the wall of a grotto is an afordance 
of passage, quite as much as a door is. But, for the person who confronts it, the 
door also afords meaning by relation to who built it, for what purpose, and 
with what implications concerning the social use of space.
In short, the scafolding of mind in propositionality is the process through 
which human meaning comes to humans as essence, that is, as existing outside 
themselves. Scafolding is a way of investing intention (the purposive facet of 
sociality) with an existence that is separate from the immediate act of intending, 
and it can only be achieved by virtue of the distancing that presence institutes. 
he emergence of presence and the entry into propositionality are, therefore, 
codependent and occur coevally during early personal ontogeny. hat is prob-
ably the principal lesson that we can take today from Saint Anselm’s ontologi-
cal proof.
hus, in the case of humans, pastness (the impact of a on _ via the world) 
airms itself through the process of worlding, even after the person enters into 
propositional thinking (`). But so does the investment in the future that the 
shared purpose of sociality necessarily entails. As a mode of imagination, futu-
rity is as limiting as pastness. Indeed, as we have already shown, primary factors, 
synthetic images, paradigmatic scenes, are limits to the imagination as much in 
pastness as in futurity. hey are central facets of the scafolding of mind.
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Each one of us, as we become persons, emerges to a dynamic social world 
that is a given to the extent that it is already marked as a space-time of purpose-
ful action. herefore, all human experience is imbued with collective inherence 
(a). But humans, as opposed to other species, do something more than other 
animals: they are world forming. to that extent, human life is both given and 
built upon. In the case of humans, owing to the achievement of propositionality, 
the world-forming disposition alters the nature of what is given. Entering into 
personhood (the emergence of `) is concurrent with entering into language and 
that involves the sharing of forms of life. As the meaning of a person’s words is 
dependent upon the objects and events “that have caused the person to hold the 
words to be applicable” (davidson 2001: 37), people who dwell in close prox-
imity share a form of life. his is how I understand what Wittgenstein meant 
when he declared that “what has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could 
say—forms of life.” he then deined forms of life as “the use that gives life to 
signs” ([1953] 1967, II xi: 226; § 432: 128), which approximates it to mauss’ no-
tion of habitus ([1935] 2007) or to Bateson’s notion that there is an “economics 
of adaptability” associated to “habit formation” (1972: 257). 
A stochastic process occurs within each one of us whereby some associations 
turn out to be favored over others. Forms of life, then, correspond to recur-
rent pathways of retention of associations; they are traditions of interpretation. 
Each historically located sociocultural environment provides evidence to the 
ethnographer of internal features of iguration that relect the fact that world 
is a habitable environment where persons are cared for during early ontogeny 
and remain exercising choices over time. It is the ethnographer’s main task to 
attempt to characterize which associations are more recurrently retained, that is, 
to postulate a worldview. 
he emergence of a form of life, however, is marked by the very constraints 
of achieving collective action that are implicit in our intentional engagement 
with world. Since mutuality is constitutive of the person, all of us carry solidari-
ties that mark our presence and that shape our choices within a world that is 
always already marked by modes of sociality—including continued identities. 
value emerges out of the choices of intentionality. Implicit in that is an uneven 
distribution among persons of the capacity to inluence the actions of others. As 
conigurations emerge, therefore, a structure of domination is shaped. In sum, 
because scafolding means that meanings are imposed on the person, in delin-
eating worldview, ethnographers are bound to deal with the way in which each 
social environment is conigured in terms of power.
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WorldVIEW BESIEgEd
In characterizing world, anthropologists and philosophers are prone to using 
visual or tactile metaphors: you approach world, you have the world at hand, you 
see the world from a certain angle, you have a worldview, you assume a perspec-
tive. over and beyond the debate as to whether the centrality of vision is a mod-
ern European ixation or not (cf. Bloch 2008), the fact is that these metaphors 
carry three central features that are related to the way the world worlds.
he irst is that people are prone to think in terms of combined environ-
ments (scapes)—with the implication of mental holism. he second is the per-
spectival nature of people’s sense of situatedness. now, situatedness (a feature of 
“basic minds”) is not only a momentary thing, for (a) it implies dwelling, both 
for humans and animals,6 and (b) there is purposefulness in it. Intentionality as 
an engagement with world is future-directed, it bears purpose (Short 2007: 44). 
he third feature is that space-time is marked by boundaries: containment and 
categorical diferentiation are at work from the very beginning, as they are writ-
ten into the physical environment where the person emerges. 
his chapter will outline the principal features that make worldview a useful 
methodological tool for ethnographic comparison. much has been written in 
anthropology about worldview, but, like michael Kearney in his Annual Review 
article of 1975, I have to admit that, paradoxically, very little has been made of 
it. my suggestion is that the reason why that is the case is the same that explains 
why Kearney’s contribution too leaves one disappointed. he deines worldview 
as “culturally speciic cognition” (1975: 247), which strikes one as an attempt to 
state that people have worldviews to the extent that they think of the world in 
culturally standardized manners. he same problem is present in the use that 
anthropologists have given to Foucault’s “episteme” or to mary douglas’ “cos-
mologies.” hey all depend on the durkheimian category of collective represen-
tation and on representationalist models of mind. 
But there is also an empirical problem here. As Kearney himself acknowl-
edges, the issue of the worldview’s integration is a thorny one (1975: 249); the 
more you look for it, the less apparent it becomes. he indeterminacy of mean-
ing precisely implies that cognition is always personal and, thus, worldviews 
will always be approximate things, subject to the vagaries of the negotiation 
6. As ethologists have long argued, “home” is centrally constituted by two processes: a 
“goal of light” and a “place of maximal security” (Ingold 1995: 73).
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of interpersonal power. Whilst it is possible to think of a worldview that com-
pounds other worldviews, it is nonsense to hope to achieve an ultimate, atem-
poral worldview. But does that mean “world does not exist,” as markus gabriel 
proposes?
many philosophers are known to disparage of worldview. gabriel, for ex-
ample, exclaims “all worldviews are equally misguided insofar as they ground 
our beliefs in a commitment to an overall world that already settles all big ques-
tions behind our back” (2015: 13). derrida would agree (garrison 1999; gaston 
2013), yet this position ails from two serious, albeit separate, problems. firstly, 
the commitment to the ultimate existence of world does not mean that we can 
dispense with the indeterminacy of meaning; that we can somehow imagine 
that it is possible to move outside of the human condition. Because something 
remains indeterminate, it does not mean it does not exist. gabriel’s proposal 
that we should impose artiicial limits to the project of science by separating 
“world” from “universe” is unwarranted, as it is based on a populist application 
of the all-or-nothing fallacy to the basic metaphysical challenge.7
Secondly, in any case, our concern as anthropologists is not to validate the 
“objectivity” of worldviews. he ethnographer (or the anthropologist, for that 
matter) does not need to validate or invalidate worldview, that is, the prone-
ness of humans in sociality to produce and reproduce habitus and to agree to a 
large extent concerning a scafolding of world. rather, we only aim to under-
stand how they do it. Incomplete and ambivalent as worldviews always are, for 
anthropologists, they are central facets of the evidence we are called upon to 
interpret as ethnographers and social scientists. We have all learned too little 
from malinowski’s comments about how his informants did not produce whole 
pictures of what they believed and how he was forced to piece together his eth-
nography not only from what they said but also from what they did and how 
they reacted to his prodding. 
personally, I have found the concept of worldview very useful in the various 
ethnographies I have undertaken over the years (see 1986; 2002a; pina-cabral 
and Silva 2013) and, in this inal chapter, I want to suggest that there are ways 
of mobilizing it that relate it usefully to the notion of “forms of life” presented 
above. A worldview, in this sense, would be an ethnographer’s presentation of 
7. his defense of the irreducible essence of the german concept of Geist, whilst calling 
itself “realism,” is in fact a politically disturbing example of a contemporary trend 
that opens the path to unwarranted forms of ontological pluralism (2015: 142).
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the major igurations that she found to be recurrent in a particular form of life 
that she has explored ethnographically. he concept can be usefully interpreted 
in a way that avoids the sociocentric pitfalls that beset the more traditional no-
tions of “culture” or “society.” 
Before that, however, we must briely address the attacks on the notion of 
worldview that have recently been produced by both tim Ingold (2010) and 
Eduardo viveiros de castro (2010). hey go at it together, but funnily enough 
from almost opposite directions. viveiros de castro’s attack is based on a fram-
ing of his opponents’ views that, on the whole, denies the wealth and complexity 
of present-day anthropological consensus. he attributes excessively unsophis-
ticated views to those who do not agree with him. he concludes his argument 
by claiming that 
no one denies that there are culturally speciic phenomena (however one wants 
to deine culture), nor that there are some cognitive tendencies and dispositions 
that characterize our species as a whole (and some others all primates, some oth-
ers still all mammals, and so on). . . . to me the question seems to be if such com-
monalities and particularities are deployed in a unidimensional continuum or if, 
instead, there exists a radical heterogeneity in what we call cognition, as seems to 
be the case as much on the phenomenal or objective plane . . . as in that of styles 
of investigation. (viveiros de castro 2010: 331, my emphasis)
his argument stands or falls on a polarization between two alternatives that 
cannot possibly be seen as alternative. Firstly, the belief that the anthropologi-
cal notion of worldview (and its associated single-world thesis) implies that all 
“communalities and particularities” will have to be placed in a “unidimensional 
continuum” is unwarranted—metaphysical pluralism has been recognized by 
many in anthropology for a very long time. If the argument, however, is that it is 
not only the content that changes between what he calls “cultures” but also the 
scheme, one is bound to respond, then, that the very scheme–content opposi-
tion must be cast aside (see davidson 1974). 
Secondly, “a radical heterogeneity in cognition” is not a necessary alterna-
tive. radical surely is a matter of quantity (how radical?). If by radical we mean 
absolutely radical (i.e., no similarity in cognition whatsoever), then viveiros de 
castro would not be able to write the irst part of his sentence, nor would he 
be able to have obtained any knowledge of the Araweté form of life. But if by 
radical we mean a whole lot, than there is little argument to be had, since we all 
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agree on the complexity of metaphysical pluralism in the human world—we are 
all precisely, much like him, trying to establish the limits of human imagination.
to the contrary, according to tim Ingold, the principal problem with the 
concept of worldview is that it assumes that those who view diferent things do 
the viewing in just the same form. he does have a point here that deserves to 
be noted. he drawback, however, will be signiicantly reduced if we remember 
that, in the irst place, as he puts it, “diference is a function of positionality, 
within a continuous universe of relations” (2010: 353) and, in the second place, 
this is once again the product of a modern proclivity to presume that world is 
outside and view is inside. If we consider that world is everything that exists, we 
must conclude that it includes the embodied cognitive dispositions that make 
humans difer. Again, worldview is only a problem for so long as one continues 
(willingly or by lack of attention) to entertain a representationalist view of mind.
he coniguring of world happens within historical human sociality as a 
fuzzy process that remains ever incomplete—that is what gives rise both to the 
freedom of transcendence that levinas (1961) thematized and to the instabil-
ity of presence that Ernesto de martino observed ([1959] 2001). As a constant 
process of error correction (orientation and disorientation), the iguration of 
world is the result of the operation of indeterminacy and underdetermination, 
not the contrary. Furthermore, the material roots of more complex forms of 
propositional structuration (the sort of thing that anthropologists have called 
“cosmologies”) never wrench themselves free of basic cognition, of the embod-
ied organic dispositions of human beings. humans build the world of content-
bearing propositions in language and symbolic behavior by means of processes 
of imagination that are themselves embodied dispositions (namely, opposition, 
containment, reiication). I repeat: behind scafolded minds there always re-
main basic minds, as their absolute condition of possibility. he “poor” world 
of animals, as heidegger would have it, is the ground upon which worlding in 
humans is based. In short, the worldviews that ethnographers postulate can-
not possibly be described in representational fashion (as if they were “emic,” 
that is). his is why we need not worry about the fact that the Kiriwina never 
managed to explain to malinowski a theory of human reproduction that they 
manifestly possessed. he had to work it out on the basis of a multiplicity 
of observations of a varied nature: his abstraction, their structuration of the 
world.
In their monographs, ethnographers are primarily engaged in capturing 
the trends that result from numberless processes of fuzzy adjustment (error 
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correction) within actual historically shaped contexts of human sociality. A 
“tribe” does not “have” a “culture”; rather, humans are constantly coniguring 
their world and struggling with each other within it. And they do not do so 
necessarily only in conscious forms, by means of linguistically shared concepts. 
Intentionality as a future-directed engagement with world is going on all the 
time. As Peirce would note, “Any act of attention interprets an index; [but] it 
does not have to be an act that is a component of a thought” (Short 2007: 52). 
he epistemological status of a worldview, therefore, is that of a hypothesis 
built by the ethnographer; a worldview is the way the ethnographer found of 
identifying the central structuring elements in a historically delimited form of 
life. Ethnographers are not representing people’s thoughts, as the representa-
tionalist vulgate would have it; they are outlining the pathways within which 
persons are prone to move in the world. many methodological discussions over 
the past two decades might have been avoided if it had been clearly understood 
that (a) what the ethnographer describes is part of world, but (b) it exists as 
stochastic recurrence, not as mental content (“knowledge,” “ideas”). Worldviews 
are hypotheses, not anatomies, as david maybury-lewis brilliantly put it so 
long ago (1974: 295).
thE goAlpoStS oF prESEncE
let us now return to the idea that ethnographers are expected to clarify not only 
what beings there are for the people they study (their ontology) but also how 
these beings constitute meaningful relations within a world (their metaphysics). 
owing to the centrality of personhood, it cannot be a surprise that its modes 
of variation and its diverse forms of constitution should be one of the central 
topics of the ethnographic tradition. 
World as “the manifestness of beings . . .” (heidegger [1929/30] 1995: 304) 
arises in worlding, but it is through triangulation with other persons who are 
already persons in speciic ways that presence emerges, thus opening ego to 
propositional thinking.8 he process of ontogeny is one where the modes of 
8. Just to allay a justiied possible confusion, it is worth clarifying that, therefore, 
mine is not a “metaphysics of presence” in the sense that derrida gives to the word: 
“the doctrine of eternal, immutable presence that conceals and denies temporality, 
contingency, and change supposedly yielding objects of indubitable knowledge” 
(garrison 1999: 3).
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being person that are predominant in a particular social environment (a) mo-
bilize the organic person who is already engaged in worlding (_) to develop an 
arena of presence and action (`). his latter, therefore, is a bridge, a necessary 
mediator, between a being for whom the world manifests itself intentionally and 
a being for whom the world manifests itself propositionally. personal presence 
(`)—uncertain and evanescent as this presence may be—is nevertheless the 
condition for a full engagement in human sociality. As such, one of the central 
tasks confronting the ethnographer is to outline the parameters of personhood 
that characterize the speciic “form of life” that she is studying. 
We are bound, therefore, to focus on the notion of presence before we pro-
ceed, particularly in its association with action and transcendence. Whilst per-
sons are everywhere endowed with presence and attributable action, the manner 
in which this is done difers profoundly from social context to social context. 
modes of presence and of attribution of action can difer considerably across the 
ethnographic register (cf. pina-cabral 2002a: 105–27). Furthermore, examples 
of pluralized (and serial) presence, as in the case of spirit possession in São 
tomé Island (cf. valverde 2000) or in Brazilian Umbanda (cf. maggie 1975), 
demonstrate clearly that a uniied continuous presence (a self ), as naturalized by 
contemporary Anglo-American individualist ideology, should not be accepted 
as a valid description of personhood anywhere. And then again, the relation 
between presence and the attribution of action cannot also be assumed as sim-
ple. personal dividuality and mutuality have historically evinced very diverse 
modalities. We will return to this idea below. 
however, once again, the principal risk here for the comparativist is to suc-
cumb to the all-or-nothing fallacy. For, in spite of the diversity, the constitution 
of an arena of presence and action and the perceived need to safeguard it in the 
face of death, enslavement, or oppression are general features of human social-
ity—they are primary factors of experience. In the following discussion, I am 
particularly indebted to two totally unrelated accounts: Ernesto de martino’s 
ethnography of southern Italian magical formulas ([1959] 2015) and mark 
Johnston’s theological treatment of personhood and death (2010). What brings 
them together is that they both share a preoccupation with transcendence in 
their descriptions of personhood. heir aim is to show how personhood in so-
ciality necessarily transcends its bodily conditionings. hey both share a refusal 
to grant empirical validity to any form of supernaturalism (de martino [1959] 
2015: 93; Johnston 2010: 16) whilst, at the same time, aiming to capture the 
sense of personal transcendence that most ethnographers encounter when they 
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carry out ieldwork, and which we discussed in chapter 2 above. We now have 
the means to move the argument further.
In his study of lucanian magic formulas, de martino situates his indings 
within a deep and complex local intellectual and political history but, at the 
same time, he proposes a framework of analysis that has a broader human reach. 
he sees the practice of magic as a response to situations of “crisis,” which he 
characterizes as “the risk that the individual presence itself gets lost as a center 
of decision and choice, and drowns in a negation that strikes the very possibility 
of any cultural action at all” ([1959] 2015: 86–87). he sees these crises as corre-
sponding to “experiences of emptiness and depersonalization” (ibid.: 98), that is, 
the users of magic take recourse to magical means as a response to situations of 
“loss of authenticity of self and the world” (ibid.: 97). And whilst it is not likely 
that magic is efective organically, there is no doubt that it is highly efective in 
what de martino calls “a psychological-protective sense” (ibid.: 20).
A particularly valuable characteristic of his analysis9 is that he relates presence 
with action throughout his study and thus, much in the same way that the evi-
dence examined in this book suggests, treats person and world as coconstituted. 
much like mark Johnston (2010), when he examines the fear of death as a fear 
of loss of presence manifested in the incapacity to act, de martino emphasizes 
the importance of “being-there” and the need of the person to safeguard the loss 
of presence that results from “being-acted-upon.” hus, he outlines a mode of 
existence of personhood which is dynamic, in that it is not ever a inished prod-
uct, a permanent existence. rather, personhood is a condition that is in constant 
airmation through action and, thus, in permanent danger of being lost. 
he notion of “presence and action” encapsulates brilliantly this view of per-
sonal ontogeny as a menaced activity; one which is menaced in all three aspects 
of personhood. In this way, self-consciousness is no longer seen in representa-
tionalist manner as a settled afair, and bodily health is no longer approached 
as the absolute boundary condition of personhood. to the contrary, person be-
comes a dynamic of constitution of the three aspects. It subsequently achieves 
a form of structural transcendence in its hypostatization in the world of the 
living—and this, as we have learned from so many studies in medical anthro-
pology, applies to the whole person (_ + ` + a). much in the same way that 
Johnston (2010) insists that one’s personhood can outlive one’s body, so one’s 
“presence” (the awareness of self that launches relexive consciousness, ` ) cannot 
9. perhaps resulting from a reading of heidegger, as his translator notes (ibid.: 15–16).
152 World: AN ANthroPologICAl ExAmINAtIoN
ever be an achieved presence, but it is always an ongoing task—thus, both im-
manent and transcendental. In this view of person and world, as the personal 
condition expands its reach, it becomes more unstable. 
following this insight, we can now postulate two boundary conditions 
(goalposts) for personhood as arena of presence and action. he irst is being-
in-company, the second being-acted-upon. We return again to davidson’s notion 
of company: since a process of triangulation is what launches personal ontog-
eny, and since ontogeny proceeds throughout the person’s life, the immersion in 
complex social encounters (company) is a condition for presence. Without com-
pany, the conditions for survival of the arena of presence and action quickly fade 
away; a crisis of presence typically arises, leading to a reduction in the capacity 
for action. his is the reason why solitary coninement is one of the cruellest 
tortures that humans have devised for each other, as it leads to the erosion of 
personhood (cf. gallagher 2014). 
perhaps the best study of company in the anthropological record is monica 
Wilson’s study of the nyakyusa/ngonde of lake nyassa, and, in particular, of 
the concept of ukwangala—“good company,” that is, the enjoyment of the com-
pany of one’s equals (Wilson 1951, 1957, 1959). For the nyakyusa, wisdom and 
company go together with cleanliness and the airming of personal presence. A 
chief ’s councillor once told the Wilsons:
It is by conversing with our friends . . . that one gains wisdom (amahala); it is bad 
to sit quite still in men’s company. A man who does this is a fool; he learns no 
wisdom, he only has his own thought. moreover, a man who does not spend time 
with other people is always dirty, he does not compare himself with any friends. 
For we learn cleanliness of the body in company. . . . Wisdom and cleanliness are 
the two great things to be learnt in company. . . . It is better to live with other 
people. (Wilson 1951: 66)
here is, however, an aporetic side to company, since it is both the producer of 
presence and its destroyer. he nyakyusa call the disapproval of one’s fellows 
“the chilling breath of men,” for it produces personal dissolution, confusion of 
mind, and ill-health. he principal lesson we take from the nyakyusa, therefore, 
concerns the double-facedness of company; the way it constantly hovers be-
tween the two goalposts of presence.
he value of good fellowship with equals is constantly talked about by the 
nyakyusa, and it is dinned into boys from childhood that enjoyment and 
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morality alike consist in eating and drinking, in talking and learning, in the 
company of contemporaries.  .  .  . now, this very emphasis .  .  . is doubtless a 
relection of the di culty of achieving it. he frequent accusations of witchcraft 
and movement from one village to another are evidence of friction between fel-
low villagers. (Wilson 1951: 163) 
hus, the “python in the belly” of the defenders of company is the same as the 
one that lives in the bellies of the “destroyers of men” (the witches); the python 
both causes death and protects life. monica Wilson (1957) spends a consider-
able amount of efort showing how person and kinship emerge from the ritual 
manipulation of this complexity: “Witches are dangerous, but the very power 
which makes them dangerous also makes them valuable as ‘defenders’, for no 
distinction between the power of attack and defence is consistently maintained” 
(1951: 120). 
one of the fascinating features of her studies is the way in which she shows 
how company is qualiied by gender and how its manifestations bear forms of 
hegemony that oppress women by systemically reducing their presence. her 
study of the change to christianity and the way in which this afected nyakyusa 
modes of company is especially valuable, for it shows how forms of life change 
and how they change by relation to the very constitutive processes of person-
hood (Wilson 1959).
hus, when approaching company, we must always contemplate the other 
boundary condition of personhood: what de martino calls being-acted-upon, 
that is, “the experience of an individual presence that cannot manage to make 
itself present, and for this reason it lounders and externalizes in various forms 
both the attack and the resistance to it” ([1959] 2015: 62). to the extent that 
humans achieve presence, they do so in company and by intervening in world 
(see gallagher 2014). his is the case from the beginning, as colwyn trevarthen 
has noted: “children from the age of six months onwards .  .  . are starting to 
be part of culture. hey want a rich environment, with lots of diferent kinds 
of people doing diferent things, not totally unfamiliar. It is to build a kind of 
working community, with jobs.”10 
10. Extract of oral communication in
 http://www.educationscotland.gov.uk/earlyyears/prebirthtothree/
nationalguidance/conversations/colwyntrevarthen.asp (accessed 30 november 
2014—no longer available; cf. trevarthen 1990).
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he importance of exercising action for developing and sustaining person-
hood cannot be suiciently emphasized, as it is through engagement with world 
that people conirm presence, and presence is a condition for propositional 
thinking, because it is a condition for relexivity. And the notion that world is 
out there beyond the person and that cognition is enclosed within the person’s 
mind is radically mistaken. to the contrary, if “meaning something is like going 
up to someone”—as Wittgenstein insisted ([1953] 1967: § 457) and radical 
embodied cognition conirmed (e.g., chemero 2009)—then thinking is a form 
of acting, and presence and action merge in important ways. he paradox of free 
will is no longer so di cult to contemplate; it becomes the always-uncertain 
negotiation of the transcendental space opened up between the two goalposts 
of presence.
For the nyakyusa, as much as for the lucanian peasants, being-in-company 
and being-acted-upon are constants of personhood; they are not contradictory, 
as they are part of the same process. hey merely push in opposite directions, 
thus revealing once again how personhood is always emotionally challenged 
(traumatic) in its condition as presence, for personhood airms itself to the 
extent that it transcends itself. 
thE crAdlE oF EthIcS
he historical origins of personhood lie outside of it, in person a, that is, the 
instantiations of personhood present in those who surround the organic person 
(_) in the original context of cohabitation. In turn, the origins of a are ultimately 
based in the evolutionary history of our species. Somewhere along the line hu-
mans developed a very sophisticated mode of communication, language, which 
was based on symbolic thinking and opened the door to presence (person `). 
gesturing and the fabrication of tools were evidently an integral part of that 
process of evolution. Since then, from person to person, the chain has never 
been broken and the efects on our world that this innovation has brought about 
(the enriching of the world, so to speak) cannot possibly be doubted. In fact, at 
this point, what we have to ask ourselves is whether the evolutionary success of 
our species is not threatening the survival of world.
hus, the process of transmission of frameworks of personhood (a) de-
mands that personal ontogeny be launched for each one of us; a process that 
is not inevitable and can be signiicantly reverted (as solitary coninement 
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exempliies—gallagher 2014). his means that, in order to share a world with 
proximate others, the infant has to be docile to their meanings, to their forms 
of occupation of world. Should the infant resist the speciicities of their use 
of signs (as in certain kinds of psychological deviance—see tomasello 2008: 
142–43), it will never become a full partner in their language games (and, by 
extension, their forms of life). here is great loss in that. Interpretive charity, 
therefore, is a condition for personhood and, prospectively, it is what opens the 
door of ethics to the new person. 
As it approaches personhood, in primary intersubjectivity, the infant already 
experiences personhood in a basic manner via its participation (à la lévy-Bruhl) 
in the carers and the joint worlding that occurs in shared intentionality with them. 
participation is made possible by the extended nature of the human mind, as we 
have increasingly become aware with recent developments in neuroscience—con-
trary to traditional belief, cognition is hardly limited to the brain: “We rely on 
the properties of the external medium to bear some of the problem-solving load” 
(clark 2014: 37). more than a semiotic disposition (a feature of propositional 
thought), mutuality of being is a cognitive condition.
he world that surrounds the child is formatted in ways that will eventually 
aford certain paths of meaning as the child develops its own personhood. he 
original disposition to accept the world one is brought into involves an inescap-
able docility (“charity,” Quine called it). he child can only create an arena of 
presence and action to the extent that it has accepted the meanings of others: 
that is, of more than one other and, characteristically, in a gender-plural context 
of cohabitation, as we have seen. one’s presence (one’s existence to oneself ) is 
predicated upon an experience of coresponsibility with those with whom one 
is solidary—our copresents, who coincide in our constitution of ourselves as 
a perspective upon world. As marilyn Strathern put it: “Being parts of others 
carries its own responsibility” (2005: 28). hus, presence and copresence exist 
in continuity, as not only is copresence anterior to presence, but singularity and 
plurality are constantly relating dynamically, so that presence is inhabited by 
copresence at all times. In sum, the futurity of others, as much as their pastness, 
is permanently part of one’s own condition before world.
In the launching of personhood, the original mutualities become solidari-
ties, that is, perspectives upon world that the person cannot simply cast away. 
coresponsibility, thus, is compelling. But there is an emotional tone in all of this 
(as heidegger and Sartre so often insisted) to the extent that presence emerges 
not from a conirmation of the arena of presence and action, but from a chal-
lenge to the child’s earlier identiications. As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
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original theater of ontogeny is such that the child’s identiication with its pri-
mary carer and its identiication with other carers come into conlict, giving rise 
to a traumatic sense of diferentiation, out of which the new person emerges. 
his triangulation is emotional because it involves a challenge to the shared 
intentionality the child continues to experience. hus, the personal discovery of 
self through cross-participation is traumatic. his is the cradle of ethics. 
In short, as it never allows the person fully to unmoor him- or herself from 
the meanings of others, all personhood is marked ab initio by domination to the 
extent that it involves an emotionally heavy dynamic of incomplete partition. 
As the person emerges from triangulation, its co-responsibilities produce an 
ambivalent condition: I experience my proximate other as one with me but, by 
relation to a third person, I ind that he or she becomes my competitor. Sociality 
depends on sharing common purposes leading to joint action—the constitution 
of value. But, once presence (`) has come about, sociality becomes a context of 
uncertainty. In this way, I come to be framed by the two goalposts of presence: I 
must be in company, yet I must resist being acted upon. here is danger in that 
condition, for personhood is an unsteady construction. his means that trust 
and betrayal emerge in humanity at the same time; they are corollaries of each 
other. Because the process of arousal of personhood is one of triangulation, pres-
ence cannot ever rid itself of the distance produced by the third party and of the 
emotional challenge thus constituted. 
he ambivalence of presence is something that Baroque thinkers elaborated 
upon in their day with great gusto; the aporias it opens up pleased their aesthetic 
sensibilities. he following quote from a sermon delivered by padre António 
vieira in 1640 in Brazil shines a bright (albeit metaphoric) light on what I 
have tried to capture in the paragraphs above. Speculating as to what the virgin 
mary might have felt after the Annunciation, when she had the presence of 
god growing in her womb, he explains that she felt very ambivalent about it; it 
confused her emotionally, since
a presence in order for it to be a presence must have something of an absence. 
he object of sight, in order for it to be seen, must be present; but if it is glued 
and united to same potency, it is as if it were absent; in order to be seen, it must 
be distant from the eyes. hus, presence in order to be a presence must not be 
intimate, nor totally united, but to the contrary a little distant. (vieira [1640] 
1959: 224)
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he paradoxical nature of personal presence that Father vieira captures so viv-
idly is due to the fact that it arises in the precise moment that separation comes 
about. It involves both proximity and distance; it involves surrendering to the 
other whilst resisting the pressures of others. to that extent presence is ambiva-
lent: that is, it is capable of profound entwinement as much as of schismatic 
eruption. human proximity is a gradual phenomenon on a scale that goes from 
one’s twin to the foreigner one meets by the side of the road, but our destiny for 
human collaboration bears an ever-present possibility of destruction. his is the 
moral of the story of Abel and cain and it is the message that the nyakyusa 
python has to teach us.
Each one of us as a person, therefore, has emerged onto a world where dom-
ination is always already instituted. We arise as persons to a set of responsibili-
ties, but these go way beyond our immediate environing fellows, for they are 
“written into” the surrounding world: they are part of a form of life. We have 
these responsibilities, not because we agree to have them, but because we cannot 
help having them. In engaging socially with each other, persons are accepting 
conigurations of power that, over time, institute themselves into hegemonies 
(see pina-cabral 1997 and 2002a). hese are recurrent uses of signs that cor-
respond to igurations of legitimate authority and that come to conigure the 
form of life as a ield of symbolic power (cf. Bourdieu 1991). one of the ethnog-
rapher’s most challenging tasks in proposing a worldview is to create a model 
of that.
his is not the place to develop at length this matter of power and domina-
tion, as it would require at least another book. But it is indispensable to note 
that the institution of presence occurs by relation to a set of solidarities, which I 
have called primary solidarities (2002b) to the extent that they are foundational 
of the person’s positioning within a form of life, that is, a hegemonically struc-
tured ield. herefore, the person emerges in ontogeny from a set of participa-
tions—not only with persons but also with socially marked features of his or 
her dwelling environment.11 hese mark the person’s position by relation to the 
more broadly shared categories of collective belonging. he primary solidari-
ties graft the person onto a set of continued identities in terms of iliation and 
alliance but also in things like class, race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, and so 
on. hey do so in terms of modes of iliation and alliance, modes of dwelling, 
11. I follow here mauss’ lesson concerning how the thing given is personiied (see 
mauss [1938] 1985 and Strathern 1984).
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modes of authority, modes of obtaining subsistence. All of these are central 
facets of what the ethnographer will have to take into account when proposing 
a worldview.
mEtAPhYSICAl PlUrAlISm
As we proceed in attempting to characterize the way in which forms of life 
are conigured, and namely how power relations pervade them systemically, the 
danger is to succumb to sociocentrism, that is, the disposition “according to 
which, in human multiplicity, the ego would be reduced to a part of a Whole, 
which reconstitutes itself in the image of an organism—or a concept—whose 
unity is the coherence of its members, or a comprehensive structure” (levinas 
1996: 165). 
from the preceding discussion, we can conirm that, indeed, levinas is 
right: the ontology and metaphysics which the ethnographer identiies within 
a form of life will always be (a) a constantly unachieved process, (b) manifested 
stochastically by the operation of complex processes of hegemony, and (c) sub-
ject to the modes of communication that characterize persons in their daily 
encounters: indeterminacy and underdetermination; polythetic association; and 
fuzzy structuration (see chapter 3). herefore, in determining what exists and 
how it exists for a person who is immersed in a particular form of life, the eth-
nographer has to abdicate from the certainties resulting from the operation of 
the Aristotelian laws of logic.12 
moreover, diferent times, diferent societies, and diferent persons live in 
a world that is diferently conigured, with diferent entities, that interrelate in 
diferent ways, but also a diversity of modes of iguration is available to each one 
of us at all times. In any single social context, one can observe the coexistence 
of diferent modes of iguration that can come into contrast, contradiction, and 
conlict. humans are metaphysically dynamic. here are even well-established, 
traditional ways of living with ontological diversity and instability. he very no-
tion of rite of passage and the long tradition of anthropological examination 
of instituted marginality is an acknowledgment of the workings of ontological 
instability within human sociality (see pina-cabral 1997). 
12. his was in fact lévy-Bruhl’s initial challenge that led him to propose the “law of 
participation” (see Keck 2008: 129–203).
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furthermore, as dividuality is an inescapable feature of personhood, meta-
physical pluralism is a function of personal constitution. his is even more evi-
dent once we take on board the notion that the arena of presence and action is 
capable of, and indeed prone to, compartmentalization.13 What this means is 
that metaphysical pluralism is not originally based on the confrontation of “cul-
tures” (as the radical relativists would have it), or the confrontation of persons 
with diferent conigurations of world based on diferent personal histories. he 
root of metaphysical pluralism is in the singular person itself—in the person’s 
capacity to isolate parts of his or her world from other parts. 
While we observe that there is a drive to create meaning by making the 
world cohere, it is not possible, nor indeed desirable, for it to go too far, since 
new participations are constantly emerging in a person’s life that enter into con-
lict with former or concomitant participations (not only with persons, but more 
broadly with aspects of world). Full metaphysical integration is not necessary 
for the establishment of presence, nor is it functionally advantageous in terms 
of the very process through which person is constituted. our reasons do not all 
add up, nor indeed should they if we are going to adapt to the challenges posed 
to us by the world that surrounds us. Ultimate rational integration is not a char-
acteristic of socially viable persons. 
however, we can now go one step further and state quite clearly that all 
ontology is predicated upon ontogeny. his is no game of words. rather, it is an 
important principle if we are to observe levinas’ warning and still safeguard 
the possibility of the ethnographic gesture. presence is the human door to 
transcendence; it illuminates the world, making it richer. Within propositional 
(symbolic) thought, therefore, the presence of other entities in world—persons, 
things, beings, patterns of action—is a function of my own presence. Essentially 
what is at stake here is that the institution of being-in-the-world can only be 
made by an agent who is already a being for him- or herself, possessing an arena 
of presence and action. his does not mean that all beings share the same condi-
tion of being as my own personal presence—metaphysical pluralism is the rule. 
But it does mean that they all interact with it as the sine qua non of human 
ontology. 
At this point, I must clarify that consciousness does not emerge in humans 
out of nothing. Again, the error is the assumption that we have an all-or-
nothing situation. to the contrary, it has been clear to many for a very long time 
13. See davidson’s suggestions in the wake of Freud (davidson 2004: 181)
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that all life contains elements of interiority that result from life’s efort to stay 
alive, its purposiveness (what Spinoza called conatus: “Everything, in so far as it 
is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being”—[1677] 2013: part III, prop. 
vI). to that extent, inspired by varela and damásio, Evan hompson argues 
that “the interiority of life is the interiority of selfhood, which is a precursor to 
the interiority of consciousness” (2007: 225). however (contra Kohn 2013), to 
identify this type of “minimal autopoietic selfhood” (hompson 2007: 162), as 
manifested by nonhuman forms of life, with the kind of selfhood which we as-
sociate with personal presence is a serious error, for it is a failure to see that the 
ontology of the world that we assume and operate with in our normal human 
linguistic exchanges is transcendent. In turn, this transcendence is only open to 
persons in ontogeny because they have, so to speak, moved out of themselves 
by means of the scafolding that symbolic (propositional) thinking permits. It is 
in this sense (not in one where we would reconstitute descartes’ summa divisio) 
that we mean that ontology is a function of ontogeny. to give Kohn’s example, 
if the forest is transcendent for his Kuna friends, it is because the Kuna are per-
sons endowed with presence.
But there is yet another important angle to consider. For each one of us, 
the world vanishes the moment our own arena of presence and action suc-
cumbs at death. nevertheless, whilst my world vanishes, I do not vanish from 
the world, since my presence and capacity for action remain to the extent that 
they are inscribed in other participations all around me. And, of course, we do 
not mean here exclusively participation in other persons (my proximate others 
whose presences are penetrated by mine), but also through other parts of world 
into which my presence has been inscribed. plato, confucius, and christ remain 
among the living all these many years later, for their actions continue to be felt 
in our world. But so do the presences of other no longer living persons of much 
more restricted import.14
In order to clarify the notion of worldview it is important to note that, 
within a single form of life, there can be diferent modes of apportioning pres-
ence and that these have a structuring efect upon that form of life. two modes 
of metaphysical pluralism will be exempliied here, as they have a foundational 
14. mark Johnston’s fascinating argument that personhood survives death but only to 
the extent that one was “good” in life is interesting and does require attention, but it 
involves a limitation to “goodness” that, unfortunately, cannot immediately be taken 
on board (2010).
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role, but one cannot exclude the possibility of there being yet other possible 
angles to metaphysical pluralism.
Ontological weight
As a form of life is reproduced from generation to generation as a habitus, cer-
tain entities and certain conigurations acquire greater centrality in its econo-
mies of meaning. hese are facets of the world that, for those who share that 
form of life, create a framework around which other facets of the world can 
arrange themselves meaningfully; thus, as meaning is favored by retentivity (see 
chapter 2), the centrality of these entities is instituted over time by the very 
process of constitution of meaning. 
Fortes ([1973] 1987) has shown how this works for personhood among the 
tallensi, when he argued that their notion of personhood was a variable to the 
extent that it is only after they die that some people (not all people) attain the 
full condition of personhood. It is not that other persons (women, young peo-
ple, men who die away from home, etc.) fail to exist as persons; it is rather that 
certain men exist more, they exist in a fuller way. But this applies also to other 
entities of our world that maximize meaning (and, to that extent, prop up igura-
tion). certain facets of the person or facets of the world come to “be” more than 
others; they assume greater ontological weight. It is not a matter of questioning 
the existence of other aspects, but rather a matter of conirmation; a greater 
readiness to airm the existence of these facets. certain parts of person or world 
are less prone to being silenced, they are more present. his notion came to my 
attention for the irst time, when I was studying the way in which personhood 
is manifested in naming practices. I came to the conclusion that certain facets of 
personhood were attributed greater ontological weight than others and that this 
was structurally signiicant in terms of the general coniguration of the naming 
systems and their relation to the forms of life to which they corresponded (see 
pina-cabral 2010c). For the ethnographer, it is immensely important to identify 
these, since they constitute central landmarks in the coniguration of worldview.
In order to exemplify what is meant here, I will recall a moment of epiphany 
during my work in rural Alto minho (nW portugal). By the time it came to 
pass, the main period of ieldwork was over and the thesis had already been 
examined. As I was now living in portugal, however, I could go back for shorter 
visits to see my friends in paço. I was preparing the version of the ethnography 
that was soon to be published (pina-cabral 1986). 
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my closest companion in Paço was a man everyone knew as morgado who 
was a passionate supporter of the “old ways,” that is to say, the peasant modes of 
living that were by then becoming obsolete and which were the central theme 
of my work. his was a fascination we both shared and our sincere friendship 
was rooted in it. he was a relatively wealthy peasant who bossed over a large, 
traditional-style household (casa) and who had never been tempted to migrate, 
unlike the majority of his coevals in minho. Although he was politically ag-
nostic (being prone toward distrusting human nature in general), he had been 
the parish president for the last decades of the fascist regime. his meant that, 
by the time I met him, after the 1974 democratic revolution, he was in a sort 
of forced retirement from public life; his cousin’s husband had become the new 
president. Still, he remained the undisputed authority on all that had to do with 
rural life. 
many of the people who had migrated in the late 1950s and 1960s were now 
returning home and investing their hard-earned savings in buying back the land 
that the wealthier townspeople had accumulated in the 1930s and 1940s, when 
conditions in rural regions in portugal had been dire. he dream of the returned 
migrant was to become a landed peasant with a large and colorful house facing 
the road. hat was their idea of the worthy life, even after all those decades liv-
ing and working in paris, lille, newark, or vancouver.
What they wanted to buy were not large tracts of land, but small plots grow-
ing maize, beans, and wine (vinho verde) in what is a hilly, well-irrigated region 
(Wateau 2000). Still, their parents had lost the land they had owned to the 
urban moneylenders or, alternatively, had had to endure hunger and misery in 
order not to sell it. his meant that their children who went away to France or 
the United States, upon their return, were desperate to show that they were not 
cabaneiros (lit. hut dwellers), people of no concern, who did not own land and, 
therefore, did not have a casa (house) worthy of the name. he land, not the 
building, turned out to be the central deining factor in deciding whether one 
truly had a “house” and, thus, whether one was truly a member of the commune 
(the freguesia).
As a result, by the early 1980s, on the morning that I went out to the ields 
down by the river with morgado, there were lots of people buying land and he 
was being regularly asked by the registry oice in town to work as a land asses-
sor. hroughout the whole district, he was oicially and unoicially recognized 
as the person who could give the last word on such matters. We arrived at the 
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designated plot—a reasonably good one, with a well-tended pergola all round 
it and a small stretch of forest with chestnut trees uphill from it. A canal that 
passed halfway through it irrigated the land. In this case, as I seem to remember, 
the plot was a disputed heritage. 
his was not the irst time I went out with him, and I had quickly learned 
his basic moves. he would start by dividing the land in easily measurable right-
angled triangles and thus, with three or four measures with his long string 
meter, he would ascertain its size in square meters. hen comes the part that 
constituted an epiphany to me. he would mentally reduce the land, whatever 
there was of it, to basic maize production and ascertain, from the quality of the 
soil and the nature of the irrigation, how many carts of maize such a piece of 
land might yield. (Carros de milho, the traditional land measure, refers to the old 
oxcarts that were by then no longer in use, assuming that they were illed with 
sheathed maize cobs.) hen he would add some value for the likely wine crop; 
then he would subtract the value of things like bad walls or delapidated pergo-
las; then he would subtract some for the part that was forested; then he would 
add more or less depending on the nature of the trees and whether they were 
above the main point of access to the plot or below it; then he would count in 
the fruit trees that might exist; then he would take into account the ease of reach 
from the main road; and so on. 
What struck me was that the land was essentially valued by how much 
maize it might produce, whether it was best suited for that purpose or not. his 
seemed extraordinary, since in fact the likelihood was that this particular plot, 
when sold, would be used for building a house. But, at that point, he had been 
asked to ascertain “the value of the land” and there was no doubt for him or for 
anybody else around (much as they certainly had not thought about it like I am 
putting it here) that the essential value of the land was what it would produce in 
terms of the staple food, maize bread (broa). 
At that point, I understood all of a sudden something that I felt I already 
knew but that I had not known how to say: maize had greater ontological weight 
than other foods, other parts of the world, and most other entities in general. I 
now understood why the central marker of value for a peasant “house” was the 
visible granary standing elegantly on its tall granite legs (igure 2). morgado’s 
one, standing proudly in the hillside in front of the door to his kitchen, had its 
woodwork painted in red, even although, these days, it no longer made any sense 
to store grain there, and it was mostly being used as a toolshed.
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Figure 2. A proud granary in Paço (ruth rosengarten, in Pina-Cabral [1993]2008).
his actually illuminated much of what I had already written in the thesis. And, 
in fact, retrospectively, I understood why I had felt it necessary to go through 
the trouble of researching certain things: to unearth the history of maize in the 
region; the details of the ritual of bread making and its implications for gender 
relations and household constitution; the central importance of female fertility 
in a region where marriage was essentially uxorilocal; the meaning of not hav-
ing land, not eating one’s own bread, and therefore being morally suspicious; 
how people claimed (against all likelihood) that they could taste with certainty 
whether or not a portion of maize bread was made in their “house”; why, in all 
the years I was there, I never managed to get anyone to provide me regularly 
with broa for a weekly price; and so on. I suddenly found a nexus between all of 
these things and many more.
In rural Alto minho, by the mid-twentieth century, this crop that had ar-
rived in the last decades of the eighteenth century had become the staple food 
and the mainstay of peasant living. heir world, contrary to that of the people 
in the towns and cities, was dependent on the notion that the good life was one 
where one produced one’s own food in one’s own land—and that was broa; all 
other foods were seen as additions to it. hus broa became the central mode of 
distinguishing those who had value, and therefore had a right to be there, from 
those who did not, and were therefore mere passing residents. heir persons, 
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their houses, their community, existed more or less to the extent that they were 
capable of ensuring their own subsistence from their own land by means of broa.
I should note here that this did not mean that the region was ever demon-
etarized. to the contrary, there has been money circulating in these hills since 
the Pax romana brought the population down from the hilltops to the riverside 
plots. later, minhoto peasants were in the forefront of Portuguese empire build-
ing at the onset of the modern Era and, later still, in the nineteenth century, 
of economic migration to Brazil, Europe, or North America. Ever since the 
ifteenth century, therefore, there had been men (and also, to a lesser extent, 
women) returning to these houses from all sorts of very distant places around the 
world (India, China, Africa, Brazil, Australia, North America). herefore, what 
was being celebrated with maize bread was not sustenance as such—for many of 
the returned migrants over the centuries had eaten plenty of very diverse foods 
throughout their travels or as sailors in the cod isheries of newfoundland. 
What was being celebrated by attributing greater ontological weight to 
maize and maize bread was its centrality in a certain form of life; the role it 
played in coniguring who each one of these persons was and desired to be. 
What surprised me, in a way, was how I suddenly was confronted with the pres-
ence of the past (the pastness) in a social situation where, indeed, the centrality 
of maize was no longer what it had been. I was surprised not by how things 
changed, but by how they survived. 
For each one of those people, maize did not “represent” anything; rather, it 
condensed a nexus of meanings that, in being shared and in acquiring hegem-
onic implications over a long period, became more present, more visible, more 
likely to be retained by each person in his or her daily dealings. no wonder that, 
after each meal, morgado’s wife would carefully gather the breadcrumbs left on 
the table top and spread them around the house outside the walls. his way the 
souls of the dead would eat them and be grateful, and thus leave the residents of 
the house alone, granting it prosperity. 
he way in which world is marked not only by the presence of entities but 
also by their relative ontological weight might equally well be exempliied by 
recourse to images such as the statues of the virgin, the nativity Scene, or the 
cruciixion that one encounters all over Europe. hese icons (and the stories 
that are told about them) facilitate access to a set of meanings; they constitute 
paradigmatic scenes (needham 1985: 67–69) to the extent that they trigger of 
retentivity. hey are modes of apportioning ontological weight, of reminding 
people what entities and actions are more present in the world.
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Ontological plurality
he second type of metaphysical pluralism is ontological plurality as exempli-
ied by göran Aijmer’s discussion of the matter: as he puts it, “life is a modal 
narration telling many alternate stories” (2001: 69). What concerns us here is 
the way in which forms of life need not cohere and, quite the contrary, gen-
erally seem to be based on modes of condensing signs that open more than 
one pathway of constitution of presence. In light of the emphasis on personal 
ontogeny in this book, it seems relevant to show how the very mode of pres-
ence of the person can be constructed in plural ways in any one speciic social 
environment. hus, the examples we will now examine all have to do with 
personhood and forms of deining continued identity by the manipulation of 
personal dividuality. 
he principal aim here is to show how diverse can be the forms of ontological 
plurality: in the irst example, one type of continued identity hides but does not 
eface the other; in the second example, two types of continued identity cohabit 
in a formally diversiied manner, producing a complex panoply of igurations; in 
a third ethnographic example, two modes of constructing the person enter into 
conlict, leading to creative equivocation. In this last case, metaphysical plural-
ism is manifested both in ontological weight and in ontological plurality. 
1. taking recourse to two classical ethnographies (Fei 1939; hsu [1948]; 
1967), Aijmer (2013, 2015) examines chinese attitudes to personhood in terms 
of childhood and of ancestry in order to highlight the ways in which the consti-
tution of continued identities is subject to a form of ontological pluralism. he 
argues that two ontological registers coexist in these ethnographic examples: 
one, more closely related to discursive processes, that emphasizes paternal ilia-
tion and agnatic group belonging—here the ancestral cult comes to the fore; the 
other, more closely related to iconic manifestations, where the person’s connec-
tion to the mother is silently but strongly emphasized—here the context of the 
kitchen and the Stove god is especially relevant.
I have in the past written about the analytical challenges posed by the pres-
ence of the Stove god in han kitchens, concluding that the contradiction 
that arises from the confrontation of the two asymmetrically related forms of 
continued identity that Aijmer identiies (the patriarchal and the uxorilateral) 
is actually constitutive of the chinese forms of being a person (pina-cabral 
1997: 38). here are diferent versions of the myth, but they mostly correspond 
to the tale of a man who, having betrayed and repudiated his good wife, wasted 
away his fortune in loose living. reduced to hunger, he is one day saved from 
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sure death by a wealthy woman who turns out to be his former wife. She takes 
him back into her home, for she considers that she never stopped being his wife. 
Coming to his senses, and seeing how shamefully he has behaved, he throws 
himself into the hearth, committing suicide. he Emperor of heaven, seeing 
that he has truly repented, makes him the Stove god. Since then, he has been 
placed above all stoves and, at new year, he goes back to visit heaven for a few 
days to report on the way in which each particular household is being run. 
here is a central ambiguity to this myth, for it is the man who repents who 
is made into a god and not his brave and faithful wife. So, we might be led to 
assume that the story reinforces the spirit of han patriarchalism. And yet from 
within the story comes a strong reminder that, although women are marginal 
to the family, they are the very source of fertility and prosperity, as demon-
strated by the ethnographic material described by hsu and Fei that Aijmer 
revisits. he story enshrines meanings and messages that run counter to the 
everyday assumptions but which cohabit with them in a penumbral, subdued 
condition. outwardly, the Stove god seems to reinforce patriarchalist assump-
tions, but inwardly he reveals the complexity of the family’s dependence on 
women. We see here, therefore, a clash between two continued identities that 
are foundational of personal presence and yet imply a structure of domination. 
hey are expressed mostly in diferent contexts and times (discursive v. iconic, 
hall v. kitchen) and are left to produce their diferent modes of condensation in 
an ontologically pluralist fashion. But they are markers of the continued identi-
ties that go into forming the arenas of presence and action of the persons raised 
in these households.
If, indeed, regular social living depends on the acceptance of legitimated 
forms of domination (hegemony), the mere presence in everyday social inter-
course of those who are not favored by that hegemonic order implies necessarily 
that the possibility of an alternative order is never fully eradicated. ontological 
pluralism must, then, be seen as a constant challenge to a form of life, and it is 
up to the ethnographer in her account of worldview to capture how that pos-
sibility is characteristically conigured.
2. A further interesting example can be found in the innovative work of 
Klaus hamberger (2011) on kinship in the ouatchi plateau (togo). here the 
author shows how everyday kinship depends on two kinds of continued identi-
ties that are conceived and manipulated by recourse to two diferent modes of 
association. contrary to the chinese example above, he argues that there is 
no particular repression of one form of association over the other. In fact, he 
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demonstrates how complex and rich can be the modes of ontological plurality 
to which the simultaneous recourse to these two forms of institution of personal 
presence give rise.
A correlation is established between agnatic participation and metonymy, 
and another between uterine participation and metaphor. hey are two modes of 
understanding continued identity. over and above mere diference, the two re-
gimes of personal participation are elaborated in diferent manners, according to 
whether contiguity or similarity, respectively, are emphasized. hus, male-related 
people are in contiguity with each other in the household; while female-related 
people stand for each other before the gods. System emerges from the combina-
tion of the two principles, so that agnatic kin turn out to be coresident and exer-
cise outward control over the political system; while uterine kin reside separately 
but share with each other greater spiritual identiication and mutual support. 
A signiicant level of complexity is achieved as the two principles are com-
bined and explored in diferent facets of the world, particularly as the religious 
and political components interpenetrate. What hamberger argues is that, whilst 
previously the attention of ethnographers had focused on the visibility of the 
coresident agnatic kin group, this led them to see only part of the picture and to 
fail to see the nexus in much of what was going on in ritual life. he sustains that 
the worldview should not be formulated as a bilineal system of descent; rather, 
it is a worldview where ontological plurality is being explored systematically at 
all points in the constitution of person and world. As they use one or another of 
the two analogical modes of association (metaphor or metonymy), each person 
is drawing on diferent parts of being. As this is done by everyone over time, a 
complex system emerges that is not essentially about kinship per se but about 
world: a world where two registers of apportioning presence are systematically 
being engaged.
3. he third example is taken from ieldwork carried out in macau in the 
1990s in the hope of showing how metaphysical pluralism can manifest itself 
jointly in terms of ontological weight and ontological plurality. his small territo-
ry in southern china was administered by the portuguese from the mid-sixteenth 
century to december 1999. Whilst the majority of the population throughout 
the city’s long history was always cantonese (both the wealthier and the poorer), 
the top administrators were high oicials sent from goa and later lisbon to se-
cure portuguese rule. In practical terms, however, the city was run by a Eurasian 
administrative middle class whose fortunes waxed and waned repeatedly during 
the past ive centuries. hey originated in the mid-ifteenth century in the creole 
169WorldVIEW
population which was formed around Portuguese malacca and which remained 
in place after the Portuguese lost the control of naval commerce, playing the 
role of mediators and compradores throughout the coastal regions of South and 
Southeast Asia. Some of the central evil igures in Conrad’s Eastern novels, for 
example, are “Portuguese of the orient” (e.g., Almayer’s folly or Lord Jim). 
I was asked to study this Eurasian administrative class in macau during the 
transition Period (1987–99), as they anxiously prepared for what would be a 
major political and economic change of condition. hey were to lose the mo-
nopoly over the city’s administrative structure (“their privilege,” as they called 
it) to the hands of the local cantonese middle class (cf. pina-cabral 2002a). 
As it happens, today, they remain an important presence, although the city that 
has emerged from the new geopolitical order, in which the chinese state has 
a world-dominant position, has totally changed. hey adapted well to the new 
conditions of extreme wealth, as the city became the world’s largest casino and 
a global money-laundering den of major proportions.
one of the irst characteristics that came to my attention as I studied their 
presence in the city in the 1990s was the matter of personal naming. most of 
the Eurasian population lived in an ambiguous linguistic world in which can-
tonese, portuguese, and English mixed freely. he vocal allegiance to European 
ways that had characterized the colonial period had come to an end in 1976, 
when the new democratic portuguese state withdrew its military presence from 
the territory, thus signaling that its rule would eventually come to an end. Fur-
thermore, as china opened itself in the 1980s and 1990s to global consumer 
and media trends, young Eurasians were increasingly drawn to chinese forms 
of sociability (particularly with the media of taiwan and hong Kong as domi-
nant references). he result was a population that constantly had to negotiate 
their cultural abilities and allegiances.
chinese and portuguese naming practices difer very signiicantly, and I 
soon came to realize that the ubiquitous visiting cards that one was constant-
ly exchanging as one was introduced to new people and negotiated one’s way 
through the city’s administrative and commercial spaces were far less straight-
forward than they seemed. one side was written in alphabetic form, and wheth-
er one’s name was originally portuguese, English, or Filipino, it was written 
in such a way as to be clearly readable to a portuguese- or English-speaking 
audience. he other side was written in chinese characters and, again, whatever 
one’s original name, it was adapted to be read by a chinese person. So far, so 
good. he problem was that, when one started trying to compare the two sides 
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of the same card, one found that, whilst they corresponded to each other, they 
did not correspond in the same way.15
he principal diference was in the actual name. Apart from the order of 
the names being diferent (the surname coming irst on the chinese side), the 
names of chinese people were translated on the alphabetic side diferently from 
how portuguese names were translated on the other side, in the case of both 
proper names and surnames. most chinese people have adopted a European-
style irst name (mike, John, miguel, Irene, Stella, etc.) that they readily use 
on the alphabetic side of their card. to the contrary, European names were 
presented in chinese characters in metonymic continuity with the original 
portuguese name (it could be either one of the person’s surnames or one of their 
proper names, depending on the translator’s fancy). his was done, however, in 
such a way as the irst syllable was always made to correspond to a recognizable 
cantonese patronymic (e.g., lourenço  lo len-So; cabral  Ka pak-lo). 
his was a way of facilitating recognition for chinese people, whilst making the 
European person in question appear a little more respectable to chinese eyes. 
Indeed, if the surname were not recognizable to a cantonese ear as a patro-
nymic, this would make the person sound comic. 
chinese patronymics were phonetically recognizable and integral on the al-
phabetic side; to the contrary, portuguese surnames were being metonymically 
transformed to correspond to chinese traditional patronymics. In fact, it turns 
out that—once one goes past supericial appearances—portuguese surnames are 
not entities of the same nature, with the same properties, as chinese patronym-
ics, and that was the reason for the asymmetry. But neither are proper names, 
since the centrality of baptism and the person’s spiritual name that is an impor-
tant facet of Western European traditions is totally absent from the chinese 
cultural universe. moreover, on the visiting cards, chinese proper names were 
never translated literally or adapted to sound European, as their connotations 
would sound ridiculous to a portuguese subject.
he ontological weight of the distinct parts of personal names is very dif-
ferent in portuguese and chinese. Whilst, in the portuguese case, the proper 
name has a decisive priority over the surname and describes the person more 
15. For discussions of naming practices in macau, see pina-cabral (2002a, 2010b). A 
further feature deserving of attention which will not be dealt with here is that, in 
macau, chinese toponymy and portuguese toponymy very seldom correspond, so 
that very often the addresses on each side of the card were not direct translations of 
each other.
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fundamentally (being the baptismal name—cf. Pina-Cabral 2012b), the con-
trary is the case in the Chinese system, where agnatic descent is empha-
sized. he option of using the mother’s surname instead of the father’s, or 
of combining them in creative ways, as is so characteristic of portuguese 
naming systems, was utterly repellent to a traditional chinese person.16 As it 
turns out, the diferent order of the names was signiicant: diverse ontologi-
cal weights were being granted to distinct parts of the name, relecting the 
way in which persons are constituted diferently in the two traditions (pina-
cabral 2002a).
he interesting characteristic of macau, of the Eurasians, and of these cards 
that were such an integral part of the daily life of this town is that both tradi-
tions were constantly present. Whether we understood the diferences in nam-
ing systems or whether we manipulated the diferences without being aware 
of them, which was mostly the case, the fact is that we were all navigating an 
environment where the diferent implications of the diferent uses had speciic 
relevance to each and every one of us. he derisive laughter that I heard from 
my portuguese companions about the chinese use of names was the same as I 
heard from my chinese companions about the portuguese. 
Ethnic grit and personal pride were being negotiated through name use, 
which is something that is relevant to each and every person who is living in the 
city. ontological pluralism, in fact, permeated the daily negotiations of name 
use for everyone. For the younger Eurasians, however, whose portuguese name 
was no longer really as important as it had been for their parents; whose knowl-
edge of cantonese had improved tremendously; and who were using patronym-
ics on the chinese side of their cards that their ancestors had already been using 
for generations, the equivocations present in the naming systems constituted 
both a source of weakness and a useful tool for negotiating the intercultural gap. 
hey navigated the border of ontological pluralism in such a way as to make 
those equivocations compatible (see pina-cabral 2010b).
to sum up, the world of persons is metaphysically unstable owing to its 
ontological dependence on personal presence and, in turn, personal presence 
is ever incomplete and dynamic owing to personal partibility: the world of hu-
mans is one and it is many.
16. It seems that new forms of naming are emerging today, as a result of an adaptation 
to the one-child policy. It is too early, however, to know how this will eventually 
alter traditional chinese family practices.
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CoNClUSIoN: oN rElAtIoN17
In conclusion, I propose that the discovery that ontological weight and onto-
logical pluralism are inescapable features of worldviews can help us open up the 
way toward clarifying one of the thornier issues in anthropology: What is the 
nature of relation (as in a relation, social relations, relatedness, relationality)? 
Ever since that strange and provocative inaugural lecture delivered by marilyn 
Strathern in Cambridge in 1994 (Strathern 1995), we have known that the 
matter is not paciic, as had been assumed by all up until then. She returns to it 
in Partial connections (2004), but without proposing a more decisive answer. fi-
nally, in Kinship, law and the unexpected, she advances the debate signiicantly by 
stressing the “embeddedness of relational thinking in the way Euro-Americans 
come to know the world” (2005: viii).
Strathern deines relationality in terms of “relationships,” following Alfred 
gell in using the concepts of relation and relationship interchangeably and then 
in understanding the relata as social agents (ibid.: 170, n. 11). She points out 
that, at the time of the Enlightenment, scientists developed a “special tool” of 
knowledge that operates by analogically encompassing a distinction—she calls 
it a “duplex.” hese duplexes are instances of analogical mediation to the extent 
that they are semiotic tools the aim of which is to overcome (or bypass) a dis-
tinction. She concludes that “the duplexes mentioned here . . . that belong to 
no single logical order, and appear to summon diverse materials, are all tools 
for grasping facets of one world. hat world is known not only from diferent 
viewpoints but also from speciically divergent, that is, related, ones. Any of 
the divergences . . . produces the ‘relation’.” (ibid.: 13, my emphasis) hus, for 
example, anthropology uses relations in order to study relations. Strathern’s own 
analysis would then be a case of raising this duplex to the power of two.
Unfortunately, I worry that her highly sophisticated historical exegesis may 
fail to respond to one of the principal challenges that confronts ethnographic 
theory today: namely, the need to overcome the primitivist polarization be-
tween the West and the rest, freeing ethnography from ethnic/nationalist 
identity politics, and opening it ecumenically to all. hat is, Strathern’s analy-
sis remains enclosed within the cosmological divide between, to one side, the 
17. his section expounds an approach that is ethnographically tested in the inal 
section of pina-cabral and Silva (2013).
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Euro-Americans18 and, to the other side, the melanesians (the Strathernian 
prototype of the other). In this sense, and as we saw above, like many of our 
contemporary theorists, her approach is a form of metaphysical agnosticism, in 
that she places her own analysis squarely within the very polarizations that she 
critiques.
It is well beyond the scope of this book to discuss “relation” from either 
a logical or a physical point of view, so we will limit ourselves to our central 
concern: how persons come to relate to each other and to world. But we must 
do this in a nonanthropocentric fashion, for humans are also animals and they 
live in a physical world (i.e., with its own “agencies,” if you wish). hat is, we 
cannot assume that all relations are social relations or that social relations are 
exclusively facts of consciousness and therefore that their existence depends on 
their essence as “knowledge” (i.e., as ideas in the mind of propositionally relex-
ive persons). In adopting a theory of afordances—relations between animals 
and world—we vow to overcome the semiotic reduction that treats all rela-
tions as forms of knowledge. As relations, afordances are indeed tools (zeug, 
in heidegger’s original sense) in the in-formation of world (by that, as we saw 
above, we mean a purposeful engagement with world). But their essence de-
pends on their existence and their existence is not uniquely a matter of propo-
sitionally constituted minds. 
In characteristic fashion, Strathern is well aware of this and of the problems 
it raises: “positivism and its critiques develop together. hey are both—overtly 
or not—an outcome of scientiic thinking insofar as they put ‘knowledge’ at the 
forefront of relational endeavour and can imagine diferent approaches to it” 
(2005: 42). But the problem is that, if we continue to rely on “knowledge” as our 
central analytical category, we are constrained to treat information as the prod-
uct of knowledge (e.g., ibid.: 35). his brings about two main unwanted results. 
Firstly, we objectify the pathways of human imagination as representations, that 
is, we deal with the modes of processing and communicating information as 
18. Apologetically typiied by her by the English (ibid.: 43), but with the notable 
exception of portuguese-speakers (ibid.: 180). Ever since her Inaugural lecture in 
1994, I and my portuguese colleagues have failed to understand precisely what she 
has in mind in reproducing this strangely unsubstantiated claim. As Spanish is 
grammatically and lexically so akin to portuguese (the major diference being in 
pronounciation), does this also include her own Spanish-speaking disciples? does 
it include French-trained Brazilians, such as viveiros de castro? A truly puzzling 
matter.
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objects of the mind (concepts). Secondly, we conjoin sociocentrically a collec-
tively held disposition with the actual processes occurring in persons’ minds. In 
this dual way, the role of basic mind is obscured, and as Alberto Corsín would 
put it, we fail to account for “the residues that [relexive] thought proportions 
out of itself ” (2004: 17, original emphasis). 
If, then, we are to avoid these hurdles, we must not start our discussions, in 
characteristic ethnographic fashion, by reference to categories. For example, in 
this present argument, I might have started by attempting to deine a relation 
mathematically as an association, correspondence, or connection between two 
or more terms. But if I had done this, I would have immediately raised the 
duplex connection/disconnection that Strathern identiies. his is the old quan-
dary that constituted the hub of the classical debate between structural func-
tionalists and structuralists: to what extent does the relation afect the terms? 
And, by implication, to what extent are the terms constituted by the relation? 
more generally, as Strathern demonstrates, this is a quandary that has ac-
companied Anglo-American philosophical approaches to relation ever since 
the Enlightenment. We need not go as far back as locke. For instance, in a 
classical essay on the notion of relation, russell’s colleague g.E. moore (1919) 
distinguishes between two types of relation: internal—those where the relation 
changes the nature of the terms; and external—those where the relation does 
not afect the nature of the terms, that is, where the terms remain essentially 
the same as they would be if the relation had not been the case. his distinction 
is aimed at validating the view that entities have an existence beyond relations, 
which characterized the positivist and sociocentric preferences of many during 
the early part of the twentieth century. 
At midcentury again, george van Sant writes a paper where he proposes 
the notion of constitutive relations, which he exempliies as “a is the father of 
b” (1959: 28, his emphasis). According to him, a constitutive relation would be 
“one in which the relation itself conditions the referent” (there is only one father 
of a, he claims) (ibid.: 29). his example turns out to be especially interesting in 
light of Strathern’s recent work. We do in fact dispute that all relations of pa-
ternity are necessarily constitutive in this way, for relations of paternity need no 
longer be unique (both in terms of artiicial reproduction and in social terms).
At the end of his paper, however, van Sant wonders whether constitutive 
relations, such as he deined them, should be considered relations at all, since 
they are not simple. his means that, half a century after moore’s paper, the is-
sue seems to have remained a source of perplexity. Indeed, already moore had 
felt obliged to acknowledge that “no relational facts are completely analysable” 
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(ibid.: 44, his emphasis). he safeguarded his view that entities in the world 
are essentially nonrelational by diferentiating between relations and relational 
properties. But if relations are distinct from relational properties, then they are 
objects of the mind, categories, ideas. And if that is the case, where do we place 
the relation between relations and relational properties? his only postpones the 
problem, of course (i.e., it is a version of the homunculus paradox). Strathern calls 
this the “connection/disconnection duplex”: an analogical mediation (or imagi-
native equivocation) that allows for the analytical survival of the very notion of 
relation. Unfortunately, in order to dispel the equivocation, we would have had 
to (a) avoid deining relation in the received “Euro-American” way as prototypi-
cally characterized by a “relationship” and (b) we would have had to refuse to 
reify information as “knowledge” (2005: 35). It would seem, then, that roughly 
ifty years after van Sant, the paradox has not been clariied in a signiicant way.
In fact, as one looks back on philosophical discussions about relation, one ob-
serves that, somehow, iliation presents itself to Anglo-American philosophers 
as the prototype of all relations. his is no recent matter. As Strathern points 
out, “We know that nineteenth-century evolutionists looked to the connection 
between individuals (genealogies) to talk about connections (classiications) be-
tween nonhuman creatures and things” (ibid.: 46). But the analogy has contin-
ued to prosper to this day. A century ago, moore (1919) chose as the prototype 
of relation the paternity of kings, no less; at midcentury, van Sant gave as his 
irst example of relation “that the music of Beethoven fathered that of Brahms” 
(1959: 27); more recently, however, maternity seems to have become the favored 
choice (Bar-yam 2016). Even an author like John ryder, who treats all relations 
as intrinsically constitutive, goes on to exemplify relations in general by human 
relations in particular (2013: 70). nevertheless, for him, all relations imply an 
element of interaction, which does suggest a path out of the original quandary.
his sociocentric proclivity to typify relation by means of iliation turns out 
to raise yet another problem: as it happens, “Euro-American” anthropologists do 
not agree at all concerning the meaning of the concept “iliation” (e.g., Bonte, 
porqueres and Wilgaux 2011). now, one suspects that, from a lévi-Straussian 
(French) perspective on iliation, the problem of relations would pose itself in a 
rather distinct fashion than to the Anglo-Americans, since lévi-Strauss adopts 
an explicitly interactionist approach to relations.19 
19. Which again points to a large ield of equivocation in the reading of deleuze or 
derrida by many of the so-called ontologists.
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In any case, relations among persons (or between persons and the socially 
salient features of their surrounding environment) are constitutive in a particu-
lar way that does not apply to all relations in general, such as those between the 
sun and the moon, between the fork and the dish, or between two letters of the 
alphabet. Again, the reason I diferentiate these two kinds of relations is not to 
do with agency versus inertness, as the followers of latour would be sure to cri-
tique; neither is it because I contemplate the existence of nonrelational entities, 
as ryder would protest. rather, relations that involve personal ontogeny are a 
bad analogy for the more generic condition of being relational in world because 
ontogenetically constitutive relations are propositionally scafolded in ways that 
other relations are not. persons are not only particular, they also are possessed of 
an immanent transcendence. While it can be argued that there is an emergent 
form of transcendence associated to the purposiveness of all forms of sociality 
(as peirce would have it), it must nevertheless be acknowledged that the emer-
gence of personhood potentiates transcendence in a powerful way. to use social 
relations (relationships) as the prototype of relations is to facilitate the works of 
the cogito disposition, which splits mind away from world.
As we have seen, for persons, being-in-the-world is being-with-others; 
place is always marked by sociality, since alterity is anterior. Filiation, in par-
ticular, implies a very speciic attribution of causality leading to participation 
between the persons involved. Before the recent days of paternity testing, pater-
nal iliation in particular was legally and socially deined as an unveriiable (thus 
classiicatory) assumption, a matter of “knowledge” rather than “observation.” 
By treating all relations as being akin to paternal iliation, Anglo-American 
philosophers succumbed to the sociocentric proneness to situate relations as 
propositional facts, suggesting that things may exist in some essential way in-
dependently of their relations. hus, by analogically generalizing transcendence, 
they adopted a position where essence and existence drifted apart. moreover, 
in so doing, they silently and indirectly validated the ontological diferentiation 
between organic and moral iliation—the old paradox of nature/nurture that 
continues to befuddle kinship theorists to this day. his is a serious problem 
with the notion of “relatedness” that has played such a signiicant role in kinship 
studies over the past decade (see carsten 2004: 82).
An alternative route emerges from our earlier discussions. humans engage 
relationally with world in varied ways. he afordances that surround us are 
relations that provide us with invitations to act. hus, I have a relation with the 
sound of the ireman’s bell in my village, with the tree that stands out at the top 
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of the hill behind my home, with the size of the door of the café, with the person 
next to me in the suburban train, with the key to my oice, and so on. hese, 
however, are relations that in the normal run of things do not afect me consti-
tutively as a person. hey may or not come to be elaborated propositionally, but 
they are not constitutive of my arena of presence and action. his does not mean 
that they are “external” in the sense deined by moore, for indeed I ind ryder’s 
approach more appealing, as it implies that all relations possess an element of 
interaction (the theory that moore had meant to disprove).
now, contrary to the examples I gave above, the signet ring my grandfather 
left me in his will, the Aborigines’ totem animal, my mother’s wedding dress, 
the consecrated host, my own sister, Edward vII for george v, to use moore’s 
example—all of these are relations that (a) have been propositionally elaborated 
in very signiicant ways and (b) bear deep implications for the intrinsic nature 
of the arena of presence and action of the persons involved in the relation. to 
deine all relations by reference to ontogenetically constitutive relations of this 
kind is to forget both that all afordances can be recognized as relations in an 
intentional sense and that personhood as an emergent property is constituted 
propositionally through participation in secondary intersubjectivity.
hus, ontogenetically constitutive relations operate in a very diferent way to 
other relations. In a study about ova donors and recipients in contexts of assisted 
reproduction in great Britain, monica Konrad, a disciple of marilyn Strathern, 
manages to advance this discussion by exploring her own ethnographic mate-
rial (Konrad 2005). her analytic challenge is simple to state: English law at 
the time was very insistent on the need to keep absolute anonymity between 
ova donors and their recipients (and the eventual child who is born of the ex-
change). however, donors made the gift because they knew they were going 
to help somebody become fertile—symbolically, a heavy life-giving gesture. In 
turn, the recipients—and the people who ultimately result from their assisted 
pregnancies—knew that there was somebody who gave them the ova and with 
whom they were . . . related? he very biologistic tone of the activity of assisted 
reproduction alerts people to the fact that they are physically constituted by 
connections that are not “relations.” Furthermore, the maussian kind of socio-
centric reading of reciprocity does not work here either, since the eggs circulate 
only in one direction and there is no payment or expression of relatedness that 
could move in the contrary direction.
Konrad speculates on how a person would feel who knows that their mother, 
before conceiving them, had already donated gametes that would have given rise 
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to persons who may be living in one’s proximate environment. She claims, “he 
knowledge is instantly ‘relational’ since it exposes the existence ‘somewhere’ of 
a genetic half-sibling. It is relational, and speciically transilient in nature, be-
cause it sets up irrelational kinship” (ibid.: 118). Unfortunately, this concept of 
transilience, which Konrad devises, does not advance us at all since it bears no 
other meaning apart from the one she gives it. he problem is that the mean-
ing she gives it depends integrally on the concept of “irrelationality,” and that is 
precisely what we are trying to understand.
he issue she is trying to address is far more common in the ethnographic 
register than may at irst seem. one of the central aporias that vanda Silva and 
I attempted to respond to in our study of kinship relations among the poor 
periurban population of coastal Bahia is a manifestation of it (pina-cabral and 
Silva 2013). people were very explicit to us that the roots of kinship/house rela-
tions were in consideração, a very heavily weighed concept in their daily life that 
implied mutual attention, continued support, and long-term reciprocity. hus, 
a person who did not give “consideration” to a relative was denying that rela-
tion. he relation was as good as nonexistent, except that it did not fade away: 
it merely became dormant, it became a possibility, an emotionally disturbing 
repressed engagement. hese bad fathers, bad mothers, bad siblings, bad hus-
bands, bad friends, who fell out of the relational circle of a person never stopped 
being there in a latent condition, an irrelational condition, to use Konrad’s term. 
his is the quandary that we had to address.
he problem is that the very language of social anthropology does not facili-
tate our task, as we are constantly called to speak of “relating,” “by relation to,” 
“establish relationships with,” and so on, as if these were patently obvious things 
to characterize. he fact is that all relational language transports with itself an 
analytical trap: precisely because it is a “duplex,” the concept of relation produces 
a caesurist efect. I mean, it assumes (a) that we are speaking of something that 
occurs between two or more separate entities and (b) that the path between 
them is symmetric (see viveiros de castro 2007). plainly, neither of these is 
the case in the two examples we detailed above. here, we are faced with forms 
of . . . relating . . . that are not relational, because they involve a questioning of 
the very processes of generation of the entities related. Being fusional but not 
symmetric, they mobilize anterior alterity, as they place the one and the many in 
dynamic engagement (persons are dividual). 
As Konrad discovered, we are here at the limit of what is possible to say in 
scientiic speak, as we are confronted with such analytic monstrosities as the 
179WorldVIEW
notion of an “irrelational relation.” In both of the examples above, what is at 
stake is less who the persons involved think they are and more the traces of their 
generation in world. relations without consideração, much as relations subject 
to the schism of anonymity, never stop existing as a possibility because they 
were never only a matter of the management of categories; they were always 
something that emerged from the person’s intentional positioning in the world. 
Whoever has been in a certain place can never stop the fact of having been 
there, even if that positioning does not come to be propositionally formulated 
into an instituted relation (see Pina-Cabral 2011). Personal ontogeny is deeply 
historical and the relational practices that persons engage in within proposi-
tional communication are constantly being undermined, altered, and made sub-
ject to the becoming of people’s intentional engagement with world—which is 
fusional and not dualist. 
I conclude, therefore, that we must swap round the focus of our analy-
sis. If we are to follow Alberto Corsín’s advice (2004) and remain within the 
language of relatedness we must turn things around and, instead of treating 
personally constitutive relations as the prototype of all relations in sociocen-
tric fashion, treat them as a very special case of relation. he acknowledgment 
of such a relation is a propositional occurrence based on an experienced af-
fordance, not the actual afordance. he nature of the afordance can be very 
diverse: people are related to each other, the sun and the moon relate with each 
other, ants relate with humans, the letters of the alphabet are related, and so on. 
All of these are relations, but they are of very diverse nature. By propositionally 
instituting a relation (e.g., “his is my cat” or “he postman comes at 7 a.m.”), 
I place it within another ield of relatedness; I transform it into a recurrent 
occurrence within a form of life. It becomes a feature of the scafolding of 
mind. As persons live in a world that they construct propositionally, that they 
conigure, the instituting of these relations (i.e., their existence as recognizable 
occurrences independent of the speciic nature of the afordance at stake) is 
the process through which world is conigured but also through which persons 
are formed. 
his allows us to resolve the quandary posed by “irrelational relations.” So-
cial relations exist insofar as they have been propositionally instituted, otherwise 
they are merely afordances, links in a world formed of millions and trillions 
and more of efective causal ties that are not deserving of reaching human con-
science or of playing a role in human social life, but which do not, for all that, 
cease to exist.
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A social relation, therefore, is a function of the attribution of ontological 
weight to an association that is recognized by persons. here can be more and 
less relation, and there are even social relations that, because their ontological 
weight is denied, can lay dormant as mere potentialities. certain social relations 
are personally constitutive in an ontogenetic way, since they involve constitu-
tive participation between the persons or the persons and the parts of world 
that they specify. Filiation is a special way of being related that engages persons 
transcendentally in their relation with world. philosophers and anthropolo-
gists would be advised not to choose iliation as the prototypical example of 
relation, for transcendence is a function of personhood but not of all relational 
occurrences.
In turn, what ethnographers must attend to when they propose a worldview 
is how relations are instituted within a form of life, and that results not from 
there having been causal associations (afordances, such as a gamete donation or 
an unwanted pregnancy) but from the fact that ontological weight (more or less 
of it) was placed on them. I may choose to identify an afordance proposition-
ally: for example, the relation between the tree and the wall in my garden. But 
when I identify a social relation between two or more persons, I am doing more 
than that, for I am stating that the relational properties of these persons have 
interacted constitutively in a transcendental manner. to conclude, all acknowl-
edged relations carry within them the processes of their propositional constitu-
tion, but some of them are constitutive of the persons involved.
Epilogue
long ago, friedrich Waisman commented that “you may confute and kill a 
scientiic theory; a philosophy dies only of old age” (1968: 66). his observa-
tion applies much more broadly than he might have imagined: in the case of 
anthropology, we have been profoundly resistant to abandoning the analytical 
underpinnings of twentieth-century sociocentrism. 
I entered into anthropology in the early 1970s, at a time when it was bravely 
responding to the challenges posed by decolonization and the emergence of 
new and very brutal forms of imperialism. We knew we wanted to purge our 
discipline of its political and theoretical drawbacks, but we did not know what 
that involved. he sociocentric consensus of the classical period had never been 
total, but it was comfortable to the point of being irresistible. Every time you 
chipped of a piece of it, you thought you had done the job, but the hegemonic 
hulk continued to exercise its silent magnetic inluence. he political implica-
tions of anthropology’s engagement with imperialism seemed easy to decon-
struct, whilst, in fact, they remained to this day more opaque than we are keen to 
admit. But the epistemological implications of neo-Kantian sociocentrism took 
a long time to unravel. And the principal reason for that is that the cartesian 
epistemological framework provided great security. 
We wanted order and, when we found it no longer, like spoilt children, we 
succumbed to analytical dissolution. Instead of inding new paths for analysis, 
we gave up on analysis; instead of searching for new modes of comparison, 
we gave up on comparison. But, worse still, instead of looking for new ways 
to engage human transcendence, we simply succumbed to anthropological 
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agnosticism, taking recourse to the weak-kneed solution of postulating a tran-
scendental unreachable other. most of us did hold on to ethnography, however, 
as a perennial source of fascination, even as many of us wrongly abandoned the 
history of our discipline as a source of authority; we stopped being able to grasp 
the profound value of the humanist legacy that the anthropological tradition 
constitutes. Anthropology had its long moment of self-doubt.
over the decades I have come to be convinced that the principal reason for 
this sorry state of afairs is our distaste for messy thinking. We ind it hard to 
accept the complexity, ambivalence, and equivocation of real-life processes: the 
messiness of it all. Still, it is only in that direction that a new and more satisfac-
tory theoretical pathway may be pursued. he arena of presence and action is a 
mediating platform; therefore, it will ever hover in thin air. yet it is upon such 
an unsteady scafold that human propositional worlds are built. he price hu-
mans pay in order to transcend their intentional (animal) condition and achieve 
relexive (symbolic) thinking is to remain ever incomplete, ever uncertain, ever 
underdetermined, and decidedly indeterminate. Fuzzy logic (based on error cor-
rection) was developed to reproduce in machines the way humans control their 
everyday environment, and it was incredibly successful at doing just that, but, 
surprisingly, anthropologists never used it as a form of modeling how humans 
engage their environment. he notions of polythetic thinking, stochasticism, 
participation, partibility, dividuality, mutuality, equivocation, have met with ex-
treme resistance in anthropological circles. Social scientists ind it safer to stick 
to the underpinning certitudes that representationalist models provide, even 
after having encountered their limits more than a quarter-century ago.
AltErIty And trAnScEndEncE
It is not enough to stay with agnostic debunking; we have had too much of that 
over the years. Anthropology has to start working at reconstructing itself so as 
to be able to satisfy the needs of ethnographic theory. In particular, we have to 
abdicate decisively from the sort of primitivist fascination with the symmet-
ric other that has deined our discipline for far too long. note, however, this 
should not be understood as an argument in favor of refocusing the study of 
humans on sameness as opposed to diference. he issue here is not the substitu-
tion of a focus on the other by a focus on the Same, but rather how sameness 
and diference are to be conceived. We must move away from the sociocentric 
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emphasis on group-to-group, symmetric alterity (particularly when presented in 
the format of “us” v. “other”). rather, we must place the emphasis on the sort of 
anterior, asymmetric alterity that is foundational of all levels of human sociality 
(intrapersonal, interpersonal, and all the many collective levels). 
As it happens, we might have taken lessons from Kant on this topic: 
What concerns anthropology is always already there and never entirely given; 
what comes irst for anthropology is bound up with a time which in any case 
envelops it from a distance. It is not that the problem of the origin is unknown 
to it; on the contrary, it gives the problem back its true meaning, which is not to 
reveal and to isolate the irst time in a single instant, but to recover the temporal 
framework that, having already begun, is no less radical. he originary is not the 
really primitive, it is the truly temporal. (Foucault [1961] 2008: 92)
As anthropologists, alterity is our challenge. But not symmetric alterity—the 
epitome of which is the “West v. rest” polarity that drives rhetorically so many 
of our contemporary arguments. In time, all duality is ultimately unstable and, 
in any case, our capacity to grasp it is nothing but an embodied intuition. Alter-
ity is always already universally present and we have to explore it ethnographi-
cally everywhere. our guiding purpose, therefore, must be the examination of 
the anterior alterity that inheres in each and every one of us; the founding histo-
ricity as persons that endows us with world but an ambiguous world. paternalist 
primitivism—with its mesmerizing promise of radically alternative worlds and 
its fascination with mimetic diference—turns out to be an abdication from 
anthropology’s basic ethical responsibility as science. Anthropologists are prac-
titioners of a discipline that is not a Western one, but that must and does belong 
to all of humankind. his has to be seen both as an ethical and as an analytical 
injunction.
If we look over this past century of anthropological history, we have to con-
clude that the troubled fascination of tylor, Frazer, durkheim, and lévy-Bruhl 
with magic, religion, and spirituality remains central to our discipline. It would 
seem that there is some reason why transcendence challenges directly the an-
thropological project of studying the human condition. he quandaries it poses 
remain central to our present-day anthropological debates (e.g., Engelke 2002). 
his book attempts to demonstrate that those who, from within anthropol-
ogy, continue to engage the perplexities caused by the false polarization of mind 
and matter are laboring in a losing battle. transcendence is an inevitable and 
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ever-present characteristic of the human condition, and we would be better ad-
vised to search for it where it can readily be found: within ourselves as persons 
as well as in worlds afar. In so doing, we can then embrace the charms of our 
contemporary polydivinistic condition; we can come to terms with our own 
proneness to “superstition” (see Pina-Cabral 2014a). metaphysical pluralism in 
humans is not to be approached as a limitation, a law, a vicious recidivism. 
Quine’s lesson about human communication was that, once we give up on an 
all-or-nothing posture toward truth, these uncertainties and doubts stop being 
impediments and become tools for grappling with our uniquely human pres-
ence in world. rather than being forced to square the circle by denying our 
indeterminacy and underdetermination, thus being left to bemoan our loss of 
eternity, we are better of in accepting that our limitations as live embodied 
humans are our door to a more ecumenical and decidedly more humane poly-
divinistic acceptance of our immanent transcendence.
thE EthnogrAphIc gEStUrE
Ethnographic engagement is the lifeline of the anthropological undertaking, for 
it is what gives it an active connection with world. As an analytical engagement, 
it explores the human condition in ever-renewed light and, in this way, it pushes 
through the task of de-ethnocentriication, that is, the process of constant ques-
tioning of our limitations concerning what we know about human sociality and 
how it engages world. It is by its very nature a messy task that will never be 
exhausted, since the metaphysical dynamism of the human condition means 
that we will ever waver between diferent and new views of the world and the 
person; we will never settle to a inal truth. here is no defeatism in this position, 
nor is there a distrust of the possibility of engaging truth in our path through 
earth. to the contrary, the aim of this book was to demonstrate that veridical-
ity is a condition of human thinking and, therefore, of the scientiic enterprise. 
humans will always search for and ind truth; what they will not ind is the inal 
truth, as that is an absurd chimera. 
Ethnography is intrinsically a comparative activity—what makes a world-
view is not what it is per se but how it difers from other worldviews. he notion 
that there could be such a thing as “a straightforward ethnographic description” 
is part of naïve ontology; it should have been worked out of any anthropological 
student by the second year of his or her degree. Ethnography is comparative in 
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at least three senses: (a) by relation to the general anthropological discourse of 
the day and the debates that are in fashion; (b) by relation to what has already 
been written concerning the particular object of description (geographically and 
thematically); and (c) by relation to the private leanings, inclinations, and inter-
ests of the ethnographer. 
for this reason I have always preferred to avoid the concept of anthropology 
at home, since it promotes a simplistic reiication of the ethnographer’s home 
culture (the imperial “we” that continues to dominate the less sophisticated ver-
sions of the anthropological discourse—cf. pina-cabral 1992). now, this is ab-
surd as some of us have an interest in, for example, matters of fertility, whilst 
others have an interest in, say, death and grieving. others, still, have read a lot of 
malinowski or monica Wilson, but not enough Bateson, and will always have 
their inspirations marked by that background. Still others have political or ethi-
cal issues to address and respond to: feminism, racism, socialism, homophobia, 
human rights, and so on. 
he notion that, in writing ethnography, an ethnographer is necessarily 
comparing her “home” assumptions with those of the natives is an imperialist 
artifact, every year more absurd. It is up to us today to invent modes of carrying 
out our ethnography that correspond better to our postimperial, globalized con-
dition. his can only be done by working at an anthropology that is accessible to 
all, not by pretending that there can be many anthropologies, for the idea that 
each culture has its own anthropology is a dangerous truism. It is a false play on 
the meaning of the word anthropology that ends up serving the interests of those 
who are sitting in a position of global hegemony and for whom cultural incom-
mensurability is a useful ploy for avoiding the ethical challenges of comparison.
he ethnographic gesture, therefore, may be deined as the movement of a 
trained social scientist who goes somewhere in order to attempt to identify the 
central igurations and recurrent modes of engagement with world that inform 
a certain form of life. he aim of the ethnographer’s work is to propose a world-
view or to clarify an aspect thereof. It is not a discourse on discourses, for that 
would be to presume that one can separate understanding from world—both as 
far as the analyst and as far as the analyzed are concerned.
As a methodology of research, ethnography depends more directly than 
other less qualitative methods on the personal encounter of the ethnographer 
with the persons she studies. Its dependence on the achievement of mutual 
understanding based on the intersubjectivity that results from sharing a lived 
environment gives ethnography a particular empirical richness and qualiies it 
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ideally for its main aim: the de-ethnocentriication of our scientiic understand-
ing of social life. his concept, borrowed from pitt-rivers (1992), is of a piece 
with the minimalist realism espoused in this book. It assumes that our sociosci-
entiic task is never achieved and, like science, is ecumenical, in the sense that it 
corresponds to a process of ever-expanding human relevance. 
For this reason it seems adequate to designate as a “gesture” the disposition 
that moves the ethnographer. It is, indeed, a gesture to the extent that it neces-
sarily involves an ethical engagement in world with the particular form of life 
it aims to analyze and comparatively qualify. his is not only the strength of the 
ethnographer’s work, it is also her main challenge, for the personal nature of 
the understanding she achieves also means that readers cannot easily verify the 
veracity of what they are being told. Ultimately, the reader’s interpretive charity 
and the writer’s capacity to produce a verisimilitudinous impression (outlandish 
as what we are told may at irst seem) are the principal tools of our trade. hey 
have served us well over the decades, and we are fully justiied in trusting that 
they will continue to do so for a long time to come.
World FormIng
human immersion in space/time is unavoidable, for the afordances persons 
meet with are constantly evolving. here is no inal resting point in humanity’s 
course, no end to history. In fact, after the last human has died, human history 
will not come to an end for quite a while still, for humans ire up the world 
with the constant reiications that characterize their communicational endeav-
ors. human action moves the world and is moved by world in processes that 
constantly relect our social condition as live beings. 
Because it emerges traumatically, personhood is ethically challenged. Each 
one of us has to struggle permanently with the limits of his or her own core-
sponsibility because personal presence allows us to dissociate from our fellow 
humans. Although this dissociation cannot ever be complete, its efects are con-
tinuously felt in human social life; evil emerges in our propositional engagement 
with world. As levinas has noted, “It is the ethical claim upon me not to kill 
that persecutes me, and it persecutes me precisely because I may well be moved 
to kill or I may well have to resist my will at the moment the commandment not 
to kill is addressed to me” (in Butler 2012: 62). We all bear the mark of cain. 
But domination is anterior to that, as it is a function of sociality, a condition 
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for collective action. owing to our capacity to dissociate from our fellow hu-
mans (a byproduct of presence, our capacity to dissociate from ourselves), we 
can take it to extremes of self-destruction that no other species could ever con-
template. Every year we remember the horror of the nuclear bombs in Nagasaki 
and hiroshima, and yet every year, by paying our taxes, we contribute toward 
keeping those bombs alive.
As opposed to other species, humans are world forming. Not because other 
species fail to act on the world, but because, with the emergence of propositional 
thinking, we succeed in accessing world as if we were apart from it—we tran-
scend our immediate world. hus, we achieve forms of action that depend on 
highly complex systems of communication and that transcend our own personal 
reach very considerably. he scafolded world that results from our propositional 
engagements is richer than that of animals. I need hardly insist on this point by 
depositing further words into my imac.
over time, the distribution of legitimate power among humans gives rise 
to hegemonies: that is, reasonably stable conigurations of power. Each one of 
us enters a world that is both given and constructed; sociality constitutes forms 
of life by establishing a habitus. We are only free to question the conigurations 
of power to a point, and we are never free to move out of them, for they are a 
function of human sociality. yet we are ethically bound to ever query them, for 
whilst we are the bearers and reproducers of hegemony, we are also mutually 
engaged with those humans who are reduced by the tragically brutal ways in 
which human power can come to be instituted. personal presence is conditioned 
on an anterior alterity; we are deined by the burden of the sufering of others.
once personhood emerges, personal participation is ever reconstituting it-
self. however, although we have our primordial solidarities and they remain 
with us way beyond the ends of our organic lives, the process of triangulation is 
constant. As it results from triangulation, personhood as an emergent property 
is irst experienced by each one of us as a lack, not a completion. his means 
that space is always available for generic alterity to airm itself; place is always 
open to be shared, whether we want it or not. herefore, the anterior presence of 
others in the caring environment turns early personal ontogeny into a sharing 
of place. cohabiting is a foundational condition of personhood and, therefore, 
of humanity. hus, in personhood, place sharing (participation) is not an option; 
it is rather an imposed condition. he place of personhood will always also be 
someone else’s place. And, furthermore, it is not a speciic (individual) condition 
but a generic one, for it opens us up to future participations.
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his sharing of place is the basis for the universality of hospitality, as the 
other who arrives inds a space of occupation that is owed to them not through 
some sort of contract but because of the gap that anterior alterity always leaves 
open in sociality. As it occurs in time, containment, like opposition, always re-
mains incomplete. he condition of being a neighbor, therefore, is anterior to 
the condition of being a person. yet, once personhood is established, the pres-
ence of the other turns into an imposition. his means that the place of the 
neighbor is always ambivalent, for it is at one and the same time both a respon-
sibility one cherishes (a charity) and a responsibility that impinges upon one 
(a drudgery). his space-for-the-other afords both a charity one cannot deny 
and a drudgery one cannot avoid. Everyone who has had a guest knows of the 
ambiguity of hospitality; everyone who has had a sibling knows of the ambiva-
lence of sharing place (participation). 
And here we turn again to the deep wisdom of Anselm’s insight. When he 
used the words of Isaiah to argue that belief is a condition for understanding, he 
took recourse to the sharing of space (to dwelling) as his dominant metaphor. 
place and understanding are linked because reason only exists within communi-
cation and all communication occurs in spaces previously marked by our social 
historicity, providing all kinds of afordances. his is the case with all everyday 
environments, where the objects that surround us provide paths to meaning 
that are not, strictly speaking, semiotic and where things and locales that we are 
bound to use implicitly aford possibilities of action that are not propositionally 
transmitted.
hospitality is a general human proclivity, because the place of the other can 
never be closed, as the Warlpiri ethnography that we recalled above exempliies. 
Ethnography has relied on hospitality from the beginning as an afordance that 
provides it with one of its conditions of possibility, and if there is something that 
ethnography has demonstrated over the last century and a half in which it has 
been systematically practiced, it is that hospitality very rarely fails us. outside 
momentary situations of crisis, ethnographers have been able to rely on it ever 
since the discipline started. In fact, from the days in the sixteenth century when 
people like tomé pires or hans Staden wrote their visionary protoethnogra-
phies that so inspired montaigne, it has been clear that anthropology is a direct 
product of the more basic dispositions of humans, and in particular their prone-
ness for interpretive charity.
Anthropology, thus, is a part of that ever-uninished efort that humans 
undertake in history to move out of their own conditionings, to rise above 
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the limits of their environment. he possibility of transcendence with which 
personal presence has endowed us is the central drive through which we can 
achieve this. By engaging in ethnography (whether we do it around the corner 
or in some place we did not know before), we are placing ourselves in others’ 
shoes and exercising the limits of our imagination by entering a place that others 
cannot but have left open for us. Anthropology’s aim of de-ethnocentriication 
is dependent upon these basic human processes: shared intentionality leading 
to intersubjectivity; the capacity to transcend partially one’s condition through 
imagination; hospitality leading to human survival and social participation. 
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